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ABSTRACT 
 
The thesis characterises European Community (EC) regulation in terms of three 
levels of ideas, namely that: (a) the EC regulatory process is best understood by 
particular styles or processes of regulation that the thesis terms emulation, innovation 
and re-regulation; (b) there are particular determinants or causes of regulation that 
are best understood as regulatory competition, consensus and co-operation; and (c) a 
hypothesis can be derived from the review of associated literature to the effect that 
diffusion of ideas and policy learning leading to consensus and co-operation are often 
of greater significance than regulatory competition in the EC regulatory process. To 
this end, taking as a frame of reference the characterisation of styles or processes of 
regulation as emulation, innovation and re-regulation, the thesis challenges the 
assumption, prevalent in much of the literature, that the main determinant or cause of 
EC regulation is regulatory competition among member states seeking to enhance 
their own competitive position in the European market and reduce the costs 
associated with legal adjustment. Using evidence from case study material relating to 
EC regulation of insurance services and drinking water quality the thesis tests the 
hypothesis that, although the literature has stressed regulatory competition as the 
main determinant or cause of EC regulation, in practice diffusion of ideas and policy 
learning are likely to occur, leading to co-operation between actors in a manner that 
ensures the emergence of a broad consensus on the preferred EC regulatory 
approach without recourse to regulatory competition at all. The thesis finds that 
regulatory competition is not, in fact, the only determinant or cause of EC regulation. 
Instead, diffusion of ideas and policy learning leading to consensus and co-operation 
are of crucial importance and should be accorded greater significance in the 
literature than has been the case in the past. 
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CHARACTERISING EC REGULATION: 
EMULATION, INNOVATION, RE-REGULATION 
 
 
PREFACE 
 
 
This thesis is being undertaken for two reasons: the first derived from personal 
experience, the second relating to a need to shed further light on the European 
Community (EC) regulatory process. The former motivation has, perhaps not 
surprisingly, informed the latter reason for undertaking the thesis. 
 
In the late 1980s I worked for three years as an EC lobbyist, making the case in 
Brussels that some of the proposals for EC regulation contained in the European 
Commission’s 1985 White Paper on Completion of the Internal Market would have 
adverse effects on UK business. Once EC regulation introduced under auspices of the 
White Paper was in place, I then spent five years in the early 1990s engaged in 
research, based at the National Institute of Economic and Social Research in London, 
seeking to ascertain the actual impact of new EC regulation on UK business, with the 
aim of finding out whether particular measures had, in fact, had the adverse effects 
that were originally predicted.  In the course of the research, I had the opportunity to 
interview over seventy business people across a range of industry sectors. The 
willingness and enthusiasm of the interview participants to share their experiences of 
assimilating EC regulation into corporate practice ensured that the project was duly 
 9
completed and I subsequently took up the post of Jean Monnet Lecturer in the Law 
and Politics of European Integration at the University of Warwick. 
 
While I remain grateful to each of the industry experts for setting aside time to talk 
about their own, very practical, experiences of coping with the demands of new EC 
regulation, I am even more indebted to these individuals for the insight they offered 
into a much bigger picture of the EC regulatory process that at one level seems 
obvious but, in so many respects, is easily ignored in the mass of EC policy-making 
studies. 
 
Presented with the opportunity to answer a rather straightforward set of questions 
about the impact of EC regulation on their business operations, many of the interview 
participants responded that the answer could be found in the form and content of 
particular regulatory instruments: if EC legislation followed a regulatory approach 
derived from their domestic law, the requirements of EC regulation were not 
considered particularly onerous and on occasion even offered opportunities to exploit 
first mover advantages. Alternatively, if EC regulation followed a regulatory approach 
already tried and tested in one or more of the other EC member states, the result was 
likely to be that higher adaptation costs accrued as the UK companies struggled to 
comply with “foreign” regulatory cultures and new regulatory standards. But despite 
the expectation that high adaptation costs could well accrue from compliance with the 
requirements of foreign regulation, there was also widespread acceptance that it was 
generally efficient for prior national regulation to be identified as a Community-wide 
approach if such an approach was seen to have worked well elsewhere. 
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It was this set of responses from the interviewees that appeared to raise more 
questions than it actually answered. On the one hand, the impact of EC internal 
market regulation on UK industry could be recorded and reported. But, on the other 
hand, how could the similarity of EC regulation to existing national law and the 
widespread acceptance that a particular member state approach offered the most 
appropriate regulatory model for the Community simply be explained away? To me, 
this was particularly noteworthy in the case of EC regulation to liberalise insurance 
services, where prior regulation in the UK was ultimately consented to by other 
member states, who co-operated on adoption of the UK approach as the EC norm. The 
extent to which EC regulation so often resembles - or “emulates” - prior national 
regulation in this way provides an important frame of reference for this thesis. 
 
By the mid-1990s I had also become interested in EC environmental policy, 
particularly questions relating to the effectiveness of EC environmental regulation and 
its ability to achieve intended outcomes. Environmental policy was an area where a 
large number of EC regulatory initiatives had been undertaken since the early 1970s. 
But unlike some aspects of EC regulation relating, for example, to completion of the 
internal market EC environmental regulation was an area where it was more difficult 
to identify a close correlation between EC and prior national approaches. Instead, it 
appeared that EC environmental regulation was often more innovative than in some 
other policy areas, with innovative EC standard setting taking the lead where national 
regulation had previously been absent. In the absence of prior national standards, EC 
environmental regulation appeared more likely to be based on a command and control 
approach, setting maximum permissible pollution limits in relation, for example, to 
water quality on the basis of new scientific evidence about risks to health and the 
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environment. By relying on scientific evidence, the consensus in favour of EC 
environmental regulation appeared, initially at least, to have gone largely 
unchallenged by member states co-operating on a preferred regulatory approach to 
standard setting. Understanding the extent to which the style or process of EC 
regulation is characterised by innovation therefore provides the second 
characterisation or frame of reference for this thesis. 
 
As the impact of EC regulation begins to be felt, pressure increases for reviews of the 
appropriateness of EC regulatory standards and, if necessary, second round regulatory 
change to rectify the unintended consequences of first round regulation. In some 
instances clarification of how EC regulation should be applied is possible through a 
process of re-regulation. In the case of EC regulation to liberalise insurance services, 
re-regulation was required to provide clarification after the initial impact of the newly 
emulated regulatory approach had been felt. In other instances, however, the standards 
set initially by EC regulatory activity appear to have become embedded in the public 
consciousness, any perceived relaxation of those environmental standards as the result 
of re-regulation subsequently proving difficult to achieve. In the case of EC regulation 
of drinking water quality, second round change in the form of reappraisal and re-
regulation was difficult to achieve because any perceived relaxation of environmental 
protection standards was seen as politically unacceptable by the majority of member 
states. Regulatory entrenchment, rather than regulatory refinement, occurred as 
consensus and co-operation broke down. Re-regulation therefore provides a third, and 
final, frame of reference for this thesis. 
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It appeared to me, then, that emulation, innovation and re-regulation were all styles or 
processes of regulation that characterised the EC regulatory process. 
 
In the thesis emulation, innovation and re-regulation provide a valuable frame of 
reference for understanding the core argument to be presented here, namely that 
although “regulatory competition” is stressed as the main determinant or cause of EC 
regulation by authors such as Adrienne Héritier, such explanations are flawed.  
Héritier’s suggestion is that different member states seek to enhance their own 
competitive position in the European market and reduce costs associated with legal 
adjustment by attempting to push their own regulatory approach as that to be adopted 
as the EC norm, in preference to the approaches taken by other member states. The 
European Commission then chooses the regulatory approach that it wants to put on 
the EC legislative track from the multitude of policy proposals put forward by 
different member states. The thesis demonstrates, however that the validity of the 
“regulatory competition” model of Héritier and others, is not borne out by case study 
analysis. 
 
Although the literature on EC regulation has tended to stress the regulatory 
competition model as the main determinant or cause of EC regulation, the thesis 
argues that in practice diffusion of ideas and policy learning are in fact more likely to 
occur, leading to co-operation between actors in a manner that ensures the emergence 
of a broad consensus on the preferred EC regulatory approach without “regulatory 
competition” taking place at all. Demonstrating the validity of this argument is the 
task the thesis sets itself. 
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CHARACTERISING EC REGULATION: 
EMULATION, INNOVATION, RE-REGULATION 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Aims and objectives 
 
This thesis characterises European Community (EC) regulation in terms of three 
levels of ideas. At the first level, the thesis argues that the EC regulatory process can 
be best understood by particular styles or processes of regulation may be termed 
emulation, innovation and re-regulation. At the second level, the thesis suggests that 
the main determinants or causes of EC regulation can be best understood as regulatory 
competition, consensus and co-operation. At the third and final level, the thesis 
constructs a hypothesis derived from the review of relevant associated literature that 
diffusion and ideas and policy learning leading to consensus and co-operation are of 
greater significance than regulatory competition in the EC regulatory process. 
 
With regard to the first level of ideas the thesis presents evidence of the propensity for 
EC regulation to emulate prior national approaches in a case study of EC regulation to 
liberalise insurance services, which copied an earlier UK regulatory approach. The 
thesis then suggests that, as an alternative to emulation, regulatory innovation may 
occur, particularly when no prior national approach exists that can be readily copied 
and when scientific uncertainty drives new standard-setting initiatives. The thesis puts 
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forward evidence of regulatory innovation in a case study of EC regulation of 
drinking water quality. The thesis also acknowledges that re-regulation and 
clarification may be required after the initial impact of the newly regulated approach 
has been felt. Evidence of re-regulation is found in the case study of insurance 
services. However, the thesis goes on to argue that, once standards resulting from this 
initial process of regulatory innovation are in place, second round change in the form 
of reappraisal and re-regulation may be difficult to achieve. This may be the case even 
when compelling arguments can be made in favour of re-regulation on the basis of 
new scientific evidence because of a perception that the outcome of re-regulation may 
be a lowering of standards. Evidence of this type of regulatory entrenchment is put 
forward from the case study of EC regulation of drinking water. 
 
Context 
 
Using the characterisation of the EC regulatory process as emulation, innovation and 
re-regulation as a frame of reference for the thesis, the second and third levels of ideas 
then come into play. It will be recalled that the second level of ideas in the thesis is 
the suggestion that the main determinants or causes of EC regulation can be best 
understood as regulatory competition, consensus and co-operation. At the third level, 
the thesis is then able to construct a hypothesis derived from the review of relevant 
associated literature to the effect that diffusion and ideas and policy learning lead to 
consensus and co-operation, this being of greater significance in the EC regulatory 
process than regulatory competition. 
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In the established literature on the subject, the regulatory model (a term coined by 
Giandomenico Majone 1998a: 5) is firmly established as one of the main theoretical 
tools for understanding the evolution of the EC (Radaelli 2000: 133). It is generally 
accepted that EC regulation can have different outcomes for different national 
systems, depending on the similarities or differences between prior national regulation 
and the new EC regulatory approach in question. However, the process by which 
particular forms of EC regulation come about is less well understood. While legal 
scholars have focused their attention on legal interpretation and regulatory impact, 
comparatively little has been written by way of explanations of EC regulatory policy-
making that go beyond political scientists’ desire to ascertain what interests are at 
work in the EC policy process. Established explanations leave under-developed the 
question of how and why particular EC regulatory approaches are likely to emerge. 
 
Despite a general shortage of appropriate analytical tools for undertaking EC 
regulatory policy analysis there are some notable exceptions. In particular, Héritier 
(1996, 1999) and Majone (1998b) offer useful, if ultimately flawed, insights that can 
provide a starting point for this thesis. For Majone, the scarcity of EC regulatory 
policy analyses has been surprising and can only be explained by the absence of a 
suitable framework for analysis (Majone 1990: 30). This thesis seeks to contribute to 
the debate about what form a suitable framework for analysis should take – informing 
future debate by structuring our understanding of the EC regulatory process. 
 
In one sense, analysts of regulatory processes have not been slow to suggest ways this 
might be achieved. They have recognised the tendency to “transfer” (Héritier 1999: 
164), “imitate” (Majone 1990: 3; Scharpf 1999: 90) or “emulate” (Woolcock, 1994: 
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15) regulatory approaches in the EC context. However, there has been a tendency to 
stress the role of “regulatory competition” or “competition among rules” as key 
determinants in deciding which dominant national approach will win out as the model 
for subsequent EC regulation. 
 
The literature on the term “regulatory competition” is used in two different senses. 
First, it is used to describe the response of national regulators to the international 
competition for mobile factors of production and mobile tax bases (Bratton, 
McCahery, Picciotto 1996). Second, it is used to describe the fact that member states 
compete with each other in order to influence the content and form of EC regulation 
with a view to minimising their own adjustment costs (Scharpf 1999: 85). It is with 
the latter use of the term that this thesis is concerned. 
 
In some instances, it may well be that a range of diverse member state approaches 
must be accommodated before EC regulation can be achieved and that, indeed, 
“regulatory policy-making is driven by competition between highly regulated member 
states” as Héritier (1999: 159) suggests. However, there has been a tendency in the 
literature of EC regulation to underplay the extent to which consensus and co-
operation between actors in the regulatory process is also required before a particular 
approach comes to the fore in the resolution of logjams that would otherwise 
necessarily arise as the result of unfettered competition. 
 
While competition is characterised by the absence of clear consensus about which 
national regulatory model should be adopted as the EC approach, this absence of 
consensus leads several member states to all envisage their preferred approach being 
 17
adopted as the EC norm. Where there are several possible national approaches to 
choose from, there will be a resultant need for compromise in the form of bargaining 
and compensation to offset the losses that may accrue to those member states that find 
that their national approach is not chosen as the model for Community regulation. 
With an expectation that not all member states will benefit from the first mover 
advantages of low compliance costs that may result from regulatory emulation, trade-
offs, package deals and compensatory payoffs may be required before compromise is 
reached. 
 
It is this “competition” scenario that has become a common explanation for EC 
regulation, particularly when explaining why EC regulation so often emulates prior 
national regulation in at least one member state. However, the contention of this thesis 
is that, while competition explanations for the EC regulatory policy-making process 
might offer useful insights and explanations for what has happened in some specific 
instances (transport policy, for example), more generally particular regulatory 
approaches often come to the fore not as the result of competitive conditions in the 
EC regulatory process at all, but rather as the result of a more consensual, co-
operative style of regulatory policy-making that has not been sufficiently emphasised 
in the literature on the EC regulatory process. 
 
In this sense, while the work of analysts of regulatory processes provides a valuable 
starting point, offering insights and analytical approaches that inform this study, a 
review of this work also highlights that explanations for outcomes from the EC 
regulatory policy-making process remain under-developed because competition 
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explanations of the EC regulatory policy-making process cannot alone explain how 
regulatory initiatives come about and are subsequently adopted in the EC context.  
 
So an aim of this thesis is to demonstrate that competition between rival regulatory 
models in the policy process is rather less prevalent than has been anticipated in the 
established literature. The thesis argues that consensus and co-operation are also 
important determinants of EC regulation. Furthermore, the thesis argues that too much 
emphasis has been placed on competitive struggles in the regulatory policy process by 
authors such as Héritier. The thesis puts forward the hypothesis that, instead, more 
emphasis should be placed on consensus and co-operation as drivers, determinants or 
causes of EC regulation. The validity of this hypothesis will be tested as the thesis 
progresses. 
 
In the context of examining case study material gathered during fieldwork for the 
research, the thesis also considers whether theories of regulatory competition, which 
have tended to be emphasised as explanations of why particular EC regulatory 
approaches have been adopted, can account for the existence of regulatory emulation 
innovation and re-regulation. The thesis argues that once EC regulation is identified 
as either being the result of emulation of prior national approaches in at least one 
member state or the result of innovation in the sense that it reflects scientific 
uncertainty, the assertion that EC regulation is largely the result of competition 
between highly regulated member states is difficult to sustain. Instead, the thesis 
suggests that it is much more likely that emulation, innovation and re-regulation in the 
EC regulatory process are the result of consensus and co-operation rather than 
competition. 
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By presenting evidence from the case studies, the thesis argues that, aside from 
regulatory competition, consensus and co-operation between member states are also 
important drivers of emulation, innovation and re-regulation in the EC regulatory 
process. However, the thesis cautions that there are limits to what can be achieved by 
consensus and co-operation between member states. While second round regulatory 
change may be possible in the form of regulatory refinement and clarification of key 
concepts, there is also the prospect that re-regulation may be difficult to achieve once 
initial regulatory standards have become entrenched. 
 
Method 
 
The characterisation of EC regulation in terms of emulation, innovation and re-
regulation and the hypothesis that consensus and co-operation have been 
insufficiently considered by scholars of EC regulation is tested through case study 
analysis of two instances where EC regulation can be observed: first, the liberalisation 
of insurance markets; and, second, the setting of standards for maximum permissible 
limits for pesticides in drinking water. 
 
Research for the case studies was undertaken by means of documentary analysis and 
face-to-face structured interviews with 28 representatives of the policy-making 
community, the business community and public interest non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs). Half of these were second-round interviews undertaken when 
the interviewer returned to talk again to the individuals representing the business 
community who had originally been spoken to during the previous research project, as 
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outlined in the preface of this thesis. The remainder of the interviews were conducted 
with representatives of the policy-making and NGO communities that had not been 
the primary focus of the original research project. Given the significance of the two 
case studies in the UK most of the fieldwork was conducted in this country, 
augmented by two research trips to Germany, where the perception of the regulatory 
issues in the two case studies is markedly different from the UK in terms of the extent 
that initial EC regulation and subsequent re-regulation were considered desirable and 
necessary - with implications for the pressures exerted for or against initial EC 
regulation and subsequent re-regulation in relation to each case study, and two further 
research trips to Brussels, where the relevant European Commission officials were 
interviewed. 
 
Analysis of data collected during fieldwork for the case studies was undertaken by 
breaking down the EC regulatory process into its component parts. This dissection of 
the process is useful for analytical purposes. By dividing the EC regulatory process 
into four phases - opportunity, negotiation, adoption and reappraisal - it was possible 
to test the significance of various factors at each stage of the EC regulatory process. 
Evidence from these four phases of the EC regulatory process is therefore presented 
under the sub-headings of opportunity, negotiation, adoption and reappraisal in the 
two case study chapters. 
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Structure 
 
How best, then, can this thesis be set out in such a way as to characterise the EC 
regulatory process in terms of emulation, innovation and re-regulation? This is the 
third level of ideas presented in the thesis, namely a hypothesis derived from the 
review of associated literature that, by focusing on the diffusion of ideas and policy 
learning, implicitly supports the contention that consensus and co-operation are of 
greater significance than regulatory competition in the EC regulatory process. 
 
Initially, the thesis must derive lessons from earlier attempts to shed light on the EC 
regulation and the EC policy process. The thesis must build upon the progress already 
made but, at the same time, avoid the pitfalls encountered by those earlier studies. 
This lesson learning exercise will involve undertaking a literature review of the 
extensive body of academic publications relating to European integration, EC policy 
studies, international relations theory, policy analysis and the study of EC regulation. 
The thesis will seek out evidence that these studies can contribute to, if not fully 
explain, the phenomena of EC regulatory policy-making, the propensity for 
innovation and emulation in that policy-making process, and the trend towards 
consensus and co-operation alongside competition explanations for why certain EC 
regulatory approaches are adopted. 
 
So, the intention of the thesis is not to dismiss the validity of earlier studies of EC 
regulation out of hand, but rather to provide a broad overview of their central themes, 
offering an indication of the usefulness and limitations of each approach for the task 
of this thesis, namely to explain how and why particular national regulatory 
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approaches or particular scientific standards are chosen as the EC regulatory 
approach, and accounting for particular outcomes of attempts at re-regulation. 
 
In this context, Chapter 1 reviews the growth of regulation as the dominant policy tool 
in the EC and pays particular attention to accounts of regulatory emulation by making 
particular reference to Majone’s suggestion that emulation of prior national regulatory 
approaches by EC regulators is justifiable on grounds of the need to achieve 
efficiency in the policy-making process. 
 
Chapter 2 engages in three stages of analysis. First, it examines whether Héritier’s 
portrayal of the EC regulatory process as being dominated by “competition” between 
interests can adequately account for the emergence of regulation that emulates prior 
national approaches. Second, it assesses whether explanations of emulation derived 
from “diffusion” and public policy analysis in the United States, particularly in the 
work of Berry and Berry, can assist by adding clarity to our understanding of the EC 
regulatory process. Third, Chapter 2 examines the potential for “policy learning” to 
provide adequate explanations for the EC regulatory process. 
 
Chapter 3 also sets the context for the case studies to be undertaken in later chapters 
of the thesis by reviewing the key literature on interests, actors and institutions in the 
EC regulatory process. The literature review is time-specific and relates in particular 
to the period up the turn of the millennium because this was the period that the case 
study material presented in subsequent chapters relates to. 
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In terms of interests, Chapter 3 gives particular consideration to member state 
preferences, through functionalist and liberal intergovernmentalist explanations of the 
delegation of regulatory powers from member states to the EC institutions. Chapter 3 
also focuses on the significance of institutional actors in the EC regulatory process. In 
part, these accounts relate to the rational choice institutionalism of Pollack (1997), 
which offers explanations for the emergence of EC regulatory approaches that are 
similar to functionalist theory but argues, in a way that functionalist theory does not, 
that institutional arrangements in the European Community give the Commission 
considerable formal and informal agenda-setting powers. Chapter 3 then examines the 
significance of policy entrepreneurship on the part of the European Commission 
drawing, in particular, on the work of Kingdon and Majone, who envisage 
institutional actors as policy entrepreneurs because they are constantly in search of 
solutions in a particular policy stream of ideas to try to take advantage of 
opportunities that might arise to push a particular policy approach. In this respect, the 
judicial activism of the European Court of Justice is also seen as significant in 
providing opportunities for regulation. EC institutional actors also influence the EC 
regulatory process because they are constantly engaged in a strategy designed to 
achieve small incremental steps towards achieving their regulatory goals, or through 
strategies of linking up and packaging together regulatory proposals. The role of 
experts, meeting within epistemic communities, is also considered in this respect as 
are advocacy coalitions, policy learning, policy networks, historical institutionalism 
and post-decisional arguments.  
 
Chapter 4 undertakes detailed case study analysis of EC regulation to liberalise 
insurance markets, providing evidence of how emulation operates in practice. It also 
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examines how re-regulation, involving regulatory refinement and clarification of key 
concepts was subsequently achieved. 
 
Chapter 5 contains an equivalent case study of EC regulation to ensure drinking water 
quality in order to demonstrate evidence of how innovative scientific standards might 
become present in EC regulation. These substantive chapters of the thesis will suggest 
also that consensus and co-operation, rather than competition, characterised the EC 
regulatory policy-making process although, in the case of drinking water quality, the 
thesis will show that attempts at reappraisal and re-regulation undertaken with the aim 
of updating scientific standards proved problematic because earlier standards 
embodied in earlier EC regulation became entrenched. 
 
As suggested above, the structure of chapters 4 and 5 is that both case studies will 
look at the EC regulatory process in terms of four distinct phases: opportunity; 
negotiation; adoption; and reappraisal. In the case of chapter 5, however, the process 
of second round regulatory change was more complex and wide-ranging, so the case 
study of drinking water quality will look in more detail at the process by which 
opportunity for re-regulation arose and how second round negotiations were played 
out. 
 
The first phase of the EC regulatory process can be characterised as the phase in 
which the “opportunity” for new regulation occurs. This phase concerns not only the 
conventional consideration of how agenda setting, leading to new EC regulation, 
occurs but also the wider issue of how the initial opportunity for new regulation arises 
at all. In this sense, the premise on which this part of the thesis will be based is that, 
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far from there being competition in the regulatory process leading to an opportunity 
for agenda setting, opportunities for EC regulatory policy-making often arise because, 
under appropriate conditions, a convergence of interests occurs with key actors all 
recognising the benefits of solving a common problem through a particular course of 
action, leading to consensus in favour of new regulatory endeavours at EC level and 
subsequent co-operation to ensure that progress on new regulation is made. 
 
While conventional models of agenda setting in the EC regulatory process tend to 
stress the existence of competitive conditions, within which different actors seek to 
find time and space in the institutional setting in which to carry forward their own 
regulatory initiatives, this thesis will seek to demonstrate that the reality is often 
somewhat different. It will seek to show that when the opportunity for new regulatory 
activity arises, it is because there is a consensus amongst actors as to the existence of 
a particular policy problem, and a widespread belief that co-operating to achieve 
policy solutions via EC regulation is the most appropriate way forward for all 
concerned. 
 
The case study chapters will then both address the second phase of the EC regulatory 
process: the “negotiation” of EC regulation. Issues to be discussed under the 
“negotiation” heading include both the problem formulation and comparison of 
alternatives stages of the EC policy process. This will investigate the scenario 
whereby, once there is a broad consensus amongst key actors about the 
appropriateness and necessity of a particular approach that should be emulated and 
enshrined in EC regulation, what might be termed “regulatory consent” may occur. 
Regulatory consent of this type may arise when there is an absence of competing 
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national regulatory approaches to choose from, such as when a particular member 
state is perceived by others to have developed a unique and efficient problem solving 
approach at the domestic level that can subsequently be transplanted into the legal 
architecture of other member states via its adoption as the EC regulatory norm, or 
where there is scientific uncertainty and the European Commission innovates and 
constructs a new regulatory approach where no appropriate member state regulatory 
approach already existed. 
 
In terms of the negotiation phase of the EC regulatory policy-making process, the 
contention of this part of the thesis will be that the expectation of regulatory 
competition between member states, with the presumption that member states 
advocate different regulatory preferences, is in practice unrealistic. In reality, 
consensus and co-operation often play a significant role. 
  
The third set of issues that need to be taken into account in the EC regulatory process 
can be considered under the heading of “adoption”. Two predominant pathways 
present themselves. On the one hand, it may be that when EC regulation is formulated 
it is possible to detect some element of path dependency on prior national regulatory 
approaches as part of a process amounting to regulatory emulation. Alternatively, the 
adoption of new regulatory initiatives may be the result of the European 
Commission’s decision to exercise its own right of initiative to put in train a process 
whereby new and previously untried regulatory approaches can be invented. The role 
of scientific expertise may be particularly significant here, particularly where 
scientific communities are of one mind that a particular approach should be a standard 
enshrined in EC regulation. In either instance, this thesis suggests that the scenario 
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played out is not one of competing member states seeking to ensure that their national 
regulatory approach becomes the EC norm but, rather, that consensus on a particular 
regulatory approach is likely, followed by co-operation leading to adoption of the 
preferred EC regulatory approach. 
 
Once a particular EC regulatory approach has been adopted and the impact of the new 
norms have been felt, attention turns to “reappraisal” leading to reconfiguration, 
which may be required to deal with unintended consequences and outcomes as 
member states seek to transpose EC regulation in a form that best suits their local 
conditions. This is the fourth set of issues that will be dealt with in Chapters 4 and 5. 
As the EC regulatory process reaches the stage at which the impact of regulation has 
been experienced and can then be evaluated, there is an implicit expectation that 
regulators will engage in a process of regulatory reappraisal, with pressure for 
refinement, clarification and/or re-regulation. 
 
In particular, where the outcome of first round EC regulation is other than that 
originally anticipated, strengthening or modification may be required in the form of 
second round regulatory changes and adjustment amounting to regulatory reappraisal. 
This may be in the form of amendment to or updating of the standards that regulation 
sets down, or improvements to the implementation mechanisms and the enforcement 
approaches that the regulatory measure prescribes. On-going regulatory consolidation 
of this type is anticipated because neither regulation, nor the problems it seeks to 
address, will remain static over time. 
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As the case study of EC regulation of insurance services will show, pressure for 
second round change may come in the form of requests for clarification of how EC 
regulation should be applied in practice. However, as the case study of drinking water 
quality will illustrate, once EC regulation has become embedded, regulatory 
entrenchment may occur with the effect that regulatory standards initially adopted as 
EC norms cannot then be amended, even when this is generally considered desirable 
because scientific knowledge has subsequently improved and where regulatory 
adjustment could have the effect of alleviating unintended consequences of 
regulation, such as unacceptably high adaptation costs, in the case study in hand in 
relation to significantly higher water bills associated with regulatory compliance 
costs. 
 
In the light of the foregoing arguments about the role and significance of emulation, 
innovation and re-regulation in the EC regulatory process, the concluding section of 
the thesis in Chapter 6 will seek to set out a clearer, structured, understanding of the 
factors that may account for the particular form and character that EC regulation may 
take, the driving forces that may better explain the EC regulatory process. Given the 
emphasis placed on consensus and co-operation in the thesis, closer consideration 
must be given in this respect to the extent to which these drivers might help to account 
for emulation, innovation and re-regulation in the EC regulatory process. 
 
In the light of this assessment, attention will then be given to whether, in view of the 
evidence presented in the case studies, the thesis can further inform our understanding 
of why emulation, innovation and re-regulation characterise the EC regulatory 
process. In particular, based on the premise that consensus and co-operation can 
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account for outcomes in the EC regulatory policy process, the thesis will seek to offer 
a greater degree of certainty and predictability in such a way as to assist our 
understanding of existing and future EC regulation. 
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CHARACTERISING EC REGULATION: 
EMULATION, INNOVATION, RE-REGULATION 
 
CHAPTER 1 
 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE EC REGULATORY PROCESS 
 
 
“Given the importance of Community regulation in so many areas of economic or 
social life, from banking to technical standardisation to environmental and consumer 
protection, this scarcity of regulatory policy analyses is surprising and can only be 
explained by the absence of a suitable theoretical framework.”  (Majone 1990: 30) 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Before undertaking a lengthy study of emulation, innovation and re-regulation in the 
EC regulatory process, it is worth reviewing the main reasons why regulation has 
become of such great significance as the dominant policy tool in the European 
Community and considering the particular characteristics of EC regulatory activity. 
This chapter will undertake two tasks. First, it will seek to account for the significance 
of the regulatory model of the European Community, offering a justification for 
devoting so much attention in this thesis to an analysis of the form and content of EC 
regulation. It will do so with particular reference to Majone’s characterisations of the 
regulatory state and explanations for the growth of regulation in the European 
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Community. Implicit in this reasoning is a wealth of arguments that provide useful 
insights into a key premise of this thesis, namely that member states are prepared to 
adopt a consensual approach towards delegating regulatory power to the Community, 
co-operation in the EC regulatory policy-making process presenting itself as the most 
efficient strategy for sovereign nations. In the light of this discussion, the chapter also 
undertakes a second task, to examine the reasons why, on grounds of regulatory 
efficiency, the EC regulatory process has so often been characterised by emulation of 
solutions originally generated in one context and then applied in somewhat different 
contexts (see also Armstrong 1999: 784). 
 
The regulatory model of the European Community 
 
In terms of providing an initial justification for arguing that structuring our 
understanding of EC regulatory policy-making should be bounded in terms of 
consensus and co-operation as well as competition, it is instructive to turn to Majone’s 
explanation for the relatively late and sudden rise of statutory regulation in the 
European Community (Majone 1994b: 83). 
 
For Majone, regulation is a distinctive form of policy-making mainly concerned with 
the correction of various types of market failure, including externalities, monopoly 
power, public goods or inadequate information (Majone 1991a: 5). In this context, the 
term “regulation” describes rules issued for the purpose of controlling the manner in 
which private and public enterprises conduct their operations (Majone 1996: 9). It is 
the new border between the state and the economy (Majone 1993a: 24). Majone 
sought to explain why economic and social regulation – the kingpins of the 
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“regulatory state” – have replaced the re-distributive policies of the Keynesian 
welfare state (Majone 1997: 141) as the dominant public policy approach, with 
statutory regulation replacing older forms of state intervention as the new frontier of 
public policy and public administration in Europe (Majone 1993b: 11). This 
administrative style of statutory regulation, long the tradition in the United States, has 
more recently become a phenomenon in Europe with public ownership through state 
enterprise and bureaucratic centralisation replaced, over the last two decades, by a 
policy-making approach based on regulation with particular European origins 
(Majone 1996: 10; 1997: 155). 
  
Rise of the regulatory state in Europe 
 
For Majone, the rise of the regulatory state in Europe is best understood as a direct 
consequence of the same processes that have contributed to the decline of the 
interventionist positive role of the state: privatisation, Europeanisation of policy-
making, and the growth of indirect government via agency politics (Majone 1997: 
143). Regulatory policies in Europe grew as a response to demand for more focused 
and more flexible forms of public intervention and for more attention to those areas of 
social regulation that were often neglected by the welfare policies of the past (Majone 
1993a: 25). In this respect, the rise of regulation in Europe owes much to the 
perceptions of a mismatch between existing institutional capacities and the growing 
complexity of policy problems (Majone 1993a: 30; 1994b: 85). Throughout the 1970s 
and 1980s, governments on a country-by-country basis throughout Europe came to the 
realisation that the interventionist and welfare policies of the past had either failed or 
could no longer be afforded (Majone 1993b: 12). Strategic adaptation to these new 
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realities resulted in a reduced role for the positive, interventionist state and a 
corresponding growth in the role of the regulatory state, with regulation replacing tax 
and spend policies (Majone 1997: 140 and 148).  
 
The problem of imposing effective public control over nationalised industries, 
together with subsequent debates on privatisation and deregulation directed the 
attention of European public opinion towards regulation as an efficient mode of 
policy-making aimed at correcting market failure (Majone 1990: 6; 1993a: 25; 1997: 
144). According to welfare economics, market failure occurs when one or more of the 
conditions for the validity of a Pareto-optimal allocation of resources is not satisfied. 
Thus, if regulation succeeds in removing market failures at reasonable cost, it can 
improve market efficiency or even ensure the viability of markets, for example in 
financial services markets where trust, transparency and information disclosure are of 
crucial importance (Majone 1997: 141). This rise of administrative regulation changes 
the role of the state from being a producer of goods and services to that of a regulator 
whose main function is to ensure that economic actors play by the agreed rules of the 
game (Majone 1990: 9). It may also lead to the growth of economic and social 
regulation by means of semi-autonomous regulatory agencies operating outside the 
line of hierarchical state control (Majone 1993a: 22), with the shift from direct to 
indirect or proxy government (Seidman and Gilmour 1996) leading to what Hood and 
James (1996) have termed the ‘inner face’ of the regulatory state. 
 
The reasons for new regulatory instruments are strikingly similar in each European 
country and strongly reminiscent of the arguments earlier put forward in the United 
States. These explanations include: the need for expertise in complex technical 
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matters; the need for a rule-making or adjudicative agency that is separate from 
government and partisan politics; the ability of agencies to provide greater policy 
continuity than elected politicians; and the ability of independent agencies to focus on 
controversial issues, thus enriching public debate (Majone 1996: 49). In addition, the 
main political, economic and technical reasons for the rise of the regulatory state in 
the EC were: external influences, mostly from the United States (Majone 1994a); the 
crisis of interventionist policies; the need for a new regulatory framework for 
privatisation; and the cumulative impact of the growing body of EC regulation 
(Majone 1996: 49). Of these factors, the increasing interdependence of domestic and 
supranational policies within the EC is by far the most significant factor for the rise of 
the regulatory state in Europe (Majone 1997: 144), given that a good part of national 
regulations are now of EC origin or are measures introduced to implement EC 
regulation (Majone 1996: 56). 
 
The growth of EC regulation 
 
So why do member states co-operate to achieve EC regulatory growth? For Majone 
(1996: 61) the growth in EC regulation, both quantitative and qualitative (Majone 
1997: 145), poses a major theoretical puzzle. Aside from competition policy and 
measures necessary for the integration of national markets, few regulatory policies or 
programmes are specifically mentioned in the Treaty of Rome (Majone 1991a: 9; 
1993b: 16; 1994a: 85). Of those Treaty areas that could have given rise to significant 
regulatory activities, some, including transport and energy policies have remained 
largely undeveloped. On the other hand, in areas such as environmental protection, 
significant policy development has taken place even in the absence of a clear legal 
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basis (Majone 1990: 30; 1994a: 87; 1998: 17). Despite the fact that environmental 
protection was not mentioned at all as a Community competence, between 1967 and 
1987 when the Single European Act finally recognised the authority of the 
Community to legislate in this area, almost 200 directives, regulations and decisions 
were introduced by the Commission (Majone 1990: 31; 1991a: 9; 1997: 145). In a 
number of important policy areas, EC regulation has often been more innovative than 
those of all or most member states (Majone 1996: 74-78; 1997: 145). 
 
It is also surprising that Community regulation should have grown so rapidly in the 
face of member state opposition to any erosion of national sovereignty. At the same 
time, member states appeared prepared to accept the transfer of regulatory 
competences to the Community that were neither required by the Treaty, nor strictly 
necessary for the proper functioning of the common market (Majone 1996: 61). Given 
the tight control of the Commission by the European Council, Council of Ministers 
and the Committee of Permanent Representatives of national governments 
(COREPER), many commentators on EC policy innovation (see, for example, 
Rehbinder and Stewart 1985: 213) have concluded that the member states normally 
set the parameters for Community action, while for intergovernmental theorists policy 
innovation is impossible since the Commission’s role is simply to facilitate bargaining 
between member states. 
 
While policy analysts have traditionally explained changes in regulatory policy as the 
result of shifts in the configuration of dominant interests or of changes in economics 
or technology, it is unlikely that the reasons for change are monocausal. Majone 
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(1996: 266-267) identifies four central themes in the EC regulatory policy-making 
process. 
 
Firstly, EC regulation has had an extraordinary impact of the actions and behaviour of 
the member states. This impact is attributed to the range of specific legislative and 
administrative measures that fall within Community competence, the choice of policy 
instruments and the relationship between EC regulation and national styles of policy-
making. In particular, Majone draws attention to the influence of policy learning, 
Community actions often providing the stimulus for national governments to 
reconsider the logic of traditional policies and institutional arrangements. 
 
Secondly, the character of EC regulatory policy-making is the product of a 
relationship between national and European regulation. For Majone, this relationship 
is far from having reached any sort of stable equilibrium. Instead, there is a 
discernible trend towards greater centralisation in some areas, with indications of an 
evolving coordinated partnership in others. This relationship is made more complex 
by a lack of mutual trust, the tendency of national governments to use EC regulation 
and uneven implementation and enforcement of Community law to their advantage.  
 
Thirdly, the limits of national and EC regulatory policy competence have not yet been 
clearly defined. 
 
Fourthly, the legitimacy and democratic accountability of EC regulatory policy-
making remains complex and includes unresolved issues, closely related to wider 
questions of political legitimacy in the Community. While the problem of 
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accountability of the regulatory process is present at all levels of government, they are 
more obvious at the Community level because regulation is the core of EC policy-
making while, in member states, welfare and macroeconomic policies are politically 
more prominent than regulation (Majone 1993b: 30). 
 
For Majone, this continuous growth of Community regulation is not easily explained 
by traditional theories of EC policy-making (1990: 31) since, at most, such theories 
tend to suggest that the serious implementation gap that exists in the Community may 
make it easier for the member states to accept Commission proposals which they have 
no serious intention of applying. These theories do not, however, account for the fact 
that in some policy areas regulatory activity has been slow while in other areas 
significant policy development has taken place even in the absence of clear legal 
bases. Furthermore, Majone contends that existing theories of EC regulatory policy-
making do not draw a sufficiently clear distinction between regulatory and other types 
of policies (1990: 32). While non-regulatory direct-expenditure programmes are 
constrained by budgets, the costs of regulatory measures are borne directly by the 
firms and individuals who have to comply with them (Majone 1990: 32; 1991a: 10; 
1994a: 87; 1996: 64; 1998a: 19). The distinction between the re-distributive policies 
of direct expenditure of public funds and regulatory policies is particularly important 
for EC policy-making because, while the costs of producing new rules is negligible, 
the real costs of regulation are not only economic, since the political and 
administrative costs of enforcing EC regulations are borne by the member states 
(Majone 1990: 32; 1993a: 31; 1993b: 18; 1994a: 95; 1995a: 10, 1997: 149; 1998a: 
19). 
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The growth of EC regulatory powers can, in part, also be explained by the fear among 
member states that national governments may use regulation to promote their own 
interests rather than common regulatory objectives (Majone 1995b: 6). In the absence 
of mutual trust and a sense of comity, centralisation of regulatory authority at a higher 
level of government is desirable as a means to correct negative externalities. Thus 
mutual distrust of the member states results in demand for a higher level of 
centralisation. But member states not only mistrust each other, they also mistrust the 
Commission (Majone 1995b: 9; 1998b: 28). This paradoxical attitude has 
consequences both for the quantitative growth of Community rules and for the poor 
level of enforcement of EC regulation. The immediate consequence is that the 
Commission is kept on a tight rein: chronically understaffed; closely monitored 
through an intricate system of “regulatory” and “management” committees which can 
block its proposals and transmit the file to the Council, which can overrule the 
Commission and ensure that it is obliged to rely almost exclusively on national 
bureaucracies for the implementation of measures it elaborates (Majone 1995b: 9). 
 
A further consequence of mistrust is the fact that the Community budget has been 
historically kept quite small: less than 1.3 per cent of the combined gross domestic 
product of the member states or about 4 per cent of the combined expenditures of the 
central governments of the member states (Majone 1991a; 1993a: 30; 1994a: 85; 
1995b: 10). The financial resources of the Community are mostly accounted for by 
the Common Agricultural Policy and a handful of re-distributive programmes, the 
remaining resources are insufficient to support large-scale initiatives in other policy 
areas such as industrial policy, energy, research or technological innovation (Majone, 
1991a: 11; 1998a: 19). While the power of the member states is still the traditional 
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role of taxing and spending (Majone 1993a: 19), the EC has lacked such power, 
regulation offering the only solution to the problem of maximising the influence of 
EC policy-makers (Majone, 1994b: 95; 1997: 150). Thus an important part of the 
explanation for the growth of EC regulation must be the desire of the Commission to 
increase its influence, even beyond the functional requirements of the common 
market, by escaping budgetary constraints and resorting to regulatory policy-making 
(Majone 1991a: 11; 1998: 20). 
 
For Majone (1997: 150; 1998: 27), the absence of binding budgetary constraints for 
regulatory policy-making has three important consequences. Firstly, neither national 
parliaments nor governments systematically determine the overall level or regulatory 
activity in a given period. Secondly, no office is responsible for establishing 
regulatory priorities across the government. Thirdly, while spending programmes are 
regulatory audited, no such control has been exercised historically over regulatory 
programmes. 
 
For Majone, this explains the continuous growth of Community rule making in 
practically every area of economic and social regulation (Majone 1993a: 31) because 
the most important paradox of institutional mistrust is actually the fact that, in an 
attempt to restrict the scope of supranational policies by imposing a tight budget 
constraint, member states have unwittingly encouraged the expansion of a mode of 
policy-making that is largely immune from budgetary discipline. This trend has been 
aggravated by institutional factors: because the Commission is a collegial body, 
central control over the regulatory activities of the different Directorates General 
(DGs) is weak. The consequence is that lack of central coordination leads to serious 
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inconsistencies across and within regulatory programmes, absence of rational 
procedures for setting priorities, and insufficient attention to the cost effectiveness of 
individual rules (Majone 1995a: 11). Given the institutional constraints under which it 
operates, regulation has turned out to be the most effective way for the Commission to 
maximise its influence (1995a: 10). 
 
Moreover, by denying the Commission any significant role in implementation, the 
member states have encouraged a tendency to focus on the quantitative growth of EC 
regulation rather than on effective compliance and actual results. But Majone does not 
blame the growth of EC regulation entirely on the Commission since many 
regulations and directives are introduced at the demand of individual member states, 
the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and a 
variety of private and public interest groups (Majone 1995a: 11; 1998: 27). 
  
While the responsiveness of the Commission to such requests may increase its 
political legitimacy, uncontrolled and un-coordinated demands can also produce a 
number of negative consequences, of which legislative inflation is the most obvious 
one (Majone 1998: 27). The subsequent dominance of the EC regulatory process has 
been criticised by Majone as being highly discretionary, suffering from weak 
accountability, weak judicial review, absence of procedural safeguards, and 
insufficient public participation (Majone 1993a: 39; 1994a: 94). It suffers from an 
absence of central coordination, leading to serious inconsistencies across and within 
regulatory programmes, lack of rational procedures for selecting priorities, 
insufficient attention paid to the cost-effectiveness of individual rules, inadequate 
staffing and insufficient research capabilities (Majone 1991a: 32; 1998: 27). 
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Majone suggests that one method of limiting regulatory growth would be to set up an 
office with the power to oversee the entire regulatory process and to discipline the 
activities of the DGs by comparing the social benefits of proposed measures with the 
costs imposed on the European economy by the regulatory requirements. Such an 
office – a “regulatory clearing house” similar to the US Office of Management and 
Budget – would provide a centralised review process to help screen demands for new 
EC regulation (Majone 1995a: 11; 1997: 151; 1998: 28). 
 
In the European Community, such a clearing house could be located at a sufficiently 
high level in the EC bureaucracy, possibly in the office of the President of the 
Commission, with DGs asked to submit annually draft regulatory programmes to the 
clearing house for review. By extending centralised control over the regulatory 
agenda of the DGs, this review process would help the Commission shape a consistent 
set of regulatory measures to submit to the Council or the European Parliament 
(Majone 1994a: 96). Alternatively, the growing complexity of regulation may require 
greater reliance on standing committees of experts and an enhancement of the role of 
specialised regulatory agencies (Majone 1991a: 32). 
 
Constraints on the growth of EC regulation 
 
But despite the range of contributory factors that account for the growth of EC 
regulation, there are also a number of constraints that have operated as mitigating 
forces to restrict regulatory growth. Both short and long run factors constrain the EC 
regulatory policy-making process (Majone 1993c: 14). In the short run, technology, 
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institutions, administrative capacities, financial resources, physical inputs and 
manpower are important. Given sufficient time, however, technological limitations 
and institutional obstacles can be removed, laws changed, capacities increased and 
new skills learned. This time dimension is important because factors that can be 
disregarded in the short run can become binding constraints in the long run. The need 
to maintain continuing cooperative relationships among policy-makers is thus likely 
to be more significant than one-off, single-issue policy agreements might indicate. 
Because of the potential variety of policy constraints, shared beliefs about the limits 
of public policy are essential, argument and persuasion playing a key role in 
identifying constraints, evaluating their significance for different implementation 
strategies and estimating the costs and benefits of relaxing those constraints (Majone 
1993c: 14). However, it is impossible to know all the relevant limiting factors and it is 
often difficult to predict which assumed set of constraints will actually be binding.  
 
Hence, as policy moves from decision to implementation, previously hidden 
constraints force policy changes.  It is this process of discovering constraints and 
modifying strategies accordingly that Majone identifies as being the essence of the 
policy process (1993c: 14). For Majone, ideas are important not only in identifying 
and categorising policy constraints, but also in pushing out the boundaries of the 
possible in public policy. What is politically feasible within given constraints will 
depend on popular knowledge and the relation of popularly accepted values to 
permissible practice (1993c: 15). Majone anticipates that constraints on policy can 
often be eased after public opinion has been conditioned to accept new ideas and 
concepts. 
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Demand and supply model of EC regulation 
 
The EC regulatory process includes many actors, including: industrialists, trade 
unions, public interest groups, national and sub-national politicians and bureaucrats. 
The Commission plays a key role in the supply of regulatory initiatives to meet the 
demand of this variety of actors (Majone 1998: 20). Evidence to support the view that 
the growth in regulatory output is attributable to its supply side function rather than 
the scale of its budget can be observed in the great expansion of Community action 
since the mid-1980s in areas such as the environment, health and safety at work, 
consumer product safety and the regulation of financial services, which has been 
accompanied by a significantly less than proportional increase of expenditure for 
administration costs - from 4.35 per cent of the total Community budget in 1985 to 
4.8 per cent in 1994 - while the number of directives has more than doubled in the 
same period (Majone 1996: 65). 
 
For Majone, the fact that budgetary appropriations per unit of regulatory output have 
actually decreased suggests that the Commission prefers ‘task expansion’ to 
budgetary growth. The Commission has been constrained by budgetary limitations 
and has simply expanded its competences in different directions (Majone 1996: 65). 
Given the imposition of these tight budgetary constraints, expansion of regulatory 
policy-making activity has provided the only way for the Commission to increase its 
activities (Majone 1996: 66). Majone suggests that it is a “fairly safe behavioural 
assumption” that the remarkable growth of Community regulation must take into 
account both the desire of the Commission to increase its influence and the possibility 
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of escaping budgetary constraints by resorting to regulatory policy-making (1990: 
33). 
 
Majone (1990: 33; 1991a: 12) suggests that a further element in the expansion of 
regulatory policy-making in preference to other forms of intervention is the interest of 
multi-national, export-oriented industries in avoiding inconsistent and progressively 
more stringent regulations. In practice, however, it should be acknowledged that 
diversity and inconsistency are the significant problems for regulatory policy-making 
in terms of implementation asymmetries. Yet for Majone, multinational companies 
tend to prefer Community to national regulations not only to avoid the costs of 
meeting differing national standards, but also to avoid the risk of progressively more 
stringent regulations in some member states in a process akin to the strong corporate 
support for federal regulation (“pre-emptive federalism”) observed in the United 
States, for example in relation to air pollution measures (Majone 1990: 33; 1991a: 15; 
1994a: 87). The interaction of national policy with new EC regulatory initiatives may 
also have the effect of re-orienting national perceptions of policy priorities. In this 
context, the Community has the advantage of providing a back door method for 
adopting measures that would not be adopted by national governments (see also 
Rehbinder and Stewart 1985: 331-332). 
 
Demands for EC regulation also come from public-interest organisations such as 
environmentalists, consumer groups and, particularly, groups in those countries with a 
low level of health and safety regulation. For Majone, these groups hope to initiate 
protective EC regulation because, due to their political weakness, they are unable to 
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achieve equivalent regulatory changes from their own national governments (Majone 
1996: 67). 
 
Majone suggests three (related) reasons why member states have accepted such far-
reaching limitations on their sovereignty through EC regulation. Firstly, using the 
theorem of Ronald Coase (1960) on the rationale for supranational regulation, Majone 
(1998: 20) suggests that international regulatory failure occurs when national 
regulators are unsure as to whether international agreements are kept or not. This is 
because much economic and social regulation is discretionary. Since regulators lack 
information that only regulated firms have in their possession, and because 
governments for political reasons are reluctant to impose excessive costs on industry, 
bargaining is an essential feature of the process of regulatory enforcement. A 
“market” is created over the precise obligations of the latter (Peacock, 1984) and, 
since bargaining is so pervasive, it may be impossible for an outside observer to 
determine whether or not an international regulation has in fact been violated (Majone 
1998: 21) 
 
Majone’s second explanation for member states’ willingness to delegate regulatory 
powers well beyond what was required by the founding treaties lies in the different 
kinds of transaction costs that arise in the formulation and implementation of 
international regulatory agreements (Majone 1996: 69). Any international agreement 
involves search and bargaining costs, but enforcement and measurement costs are 
particularly significant in the case of regulatory agreements and it is the high costs of 
enforcement, mostly derived from policy discretion in choosing between several 
possible courses of action (Majone 1994a: 89), that explain the decision to delegate 
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powers to a supranational authority rather than setting up an international secretariat 
(Majone 1996: 70). The delegation of regulatory powers to an agency distinct from 
national governments is, of course, in itself also an important means by which 
national governments commit themselves to EC regulation (Majone 1996: 71). 
Majone also points out that the Treaty of Rome is a framework treaty rather than an 
international agreement providing a detailed specification of objectives and policy 
instruments. The result is a Treaty that Majone (1996: 71) describes as a “relational 
contract” among the member states, namely an agreement which frames the entire 
relationship by recognising that it is impossible to agree all relevant bargaining action 
at the contracting stage, making the delegation of discretionary powers to 
supranational Community institutions essential. The delegation of regulatory policy-
making powers to the Commission thus becomes an appropriate response to the 
(necessarily incomplete) contractual arrangements set out in the Treaty of Rome 
(Majone 1996: 72). 
 
Indeed, the demand for regulatory initiatives supplied by the Commission often comes 
from member states themselves, for example the UK exerted considerable pressure on 
the Commission to liberalise the market for life and non-life insurance where British 
insurers enjoyed a comparative advantage over their competitors on the continent 
(Majone 1998: 20). 
 
Finally, perhaps the greatest advantage of EC membership (Majone 1998: 21) is the 
possibility of delegating politically difficult decisions (such as strict environmental 
regulations) to supranational non-majoritarian institutions (Majone 1991b) since, by 
showing that their hands are tied by EC regulation, member states can increase the 
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international credibility of their policy commitments and reduce the power of re-
distributive coalitions domestically. For Majone (1998: 22), it is the low credibility of 
purely intergovernmental agreements, together with the advantage of shifting 
politically difficult decisions to non-majoritarian institutions, which explains the 
willingness of member states to delegate important regulatory powers to the European 
Commission. 
 
Regulatory efficiency as an explanation for EC regulatory emulation 
 
Most importantly, Majone has also suggested reasons why EC policy innovation so 
frequently resembles prior national regulation in at least one member state. For 
Majone (1990: 1) genuine EC policy innovation, where new Community standards 
replace and improve on those used in member states is rare, the ability of EC 
regulatory policy-makers to innovate often depending more on their skill in utilising 
existing models than on inventing novel solutions. Looking for models that imitate 
rather than seeking originality thus becomes the key to EC regulatory policy-making 
because “imitation affords relief from the necessity of searching for optimal decisions 
and conscious innovations which, if wrong, expose the decision maker to severe 
criticism” (Majone 1990: 2). 
 
Regulatory efficiency thus encourages adoption of the emulation model. Selection 
between policy variants then occurs, a process that may be separated by a time lag of 
several years or even decades because events occur too fast and ideas mature too 
slowly for responses to be devised anew for each set of pressing problems (Majone 
1990: 1).  
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Where events occur too fast, policy-makers will usually select their ideas from the 
stock of existing models available at a particular time (Majone 1991: 21), known in 
other literature as the “normative repertoire” as part of a process of regulatory 
competition. In turn, the existing policy ideas are usually the results of intellectual 
efforts or practical experiences of preceding years. Derthick and Quirk (1985: 57) 
have made the similar observation that the existing stock of ideas shapes the response 
of policy-makers to events by defining the conceptual alternatives from which they 
can choose (also quoted in Majone 1990: 2). 
 
From the range of available regulatory policy models, choice of the most appropriate 
alternative will be dependent on evidence that the idea is workable and, given the 
desire to avoid the uncertainties of social experimentation, persuasive proof of 
successful implementation in some country or jurisdiction not too different from that 
of the policy-making regime. Essentially, therefore, policy-makers are engaged in a 
process of finding reassurance and inspiration in concrete historical experience rather 
than abstract theories (Majone 1990: 2). As a result, “EC regulation often seeks to 
diffuse throughout the Community solutions already adopted in the most advanced 
member states” (Majone 1998b: 18). This desire for reassurance limits the range of 
policy variants a good deal more than one would otherwise expect. By searching for 
models to imitate rather than seeking originality, imitation affords relief from the 
necessity of searching for optimal decisions and conscious innovations that would 
expose policy-makers and politicians to the risk of exposure to severe criticism in the 
event of regulatory failure. According to Majone (1990: 2), this strategy of adopting 
patterns of action observable in past successes instead of searching for novel solutions 
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accords with the expectations of evolutionary economics that rational (economic) 
actors will seek to learn from action observable in the past in a complex and uncertain 
environment. 
 
Successful regulatory emulation is not, however, simply a case of observing and 
copying existing policies. The critical question is whether emulation is appropriate 
given the likelihood that the set of circumstances in which it is being replicated will 
be different for those that the measure was originally designed for. As Scharpf (1999: 
90) puts it “policy imitation remains a difficult and uncertain process whose outcome 
depends not primarily on the attractiveness of the foreign models but on the domestic 
conditions affecting adoption and implementation”. The key decision is therefore 
whether a programme or policy that is successful in one setting can be transferred to 
another and, in practice, regulatory policy-makers often seem only mildly preoccupied 
with this problem of transferability.  
 
For policy-makers, it is often sufficient to know that a policy idea is likely to be 
modified by the political and institutional conditions in which it is introduced (Majone 
1990: 3). What policy-makers want above all is less a detailed blueprint, since this is 
likely to be inapplicable to the specific conditions in which they operate, than the 
general guidance and prima facie evidence that the proposed policy is feasible 
(Majone 1990: 3). Majone, then, leaves us with the assertion that the existence of 
regulatory emulation can be explained fairly straightforwardly on grounds of 
regulatory efficiency (1990: 46). However, he also leaves unanswered the question of 
why a particular national regulatory approach comes to be adopted as the EC norm at 
any given time. This question remains under studied in EC regulatory policy analysis. 
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Summary 
 
To summarise the foregoing discussion, Majone’s regulatory model of the European 
Community provides a range of explanations for the growth of EC regulatory activity. 
These include the assertions that: 
 
• The costs of new (non-direct expenditure) EC regulation are seen as 
negligible; 
• Mutual distrust amongst member states encourages EC regulatory activity, 
since they distrust the Commission less than they distrust each other; 
• Demands for EC regulation are expressed by public-interest organisations and 
multi-national corporations who prefer coordinated Community regulatory 
activity to piecemeal national measures; 
• Member states seek to reduce the transaction costs associated with the 
formulation and implementation of regulation by pooling resources at EC 
level; 
• Member states see delegation of difficult regulatory decisions to the 
Community as being politically expedient; 
• Emulating prior national regulation is considered efficient, with regulators less 
concerned with transferability than with general guidance, ideas and 
feasibility. 
 
The question that remains, however, is whether emulation of prior national regulation 
is the result of a process of regulatory competition as the dominant literature has 
tended to suggest or, alternatively, whether emulation is in fact the result of co-
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operation and consensus between member states who learn from the experience of 
others and choose a prior national approach as the preferred model for EC regulation 
because it has appeared to work well elsewhere. The possibility that consensus and 
co-operation of this type can best explain the propensity of EC regulation to emulate a 
prior national approach will be investigated as the thesis progresses. 
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CHARACTERISING EC REGULATION: 
EMULATION, INNOVATION AND RE-REGULATION 
 
CHAPTER 2 
 
COMPETITION, DIFFUSION AND LEARNING 
IN THE EC REGULATORY PROCESS 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The central theme of this thesis is that EC regulation can be best understood in terms 
of three levels of ideas, namely: (a) that the EC regulatory process is best understood 
by particular styles or processes of regulation; (b) that there are particular 
determinants or causes of regulation that are best understood as regulatory 
competition, consensus and co-operation; and (c) a hypothesis can be derived from 
the literature review to the effect that diffusion of ideas and policy learning lead to 
consensus and co-operation, this being of greater significance than regulatory 
competition in the EC regulatory process. 
 
 In order to inform this approach and underpin subsequent analysis, this chapter 
undertakes three tasks. Firstly, it examines whether characterisations of the EC 
regulatory process in terms of “competition”, derived from the work of Héritier, can 
adequately account for the emergence of EC regulation. Secondly, it assesses whether 
explanations derived from “diffusion” and public policy analysis in the United States 
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can assist by adding clarity to our understanding of the EC regulatory process. 
Thirdly, it examines the potential for “policy learning” scenarios developed in the EC 
context to provide adequate explanations of the EC regulatory process. In its 
conclusion, the chapter suggests that analysis of the diffusion and policy learning 
literature may indicate that consensus and co-operation between member states in the 
EC regulatory process is a viable alternative to the model of regulatory competition 
envisaged by Héritier. In order to make this argument, it is to an analysis of 
competition as a process leading to EC regulation that this chapter will first turn. 
 
Competition as a process leading to EC regulation 
 
A common explanation of regulatory policy-making is that it tends to be the result of 
competitive struggles and outcomes dependent of the resources used in these struggles 
and the distribution of those resources between the different involved institutions, 
with the play of power central to that process (see, for example, Hancher and Moran 
1989: 277). In the context of the European Community regulatory process, one 
prominent proponent of this scenario has been Héritier, whose work on competition 
and accommodation of diversity is reviewed in five sections of this chapter: the first 
looks at Héritier’s explanation for the origins of “competition” in the EC regulatory 
process; the second, reviews her categorisation of member states as “leaders” and 
“laggards” in regulatory terms; the third, summarises her depiction of the Commission 
as a “gatekeeper” for member state initiatives; the fourth, reappraises Héritier’s 
description of the “coordination” of diverse interests; and the fifth looks at the 
strategies identified by Héritier that she claims are used to overcome deadlock in the 
EC regulatory process. 
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Origins of competition in the EC regulatory process 
 
Chapter 1 of the thesis began by setting out reasons why regulation has come to be the 
dominant tool in EC regulatory policy-making. It noted that central to Majone’s 
characterisation of the EC regulatory state has been the identification of member 
states as providing by far the most important source of demand for EC regulatory 
initiatives, with the Commission introducing legislative proposals in response to 
requests from particular national governments or the Council of Ministers (Majone 
1996: 68). There are several reasons why a particular member state may want EC 
regulation to impose its own approach to a particular regulatory issue on other 
member states. Such a strategy would minimise the costs of legal and administrative 
adaptation to new Community rules, would give competitive advantage to the national 
industry which has already adjusted to that particular regulatory regime and, in the 
case of countries with a high level of social protection, would reduce the cost 
advantages of countries with lower levels of protection (i.e. social dumping) by 
forcing all member states to adopt the same regulatory standards (Majone 1996: 68). 
Conversely, member states that anticipate high adaptation costs as the result of EC 
regulatory change may be expected to oppose the initiative. 
 
Building on this scenario of regulatory innovation primarily driven by member state 
interventions, Héritier has made a strong case for the assertion that “European 
[Community] regulatory policy-making is characterised by regulatory competition 
among the highly regulated member states which, by influencing European policy-
making, seek to enhance their competitive position in the European market and to 
reduce costs of legal adjustment” (Héritier 1996: 164). 
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Héritier describes the EC regulatory policy-making as being driven by “competition 
between highly regulated member states” (Héritier 1996: 159), with the “the 
inevitable outcome of regulatory competition [being] an ever-increasing and 
thickening network of European regulations” (Héritier 1996: 159). 
 
Chapter 1 also noted that, in Majone’s characterisation of the EC regulatory state, 
member states are willing to transfer national regulatory policy competence to the 
Community due to mutual distrust, while the European Commission is engaged in a 
strategy of policy expansion. As a corollary to this model of the regulatory state, the 
EC version of “competition” envisaged by Héritier attributes to member states not 
only the desire to transfer regulatory competence to the European level, but also the 
desire of those member states to see EC regulation fashioned in the image of their 
own regulatory traditions. The result is that EC regulation either amounts to a “policy 
patchwork” in which diverse member state regulatory approaches are linked under the 
roof of the same Directive or, alternatively, that EC regulation is modelled after the 
regulatory style of one particular member state (Héritier 1996: 149). 
 
It is anticipated that the specific outcome of a process of accommodating the diverse 
interests of the member states will vary according to the institutional conditions of 
each stage of the policy-making process (namely the phases characterised in later 
chapters of this thesis as opportunity, negotiation, adoption, and impact/reappraisal). 
Héritier finds that this expectation is to some extent corroborated by the empirical 
development of EC regulation, especially in the field of the environment, but also 
acknowledges that there are countervailing tendencies: the subsidiarity principle and 
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the lack of support among member states for ever-increasing and detailed EC 
regulation (Héritier 1996: 159). Recognising the changing tides, Héritier suggests that 
the Commission, in devising legislation, has deliberately given more latitude to 
member states in policy implementation, with often only policy objectives laid down 
while the choice of instruments to reach these is left to member states. In this regard, 
it is important to distinguish between the older EC regulatory approach that pre-dated 
the Single European Market Initiative and which was largely prescriptive, dictating 
the policy method to be followed, from the so-called “new approach” to EC regulation 
that became commonplace from 1986 onwards. This thesis is concerned with the 
latter approach. 
 
Furthermore, an important precondition that Héritier identifies as being prevalent 
under conditions of EC regulatory competition is the fact that there is no structural 
“first mover”, by which she means that no one member state emerges as the “winner” 
in terms of seeing its outcomes consistently predominate across a range of regulatory 
policy areas. The consequence is that Héritier sees no particular tradition dominating 
EC regulation across the board, but rather “a colourful patchwork composed of 
various instruments and national regulatory styles derived from distinctive regulatory 
backgrounds” (Héritier 1996: 159). 
 
Leaders and laggards in EC regulatory competition 
 
The “competition” that Héritier identifies in EC regulatory policy-making is largely 
confined to a particular cohort of countries, namely the highly regulated member 
states with a long and well-established tradition of regulatory control. Although 
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Héritier does not elaborate on her definition of “highly regulated member states”, 
France, Germany and the United Kingdom are examples that she cites as countries 
that have the appropriate credentials and regulatory traditions (Héritier 1996: 164). It 
is this group of highly regulated member states that seek to enhance their competitive 
position in the European market and to reduce costs of legal adjustment. The 
proposals put as the preferred EC regulatory approach tend to correspond to that 
member state’s own economic interests and regulatory traditions since “the initiator 
seeks to widen the scope of European policy-making according to its own 
preferences, and to transfer its own regulatory style to the European level” (Héritier 
1996: 151). These member states are Héritier’s “leaders” in regulatory terms that are 
likely to provide the model for the “laggard” member states that lack their own 
traditions of highly regulated arrangements. Héritier then envisages that it is the 
regulatory achievements of highly regulated member states that are presented to the 
Commission which then determines the chances of the member states’ regulatory 
proposals to influence the EC regulatory policy agenda (Héritier 1996: 164). 
 
The initiator, or “first mover”, member state has the opportunity to define the scope 
and nature of problems dealt with by EC institutions and shape the content of EC 
regulation, where as other member states are forced into reactive mode. By defining 
the problem, the “first mover” is also able to suggest a practical approach to solving 
the problem that it has defined and may carry on the role of “first mover” from the 
“problem definition to the “problem solving” (or “negotiation”) stage of the 
regulatory policy-making process and anchor its approach in draft EC regulation. If 
not seriously challenged by an opposing approach by another (highly regulated) state, 
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“problem solving” then proceeds within the regulatory approach defined by the “first 
mover” member state (Héritier 1996: 150). 
 
The chances for one of the cohort of (highly regulated) member states to influence EC 
regulatory policy-making by directly approaching the Commission are, according to 
Héritier (1996: 164) relatively high, because the attempt to exert influence does not 
have to pass the institutional filters of a parliamentary democracy governed by parties. 
Instead, if a “leader” or “first mover” member state is successful in gaining the 
support of a division of a particular Directorate General within the Commission, it can 
shape problem definition during what this thesis categorises as the initial 
“opportunity” state of the EC regulatory process. For Héritier, this first mover 
advantage may, however, be lost once a regulatory policy proposal leaves the 
institutionally secluded stage of drafting within a division of a particular DG and it is 
then, at what this thesis terms the “negotiation” phase of the regulatory process, that 
“[D]istributive issues come to the fore which are the object of extensive bargaining 
processes, in the course of which compensations are offered to those who perceive 
themselves as the losers of a proposed new regulation” (Héritier 1996: 164).   
 
In sum, the scenario that emerges is one in which the “leader” member states seek to 
see their national regulatory approach adopted as EC regulation for four reasons: 
firstly, they seek to avoid the costs of institutional and legal adjustment caused by EC 
legislation; secondly, they try to establish favourable competitive conditions for their 
own industry by raising EC standards to their own national level; thirdly, they suggest 
more stringent technology-oriented rules to enhance the market for national 
technology industries; and, fourthly, by preventing more lenient EC regulation, 
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national authorities seek to maintain their bargaining power with their own industries 
because the latter cannot point to more lax EC standards when required to implement 
national standards (Héritier 1996: 151). 
 
Yet being the “leader” or “first mover” once does not mean always being so. 
Presumably with the objective of avoiding ‘regulatory capture’, the Commission 
avoids frequently adopting the proposals of one member state in a way that would 
accord it the status of “structural first mover” (Héritier 1996: 153) in any given 
regulatory policy area. EC institutional arrangements dictate that, although holding 
the Presidency can assist “first mover” initiatives by allowing a member state 
influence over agenda setting (Héritier 1996: 158), on the other hand qualified 
majority voting in the Council can increase the risk of “foreign” regulatory 
approaches being “imposed” on a member state via EC regulation. 
 
Being the “leader” and making the first move does not necessarily imply a policy 
advantage, but may immediately trigger the formation of an opposing coalition 
seeking to obstruct the first mover’s initiative. Thus Héritier accepts that it does not 
necessarily follow that “first movers” will see their preferred regulatory approach 
adopted as the EC norm (1996: 153) since the first move may trigger the formation of 
opposing coalitions of member states, but she also points out that agenda setting and 
problem definition generally occur under conditions of extreme secrecy, allowing the 
Commission considerable discretion in choosing from among policy options in the 
European “policy market” (Peters 1992: 75; quoted in Héritier 1996: 154). The 
Commission has considerable latitude in choosing from among the policy options in 
the EC regulatory market (Héritier 1996: 153). 
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But, given the primacy accorded to heavily regulated member states in Héritier’s 
analysis, what role can be accorded to less regulated member states in the EC 
regulatory policy making process? For Héritier, because less regulated countries often 
consider lower standards preferable because they allow businesses established within 
their territories greater competitive advantage over those based in more heavily 
regulated member states, there is a tendency for less regulated states to acquiesce to 
new EC regulation without playing a significant role in determining its content, then 
relying on non-implementation or incomplete implementation as a way of retaining 
competitive advantage (Héritier 1996: 154). She goes on to suggest that, for less 
regulated states, no new EC regulation is the preferred outcome, with a “mixed” 
regulatory approach, the second best option, the introduction of EC regulation which 
closely corresponds to a highly regulated member state being the least attractive 
option. 
 
Commission as “gatekeeper” in EC regulatory competition 
 
By virtue of their decision to allow the transfer of regulatory policy making duties 
from the nation state to the EC institutions (Majone 1996), member states have 
effectively “stepped back as innovators” (Héritier 1999: 93) in the regulatory process. 
The Directorate General of the Commission responsible for a particular policy area 
forms what Majone (1994a: 90; 1996: 73) describes as the “central node” of a vast 
“issue network” which includes national experts, academics, consumer and other 
public interests groups, economic interests, professional organisations and sub-
national governmental organisations (see also Héritier 1999: 94). Within this issue 
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network, the variety of policy positions will be much greater than at the national level 
and it may even be the case that national experts find the Commission a more 
receptive forum for new ideas than their own national government (Majone 1996: 74). 
 
So, with the Commission to the fore, it is able to act as a policy entrepreneur and is 
constantly faced with a variety of policy options from actors from various member 
states. This means that whether or not a member state is successful in shaping the 
European regulatory agenda by using the ‘first mover’ strategy depends on the 
response of the Commission, with the Council unable to take any policy decisions 
unless the Commission has put forward a corresponding proposal. It is in this role as a 
“gatekeeper”, confronted with a variety of regulatory options by member states, that 
the Commission must choose the regulatory approach that it wants to put on the 
legislative track as EC regulation. In this sense, Héritier portrays the EC regulatory 
policy-making process as a “market”, in which member states offer their “products” 
to the Commission (Héritier 1996: 152). 
 
From the multitude of policy proposals, Héritier suggests that the Commission 
chooses the ones that it wants to put on the legislative track. The member states can 
thus be regarded by as “innovative policy entrepreneurs in the EC regulatory market, 
offering their products to the Commission” (Héritier 1996: 152). The Commission’s 
responsiveness to such policy proposals is no act of generosity on the part of a 
supranational institution. Having relatively few personnel of its own, the Commission 
depends on member states to provide policy expertise. But whether or not the 
Commission responds favourably to the policy initiative of the ‘first mover’ member 
state will ultimately depend on whether the proposal fits into the overall EC 
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regulatory policy-making philosophy (Héritier 1996: 152). The Commission is also a 
corporate actor (Héritier 1996: 152), interested in expanding its own regulatory policy 
competence but endowed with limited financial resources (Majone 1994). This leads 
Héritier to acknowledge that, ultimately, despite the primacy she accords earlier to the 
role of member states in EC regulatory policy-making, whether or not the 
Commission responds favourably to the regulatory initiative of a “first mover” 
member state depends on whether the proposal fits into the overall “policy-making 
philosophy” of the European Community (Héritier 1996: 152). 
 
The scenario that emerges is therefore one in which, after a “first mover”, with the 
Commission acting as “gatekeeper”, has defined a problem and set the agenda, a 
“coordinative pattern” emerges in the problem-solving (Scharpf 1991) phase of early 
drafting. At this stage, technical, scientific experts, who are more interested in 
pragmatic problem-solving (Majone 1994: 91) play an influential role, the more 
technically oriented a regulatory question, the more easily it can be insulated from 
“distributive questions” (Héritier 1996: 155). These scientific committees are seen as 
playing an important role in simplifying problem-solving, even allowing a learning 
process to evolve which facilitates the development of “epistemic communities” and 
mutual learning among national experts (Haas 1992a; quoted in Héritier 1996: 156), 
building a consensus across diverse national interests. 
 
The role of the European Commission as a policy entrepreneur and the role of 
epistemic communities in the EC regulatory process leading to emulation, innovation 
and re-regulation are discussed in greater detail in the next chapter of this thesis. 
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Coordination of interest diversity in EC regulatory competition 
 
Within the scope of Héritier’s hypothesis that competition drives new initiatives in EC 
regulatory policy-making, she has observed that at specific stages of the EC 
regulatory policy-making process, patterns of “informal coordination”, based on 
compensatory payoffs, evolve among actors (Héritier 1996: 150; see also Richardson 
1994: 140). As “competition” gives rise to interest diversity, coordination follows 
once the member states that are “leaders” in regulatory terms have made their 
strategic “first move”, Héritier envisages that there will then be “unilateral 
adjustment” by all other member states during the problem definition stage of the EC 
regulatory policy-making process (1996: 150). It is then at the bargaining stage of the 
regulatory policy-making process that coordination between member states occurs, 
with the consequence that it is most difficult for the “first mover”, the “leader” in 
regulatory terms, to maintain “structural advantage” in the face of compensatory and 
distributional questions (1996: 151). The presumption of Héritier here is that other 
member states will seek payoffs and compensation as the result of their perception 
that member states that are “leaders” in providing the model for EC regulation terms 
will be “winners” in terms of low adaptation costs and first mover advantages once 
their national regulatory approach is adopted as the EC norm. Héritier’s presumption 
appears to be that re-distributive issues will come to the fore in the EC regulatory 
policy-making process because “laggard” member states will see themselves as 
“losers” in regulatory terms, faced with the burden of high adaptation costs once new 
and, for them, previously untried EC regulation comes on stream. For Héritier, the 
“first mover” may at this stage experience a “clear home run” or have to make 
considerable concessions with respect to the regulatory approach proposed, with the 
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final version of EC regulation often containing a mix of diverse national approaches 
amounting to a “thwarted home run”. 
 
Overcoming institutional deadlock in EC regulatory competition 
 
Héritier (1999: 87) points out that the conventional wisdom of EC decision-making is 
that it has a distinct tendency to stall because, in a system of multi-level governance, 
diverse actors are likely to reach stalemate in any given policy area if the application 
of new EC regulation is likely to cause economic loss, impair their decision-making 
competences or impose additional costs of instrumental adjustment. Since virtually all 
regulatory decisions entail some form of “winners and losers” scenario, there might 
have been a rational expectation that deadlock in the policy-making process might 
result from the intransigence of one or more actor, motivated by self-interest and self-
preservation.  Héritier (1999: 88) supports the view that deadlock flows from conflict 
over economic costs and benefits, gains and losses in policy competence and the costs 
of instrumental adjustment. In policy areas where national legal culture and existing 
practice favour a dichotomy between differing national regulatory approaches, the 
reluctance to change the national problem-solving approach and expose domestic 
actors (firms, consumers) to high compliance costs of adaptation, makes EC 
regulatory progress particularly difficult to achieve. 
 
How, then, is progress ever achieved in practice? In relation to environmental policy, 
Héritier suggests that package deals are frequently struck, allowing for differential 
rules within a framework of regulation that takes account of the diverging regulatory 
cultures of different member states (Héritier 1999: 90). The task of the EC regulatory 
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process therefore becomes one of interest accommodation and interest bargaining. 
Elsewhere within the EC institutional setting, Héritier (1999: 89) suggests that a shift 
in the decisional arena may play an important role in promoting progress towards 
agreement on a new EC regulatory approach. The significance of this “shift in the 
decisional area” in the EC regulatory process, will be discussed in this thesis in terms 
of judicial activism and the windows of opportunity opened by policy entrepreneurs. 
 
Diffusion as a process leading to regulation 
 
An alternative to Héritier’s explanation of competition leading to regulation may be 
derived from the United States where, although the terminology of emulation and 
innovation adopted in this thesis has not always been used, in practice the issues 
involved have been a topic of research for over thirty years. Walker (1969) began this 
endeavour with his classic public policy study that defined government innovation as 
a “program or policy which is new to [the state] adopting it” (Walker 1969: 881). The 
central research question that US public policy analysts have sought to answer since 
then is: what causes government to adopt a particular new program or policy?  
 
Three principle schools of thought have sought to provide an answer to this question. 
Through the 1970s and 1980s, state innovation in the United States was characterised 
by the segregation between internal determinants models (Downs 1976; Regens 
1980), which suggested that the factors causing a government to innovate are 
political, economic and social characteristics internal to that state but specify no role 
for regional influence, and regional diffusion models (Grupp and Richards 1975; 
Light 1978), which assumed that states emulate their neighbours when confronted 
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with policy problems but attribute no significance to the internal dynamics of the 
state. In terms of usage of these two models, while internal determinants have tended 
to be portrayed as determinants of policy innovation, it is regional diffusion models 
(Canon and Baum 1981; Gray 1973; Walker 1969) that have been framed in terms of 
explanations for policy emulation. The event history analysis model (Berry and Berry 
1990, 1999) has attempted to combine elements of the earlier variations. The key 
aspects of the internal determinants, diffusion and event history analysis models are 
set out below. 
 
The internal determinants model 
 
The internal determinants model assumes that new regulatory measures are 
attributable to political and economic characteristics internal to the state. The internal 
determinants model would preclude diffusion effects but, once one state has adopted a 
particular approach, it is extremely unlikely that another state’s adoption of the policy 
would be completely independent of the previous adoption. Berry and Berry (1999: 
178) suggest that internal determinants models alone offer inadequate explanations for 
policy innovation and emulation, given that diffusion of some degree is likely to occur 
via, for instance, media coverage or communication among state officials. However 
they also suggest that where internal determinants models may be helpful is by 
assisting in an understanding of how organisational characteristics might determine if 
and when adoption will occur. Individuals in an organisation who advocate particular 
policy ideas and are willing to devote their energies to pushing these ideas can play a 
critical role in the adoption of new policy.  
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Most attention in this respect has focused on policy entrepreneurs and their role in 
agenda setting (Kingdon 1984). Kingdon has commented on the rarity of government 
innovation, noting that it occurs only when a set of conditions occur simultaneously to 
create a policy window (Kingdon 1984). He argues that policy entrepreneurs 
consciously wait for such windows of opportunity to press their policy demands. 
Similarly, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) argue that advocacy coalitions (that is to 
say coordinated groups of governmental officials, activists, journalists, researchers 
and policy analysts) can be crucial in paving the way for the adoption of policy. These 
concepts are examined in greater detail in the next chapter. 
 
The national interaction diffusion model 
 
Rogers (1983: 5) defined diffusion as “the process by which innovation is 
communicated through certain channels over time among the members of a social 
system”. The national interaction model of public policy assumes that there are multi-
lateral communications networks between officials from various states, in which 
officials learn about regulatory initiatives from their peers in other states. It is 
presumed that officials from states that have already adopted a program interact freely 
with officials from those states that have not yet adopted it (Berry and Berry 1999: 
172). Thus Walker (1969) discovers clusters of states having similar orders of 
adoption for a variety of policies and then assesses whether states in the same cluster 
are in the same region of the country. Some of the variation in approach may be 
anticipated due to what Glick and Hayes (1991) call policy ‘reinvention’, namely 
diffusion from one state to another, but this occurs in a way that allows the latter state 
to learn from its predecessor’s mistakes, developing a more sophisticated regulatory 
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approach to solve a similar set of problems. It does so by using information about the 
impacts of the initial regulation to refine its approach rather than simply borrowing a 
regulatory approach wholesale. This method of regulatory “reinvention” displays a 
higher level of sophistication than straightforward imitation of an earlier regulatory 
approach because it displays characteristics of adaptation and an appreciation that the 
application of identical regulatory standards may result in different outcomes 
depending on local conditions and implementation approaches. 
 
The national interaction diffusion model reflects many of the assumptions implicit in 
the policy learning literature, officials interacting and learning from one another 
within institutional structures, with the result that “best practice” in policy is diffused 
from one state to the next. However, in considering the application of the national 
interaction variant of the diffusion model, it is also important to acknowledge that 
cautionary warnings have already been given in the United States: when studying the 
diffusion of regulatory policies, states should not be treated as undifferentiated units 
(Berry and Berry 1999: 173). In much the same way as Mississippi differs in many 
ways from New York, it can be envisaged that Spain differs in many respects from 
Sweden in the EC regulatory context. It is in recognition of these regional disparities 
that the “regional diffusion” model has been advocated as a more appropriate 
analytical tool. 
 
The regional diffusion model 
 
While the national interaction model assumes that any number of states may interact 
with one another on a relatively undifferentiated basis, the regional diffusion model 
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takes into account the geographical proximity of states to each other when 
determining the likely influence that one may have on another. Accordingly, Crain 
(1966) and Lutz (1986) assess the relationship between adoptions by states and 
previous adoptions by their neighbours, seeking to establish whether adoptions occur 
more frequently in jurisdictions with neighbours that have already adopted than in 
jurisdictions with no such neighbours. “Neighbour” models assume that states tend to 
be influenced by those with which they share a border (Berry and Berry 1990). Other, 
“fixed-region” models predict that there are multiple regions within which states tend 
to emulate the policies of other states within the same region (Mooney and Lee 1995). 
The reasons for emulation might be that states “learn” more from those near by than 
from those far away because states have more in common with their neighbours, in 
terms of cultural and social confluence, and geographical and environmental 
conditions (Mooney and Lee 1995: 605). Applying this scenario to the EC regulatory 
process, member states may also find that their legal traditions more closely resemble 
those of their near neighbours, further enhancing a perception of common interests 
and the need for a unified position when negotiating EC regulation. Similarly, public 
pressure to adopt a particular regulatory approach may be greater if a state nearby has 
already initiated similar measures (Berry and Berry 1999: 175). The impact of that 
regulation may well be more visible to citizens, who are more likely to travel to 
nearby states, and to business, which is more likely to have trading links with a state 
that shares its borders. 
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The leader-laggard diffusion model 
 
Related to the regional diffusion model is the leader-laggard model of policy transfer. 
Leader-laggard models assume that certain states are pioneers in the adoption of 
policy approaches, and that other states emulate those leaders (Walker 1969: 893). In 
the United States it is often assumed that this leadership is regional, with one state 
providing leadership for others in that region. Collier and Messick (1975) hypothesise 
that “leaders” tend to be characterised by high economic development, with an 
ordering of successive adoption by the laggards from most developed to least 
developed countries. Leaders and laggards have been identified in US empirical 
analysis in surveys of state officials (Freeman 1985; Grupp and Richards 1975; Light 
1978; Menzel and Feller 1977), for instance, where respondents are asked what states 
are leaders in a particular policy area or which officials in other states they consult for 
advice, the diffusion patterns then discerned from the responses. 
 
Event history analysis 
 
Later studies rather blurred the dichotomy between the internal determinants and 
diffusion models. The work of Berry and Berry was the first to acknowledge 
explicitly that neither a pure internal determinants model nor a pure regional diffusion 
model can provide a plausible explanation of state innovation on its own. In practical 
terms, their work highlights the fact that it may be unrealistic to assume that a state 
blindly emulates its neighbours’ policies without its public officials being influenced 
by the political and economic environment of their own state (Berry and Berry 1990: 
396). On the other hand, they also claim that it is implausible to presume that states 
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are totally isolated from influence by neighbouring states, given that state officials 
meet each other, and that media attention often draws attention to state innovations. 
So, in support of their claim that both internal and regional factors influence a state’s 
propensity to innovate by emulating a neighbouring state, Berry and Berry use Mohr’s 
(1969: 111) theory to assert that the propensity to innovate is a function of “the 
motivation to innovate, the strength of obstacles against innovation, and the 
availability of resources for overcoming such obstacles”. 
 
In order to reflect the simultaneous effects of both internal determinants and policy 
diffusion, the goal of the event history analysis that Berry and Berry advocate (1990: 
398) is to explain a qualitative change (an “event”) that occurs in the behaviour of an 
individual at a particular point in time. The data for analysis (the “event history”) is a 
longitudinal record showing whether and when the event was experienced by a 
sample of individuals during a period of observation. Since most individual 
government programmes can only be adopted once by a given jurisdiction, in 
applying event history analysis to the study of state policy innovation, analysts will 
typically be dealing with non-repeatable events the conceptual variant thus being the 
probability of a state’s adopting a policy during a particular period. 
 
Berry and Berry (1990: 398) suggest that this form of event history analysis has 
several critical advantages over the internal determinants and regional diffusion 
models. Firstly, it is suitable for testing a unified theory of state innovation 
incorporating both internal determinants and regional influences. Secondly, including 
both internal and regional influences in the same model guards against mistaking a 
spurious relationship between states’ years of adoptions and those of their neighbours 
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as evidence of regional diffusion, namely an assumption that a state adopting a 
programme is affected by what its neighbours did perhaps decades earlier. Thirdly, 
while internal determinants and diffusion approaches are capable of predicting only 
whether a particular type of state should have adopted a policy prior to a specified 
date, or the timing of a state’s adoption relative to that of other states, event history 
analysis can predict the probability that a particular type of state will adopt a policy 
during a particular year. 
 
By using event history analysis, Berry and Berry deduce that numerous internal 
determinants of innovation reflect officials’ motivation to innovate, the obstacles they 
face and the resources available. They then seek to establish whether regional 
influences also play a determinant role. Using Elazar’s (1972) claim that policy-
makers tend to view nearby states as “experimental laboratories” for policies, they are 
able to acknowledge that, since the consequences of adopting a new program can be 
difficult to predict, information about the effects on similar states can help to 
overcome uncertainty. Thus policy adoptions by nearby states provide crucial 
resources (information) for overcoming an obstacle (uncertainty) for innovation. 
When a policy decision is unpopular with the electorate, the presence of previously 
adopting nearby states becomes a resource useful for overcoming an obstacle to 
innovation. When a policy decision is generally popular with the electorate, the 
existence of previously adopting nearby states should intensify internal pressures to 
adopt a similar approach as voters see a popular policy in place in nearby states and 
want it in their state as well (Berry and Berry 1990: 400). As a greater number of 
states adopt a popular policy, the motivation for a state to adopt is heightened.  
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Berry and Berry suggest that this insight adds credence to their claim that a unified 
theory of the causes of state innovation, relying on both internal and regional 
influences, can be developed, with recognition that previously adopting nearby states 
can be a resource for overcoming obstacles to innovation suggesting that the strength 
of regional influences on a state’s probability of innovation should vary depending on 
the internal circumstances in a state. It will now be instructive to proceed to an 
assessment of the extent to which theory derived from US public policy analysis can 
assist in explaining the characteristics of the EC regulatory process. 
 
Using diffusion to explain EC regulation 
 
The diffusion model, derived from US public policy analysis, does not of course seek 
directly to account for policy developments in the EC context and there are two 
important reasons why we might want to be cautious about over-emphasising the 
transferability of US analytical models when explaining European phenomena. 
Firstly, the range of instruments and approaches available to policy-makers in the US 
simply do not exist in the European context. As we observed in Chapter 1, the EC has 
been characterised as predominantly a “regulatory state”. While US states have been 
able to rely on a wide variety of policy instruments including fiscal, social and 
judicial measures, in the EC regulation has, virtually to the exclusion of all other 
approaches, emerged the dominant policy tool. The second reason to be cautious 
about using US public policy analysis in the EC context is that the approach seeks to 
explain purely intergovernmental phenomena. The studies that have been undertaken 
in the US describe policy interactions of an intergovernmental nature, set within the 
frame of interactions between states operating within a constitutionally enshrined 
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federal structure, some states influencing others that occupy equivalent constitutional 
territory. Accounting for EC regulatory emulation involves accounting for a rather 
different set of circumstances. Our interest in this thesis is in the ways that EC 
regulation emulates, innovates and re-regulates. Member states are involved in this 
process, but the factors to be taken into account are not only intergovernmental 
interactions between national governments, but also the interactions between member 
states and the European Commission. The utility of US public policy analysis in the 
EC regulatory context is given further consideration below. 
 
US public policy analysis is not entirely without its insights into the factors that might 
influence EC institutions in terms of regulatory opportunities: the internal 
determinants model, for instance, would appear to offer a viable account of regulatory 
innovation by corroborating the characterisation of the EC regulatory process, 
discussed in Chapter 1, as being at least partly accountable for in terms of the policy 
entrepreneurship of Commission officials. On grounds of regulatory efficiency, there 
is an expectation that some EC member states might emulate the regulatory policies 
of others. Like their US state counterparts, policy-makers within the European 
Commission exploit ‘windows of opportunity’ to choose between regulatory 
alternatives in a way that will achieve the desired regulatory objectives in the most 
efficient way. Given the supranational nature of EC decision-making, 
intergovernmental relations between member states are further complicated by the 
role accorded to EC institutions, particularly the Commission, in the EC regulatory 
process. In many respects, it is member states that are observing successful regulatory 
initiatives in other parts of the Community and presenting, from a range of regulatory 
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alternatives, a preferred option that can then be coordinated by the Commission as the 
EC regulatory approach. 
 
In relation to public policy diffusion models, US analysts imply that states bordering 
each other in a particular region often display a common policy preference. So, 
applying policy diffusion models to EC regulation, the expectation would be that 
member state preferences alter slightly from one country to the next, with those states 
furthest apart holding more pronounced differences in their views on the preferred EC 
approach, while those bordering each other would be more likely to share common 
aims. 
 
This also suggests that, when there is potential for member state regulatory options to 
compete for adoption as an EC approach, the likelihood for regionally focused 
diffusion of regulatory policy would be greatest. In a sense, the logic of common 
interests between a regionally homogenous alliance of EC member states, northern 
European states for example, presenting a common regulatory approach as the 
preferred EC approach, is contrary to what one would expect from a competitive 
model. Berry and Berry (1999: 175), for instance, envisaged that US states are more 
likely to be concerned about competition with their close neighbours than with remote 
states. However, in the EC context while this might hold true in terms of, for example, 
competition for corporate location decisions and foreign direct investment, Berry and 
Berry’s model tends to fall down in relation to its omission of similarities or 
differences in cultures – particularly in legal cultures – between neighbouring EC 
member states. The possibility that similarities (and differences) between legal 
traditions motivate EC member states to form regionally based negotiating blocs 
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during negotiations over the form of EC regulation will be investigated as subsequent 
chapters examine the dynamics of the EC regulatory process. 
 
Can, then, leader-laggard diffusion models assist in identifying the determinants of 
EC regulatory emulation for the purposes of this thesis? This model assumes that 
some states emulate other states as part of a ‘learning’ process but Berry and Berry 
(1999: 176) criticise the leader-laggard model for its failure to identify: (i) the states 
(or even the types of states) that are expected to be the pioneers; and (ii) the predicted 
order of adoption of the states that are expected to follow. Is this criticism valid in the 
EC context? Is it possible to be able to predict, with any degree of certainty, how and 
why particular national regulatory approaches are adopted based on the leader and 
laggard model? Surely some predictability can be attributed to the departmental 
culture on the part of the Commission, the critical mass of member states that already 
follow a broadly similar regulatory approach, or the extent to which a particular 
member state has developed a novel and successful regulatory approach that others 
can see clear benefits from following. 
 
Perhaps the greatest potential benefits for US public policy analysis to assist in 
providing explanations for the characteristics of the EC regulatory process lie 
primarily in the distillation of internal determinants and diffusion models carried out 
by Berry and Berry (1990, 1999). By utilising Berry and Berry’s interpretation of 
Mohr’s (1969) analysis of organisational innovation, we are able to see the 
foundations of a suitable conceptual framework that can be applied in the EC 
regulatory setting with diffusion of ideas, not regulatory competition, the most likely 
cause of consensus and co-operation as determinants or causes of EC regulation. 
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Berry and Berry (1990: 399), citing Mohr, argue persuasively that policy outcomes 
are dependent on the motivation to innovate. Applying this variable in the EC context, 
we are readily able to see circumstances in which the willingness of member states to 
sanction new EC regulation and the desire of Commission policy-makers to carry 
through their preferred regulatory policy initiatives are likely to fall under the same 
“motivation to innovate” heading described in the US. 
 
Next, the utilisation of Mohr’s assertion that the strength of obstacles is an important 
determinant, with the probability of policy innovation inversely proportionate to the 
obstacles being faced, appears to carry resonance in the EC regulatory context in 
relation to the acknowledgement made in Chapter 1 that windows of opportunity open 
for policy entrepreneurs in the European Commission. Finally, the suggestion that 
availability of resources is a key variable in innovation, leading policy-makers in the 
US to engage in the emulation of policies previously adopted by nearby states on 
grounds that the success of a neighbour’s earlier policy approach offers an important 
analytical resource and accords closely with the account of “regulatory efficiency” as 
an explanation for EC regulatory innovation that was presented earlier in this thesis. 
 
In the light of the potential relevance of Berry and Berry’s work on providing the 
foundations of a unified theory capable of accounting for regulatory innovation and 
emulation, it is now worth summarising the three explanations that they suggest: 
 
• States emulate one another because they are engaged in “competition” (Berry 
and Berry 1999: 171), with pressure on states to conform to regionally 
accepted standards (Walker 1969: 891) leading to the adoption of approaches 
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already widely accepted by other states. It is thus often rational for states to 
emulate others, on the one hand, in order to achieve a competitive advantage 
and, on the other hand, to avoid being disadvantaged (Berry and Berry 1999: 
171). 
 
• States “learn” from one another as they borrow approaches perceived as 
being successful elsewhere (Berry and Berry 1999: 171). This hypothesis is 
in keeping with Walker’s (1969) presumption that state regulators seek 
shortcuts when faced with complex problems, one crucial method of 
simplification being to choose from a range of alternatives that have been 
tried and tested in other states. By demonstrating how emulation of other 
states’ innovations can simplify complex decisions, policy diffusion assists in 
demonstrating how apparently new and radical approaches in one state can 
actually reflect a wider notion of incremental change (Lindblom 1965) when 
considered as part of a wider scheme of intergovernmental interaction. 
 
• States emulate each other because of “public pressure”, arising from public 
concern or electoral dissatisfaction. 
 
It will be instructive to test the applicability of Berry and Berry’s explanations for 
policy-making decisions in the United States in relation to EC regulation in greater 
depth as the thesis progresses. At this stage, what is required is an indication of the 
extent to which the “competition” and “learning” explanations, already highlighted as 
concepts familiar to scholars of EC regulatory policy-making analysis, are akin to the 
equivalent concepts as they are used in the US sense. What follows is an examination 
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of the “policy learning” literature as it is used in the EC context, the task being to 
indicate the extent to which these approaches have already followed a parallel path to 
Berry and Berry’s work, and to assess the extent to which existing theory is capable of 
accounting for emulation in the EC regulatory process. 
 
Learning as a process leading to regulation 
 
Despite the advantages offered by the policy diffusion literature that emerged from 
the United States following Walker’s (1969) emphasis on the need to find 
explanations for diffusion based on timing, geographic location and resource 
similarities, by the mid-1980s, there was a growing perception that “a major problem 
of this research tradition is that it reveals nothing about the content of new policies. Its 
fascination is with process not substance” (Clark 1985: 65). Out of this perceived 
need to address questions ignored by policy diffusion studies grew a new body of 
literature on lesson drawing and policy transfer. 
 
In addition to the possibilities offered by “competition” and “diffusion” explanations 
for regulation, a separate but related strand of literature suggests that states “learn” 
from one another as they borrow approaches perceived as being successful elsewhere. 
The “learning” scenario relates to, but is not identical to, the explanation for 
emulation offered by the diffusion model. In their diffusion hypothesis, Berry and 
Berry  (1999: 171) follow Walker’s (1969) presumption that state regulators seek 
shortcuts when faced with complex problems, one crucial method of simplification 
being to choose from a range of alternatives that have been tried and tested in other 
states. In this sense, the “policy learning” explanation for emulation accords closely 
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with Majone’s (1990: 2) assertion that looking for models that imitate rather than 
seeking originality is the key to EC regulatory policy-making because imitation is 
efficient in regulatory terms. 
 
As Hancher and Moran (1989: 285) have expressed this: “Copying is obviously an 
economical way of solving the problem of regulatory design. Since regulation 
typically is begun under pressure of time, or in conditions of crisis, the incentive to 
imitate is great.  The result is that ‘early’ regulators often provide a model for 
countries following later along the regulatory road”. As Hancher and Moran put it: 
“there are ‘early’ and ‘late’ regulators.  This simple fact of historical timing has 
profound implications for regulatory arrangements, because it intimately affects the 
international diffusion of regulatory forms.  The most casual acquaintance with any 
important substantive area of regulation soon reveals that “institutions and rules are 
widely imitated” (Hancher and Moran 1989: 285). 
 
Similarly, in the EC regulatory context, Armstrong (1999: 784) has suggested a 
process of “bounded learning” in which a preferred approach is selected from a 
limited set of policy choices. This approach is taken instead of a rational appraisal of 
each specific situation leading to a unique and efficient policy prescription. 
Armstrong suggests that EC regulatory change takes into account a variety of sources 
of pressure for change – from economic and political constituencies to the institutions 
themselves – with the result that these forces have not resulted in a single efficient 
regulatory reform process, but rather that competing approaches have been mediated 
through the organisational, procedural, and normative structures of the EC.  
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The result, according to Armstrong, is that past solutions become attached to what is 
perceived as a new problem as the result of an evolutionary process of learning. With 
EC regulatory options restricted to pre-existing solutions to problems rather than 
developing new solutions, “the process of learning may, therefore, be viewed as 
bounded, in that strategies and instruments deployed in one setting may be applied in 
other settings or at least frame the debate about appropriate structures and 
instruments” (Armstrong 1999: 784). Given the long histories of the nation states in 
seeking to develop policy solutions, “the EU institutions can themselves learn and 
apply policy solutions which have their origins in the Member States…these national 
structures and strategies can, therefore, either be mimicked in the development of EU 
policy or simply harnessed in the delivery of EU goals and objectives (Armstrong 
1999: 785). 
 
Advocates of lesson drawing and policy transfer argue that it can assist in providing 
explanations for emulation to the extent that they are concepts that refer to a process 
in which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements and institutions in 
one setting are used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements and 
institutions in another time or place. Initially, these studies focused upon “voluntary” 
policy transfer, with “lesson drawing” implying that actors in one country draw 
lessons from one or more other countries, which they observe and then apply to their 
own system.  Dolowitz and Marsh (1996: 344) have suggested that policy transfer has 
a wider meaning as a term that can cover both “voluntary” and “coercive” transfer, 
the key distinction being that the latter envisages that one government or 
supranational institution, such as the Commission, ‘pushes’ other governments into 
accepting a particular policy approach. 
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Dolowitz and Marsh have identified six main categories of actors involved in 
emulation: elected officials; political parties; bureaucrats; pressure groups; policy 
entrepreneurs/experts; and supranational institutions (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996: 345). 
The latter two categories warrant particular attention: policy entrepreneurs/experts are 
important actors in lesson drawing and policy transfer because they act as advocacy 
coalitions, their concern with a particular subject leading them to build an 
international network of contacts in that area as a source of ideas (Rose 1991); 
supranational organisations such as the European Commission encourage the 
exchange of information between policy entrepreneurs/experts and also promote 
comparison so that member states become aware of what their competitors are doing 
and decide which elements of foreign programmes they wish to emulate (Rose 1991). 
 
However, most lesson drawing and policy transfer studies prior to Dolowitz and 
Marsh tended to pay too little attention to the interplay between supranational 
organisations and coercive forms of policy transfer. This is surprising given the 
potential for EC regulation to emulate prior national regulation not only as a result of 
comparison and voluntary emulation, but also for EC institutions to play a key role in 
coercive policy transfer (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996: 348). This thesis, for instance, 
highlights the extent to which the European Court of Justice (see also Shapiro 1992) 
used judicial activism to open the window of opportunity to enable further rounds of 
EC regulatory activity to liberalise insurance markets in the form of measures that 
closely resembled and emulated prior national financial services regulation in the UK. 
In addition to the direct imposition of policy transfer, Dolowitz and Marsh (1996 p. 
348) also assert that emulation may arise as the result of “indirect coercive transfer”, 
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with functional interdependence leading to lessons that can be used in drafting 
regulation in other regimes, externalities resulting from interdependence pushing 
governments to work together to solve common problems. This argument carries 
particular resonance in relation to environmental regulation.  Majone, for example, 
discovered that externalities stimulated the development of EC regulation of 
dangerous chemical substances in response to US legislation controlling imports of 
toxic substances. In response to US regulatory action, member states turned to the 
Commission to draft a common EC regulatory response (Majone 1991b: 98). 
 
Technology can also push governments into policy transfer since, not knowing how to 
deal with the issues that technological advances create, regulators turn to other 
regimes for solutions. In terms of environmental regulation, this thesis discusses the 
decision of the EC in the later 1970s and early 1980s to introduce strict toxicological 
limits in order to ensure drinking water quality was driven by advancements in 
scientific detection of chemicals in water, the associated rise of environmental lobby 
groups and the politicisation of environmental protection issues in Western Europe. 
 
Policy transfer also suggests that regulators can also be pushed towards ‘indirect 
coercive transfer’ as the result of a process akin to Berry and Berry’s “leaders and 
laggards” scenario of policy diffusion outlined above: actors perceive that they are 
falling behind their neighbours or competitors, with the result that “action elsewhere 
may translate into a feeling of insecurity about being the odd-man out” (Bennett 1993: 
150). Thus the emergence of a European Community of member states encourages 
comparison with European neighbours and a collective insecurity about the EC’s 
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international competitive position in global markets, both contributing to the trend to 
emulate the best-placed member state in regulatory terms. 
 
When engaged in policy transfer actors have a range of alternative ways of drawing a 
lesson. Rose (1991: 22) identifies five possible scenarios: firstly, copying occurs 
when a programme already in effect in another jurisdiction can be adopted more or 
less intact; secondly, emulation occurs when a programme already in effect in another 
jurisdiction can be adapted with adjustment for different circumstances; thirdly, 
hybridisation combines elements of programmes from two different places; fourthly, 
synthesis combines familiar elements from programmes in effect in three or more 
different places; and fifthly, inspiration occurs when programmes already used 
elsewhere provide the intellectual stimulus for developing a novel programme. 
 
This thesis suggests that explanations for EC regulation can be derived from a set of 
variables that are related to, but not identical to, those outlined by Rose. These 
explanations were set out in the introduction to the thesis. By way of comparison with 
Rose’s range of options open for actors seeking policy transfer, the first, direct 
copying, is not considered directly relevant in the EC context given that the form of 
EC regulation – the Directive – essentially gives member states a large degree of 
discretion in terms of the implementation of a particular Community legislative 
instrument, largely negating the likelihood of direct copying without changes being 
required to take account of administrative structures and legal traditions in different 
parts of the Community. Rose’s second category, which he terms “emulation” is akin 
to the scenario of emulation as it is discussed in this thesis, namely the adaptation of a 
programme already in existence in one member state and its implementation, via an 
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EC Directive, to other parts of the Community. This thesis then shares with Rose an 
acknowledgement of the potential for a “hybrid” of approaches from more than one 
member state providing the model for EC regulation, but it also agrees with Dolowitz 
and Marsh’s suggestion that the hybridisation and synthesis categories should, in fact, 
be combined, so that the “hybrid” heading includes the combination of elements 
found in more than two states. Finally, the thesis incorporates Rose’s notion of 
‘inspiration’ in the context of lessons that inspire “invention” in regulatory terms, 
developing novel approaches without the prior existence of analogous regulation 
elsewhere. 
 
Assessment 
 
Héritier has emphasised the significance of regulatory competition as a determinant of 
what this thesis has termed emulation and innovation in the EC regulatory process, the 
scenario being that highly regulated member states “competing” with one another to 
see their national regulatory approach chosen as the EC norm. However, competition 
is only one possible explanation for the characterisation of EC regulation in terms of 
emulation, innovation and re-regulation. This chapter noted that policy diffusion 
theory has identified other explanations for emulation: policy learning and public 
pressure. In relation to explaining the EC regulatory process these determinants 
remain relatively understudied, with the work of Rose (1991) and Dolowitz and 
Marsh (1996) offering an insight into the potential of policy transfer literature and 
explicit encouragement to others to engage in much-needed further research. This lack 
of appropriate theoretical frameworks is all the more surprising given the evidence 
that member states may not be “competing”, but may in fact be making rational 
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decisions to co-operate and “learn” from one another to achieve the most efficient 
regulatory outcomes at Community level. 
 
Diffusion, competition and learning are all processes that may influence the EC 
regulatory process and are far from being mutually exclusive. Rather, they should be 
viewed as complimentary scenarios that can account for different events and different 
outcomes within the complex web of interests, actors and institutions in the EC 
regulatory process. Indeed, while Héritier’s EC regulatory policy-making analysis has 
tended to emphasise the “regulatory competition” scenario on a largely 
intergovernmental level with the Commission as “gatekeeper”, the potential for rival 
national regulatory approaches to engage in “competition” may have been somewhat 
overstated. In other instances, when member states all demonstrate their preference 
for a particular regulatory approach, consensus and co-operation may be more 
significant. Subsequent chapters of the thesis will outline the significance of this 
debate in relation to case studies of EC regulation of insurance services and drinking 
water quality. 
 
In the light of the foregoing literature review, a hypothesis may be constructed that: 
 
• Regulatory competition, stressed by Héritier as the dominant form of 
interaction resulting in emulation of EC member state regulatory policy, is 
only one possible route to EC regulation that closely resembles prior national 
regulation; 
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• Diffusion and learning may equally lead to co-operation between actors in the 
EC regulatory process in a manner that ensures the emergence of a broad 
consensus on the preferred regulatory approach for Europe. This co-operative, 
consensual process takes the place of “competition”; 
 
• The result is that, through a process of distinguishing between regulatory 
competition, on the one hand, and regulatory consensus and co-operation, on 
the other, it is possible for the thesis to construct a more refined model of the 
particular determinants or causes of EC regulation; 
 
• Having emphasised the significance of consensus and co-operation as factors 
influencing outcomes in the EC regulatory process, this model can then be 
tested against case study material in chapters 4 and 5 of the thesis. Before 
undertaking detailed case study analysis the next chapter will first look at the 
key interests, actors and institutions that influence outcomes in the EC 
regulatory process, stressing the extent to which policy learning leads to co-
operation and the emergence of a broad consensus that may help to explain the 
tendency of a particular EC regulatory approach to emerge. 
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CHARACTERISING EC REGULATION: 
EMULATION, INNOVATION AND RE-REGULATION 
 
CHAPTER 3  
 
INTERESTS, ACTORS AND INSTITUTIONS: 
MEMBER STATE PREFERENCES AND  
EUROPEAN COMMISSION ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
IN THE EC REGULATORY PROCESS 
 
 
Introduction 
 
So far, this thesis has set out the reasons behind its intention to characterise EC 
regulation in terms of emulation, innovation and re-regulation. It has reviewed 
explanations for the growth of EC regulation, derived from the work of Majone in 
particular, and suggested that the competition explanations of the EC regulatory 
process advocated by Héritier are flawed and that explanations based on consensus 
and co-operation, derived from theories of diffusion and policy learning, are more 
helpful in understanding what happens in practice. Before undertaking detailed case 
study analysis in the next two chapters of this thesis to test the validity of these 
hypotheses, it is instructive to look more closely at the key interests, actors and 
institutions that influence outcomes in the EC regulatory process and to consider the 
extent to which prior accounts and established theoretical approaches in this respect 
can inform our understanding of the EC regulatory process. 
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Although often preoccupied with issues other than the “regulatory” nature of the 
European Community, well-established theories of European integration and EC 
policy-making nonetheless offer useful insights for this thesis. Existing theories may 
have inherent weaknesses in terms of explaining either the tendency for emulation, 
innovation and re-regulation to characterise the EC regulatory process, or for 
consensus and co-operation to be the main drivers for a particular EC regulatory 
approach, but each theory provides some relative degree of insight, however flawed, 
into possible reasons for path dependency between national and Community 
regulatory approaches. A number of theoretical approaches that offer up possible 
assistance when accounting for consensus and co-operation in the EC regulatory 
process are considered in this chapter by two broad headings: (i) explanations that 
emphasise member state preferences; and (ii) explanations that emphasise European 
Commission entrepreneurship. 
 
Member state preferences 
 
Functionalist theory 
 
Functionalist explanations for the delegation of regulatory powers from member states 
to the EC institutions envisage successful market integration in limited areas leading 
to unpredictable “spillovers”’ into other areas of competence. Within the functionalist 
scenario, where the EC is a bargaining forum for member states’ national interests to 
be expressed, innovation in EC regulation or emulation of prior national regulation as 
the EC norm might occur because, given the primacy of national governments vis-à-
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vis EC institutions that functionalists anticipate, national governments reach 
consensus on the need for coordinated action at EC level. 
 
In Keohane's classic study of the functional theory of regimes, international 
institutions make interstate agreements possible by improving the information 
available to each state about the preferences, goals and behaviour of other states 
(Keohane 1984). The international regimes provide a stable forum for bargaining, 
allowing states to proceed directly to negotiation of agreements without having to 
establish bargaining rules every time they seek agreement on a particular policy issue.   
 
In EC regulatory policy-making, the functional, transaction-cost approach forms the 
basis of the traditional “Monnet method”, namely that of promoting market 
integration starting with limited achievements, establishing de facto solidarity, from 
which a federation would gradually emerge (Monnet 1978: 93). Functionalist 
explanations of European integration anticipate unpredictable spillovers, a mechanism 
akin to policy transfer explanations, which amount to “a form of generalised policy 
promiscuity in which no one really knows what leads to what” (Weale 1997: 669).  
 
Functionalist theory thus offers explanations of why member states have been 
prepared to delegate regulatory powers to the EC institutions (Haas: 1968) based on 
facilitating co-operation, monitoring compliance with EC regulation, identifying 
breaches in regulation, and consolidating regulation. The need for consolidation 
through second-round regulatory changes and re-adjustment is also anticipated by 
functionalist theory because the dynamics of the subject matter mean that initial 
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regulation will be incomplete. The functional scenario, then, is that the EC is a 
bargaining forum for member states’ national interests to be expressed. 
 
The chief advocate of a functional interpretation of the EC bargaining process is 
Moravcsik (1993, 1998), whose liberal intergovernmental agenda is mainly intended 
to structure the explanation of “celebrated intergovernmental bargains” in the history 
of European integration (see also Scharpf 1999: 65). Moravscik contends that EC 
institutions strengthen the autonomy of national governments, make bargaining 
between member states more efficient and so reduce transaction costs (Moravcsik 
1993: 507-508). In the context of negotiations leading to the Single European Act, 
Moravcsik suggested that it was interstate bargains between the UK, France and 
Germany that were the key determinants (Moravcsik 1991: 42). While recognising 
arguments of the regime school of international relations that a common EC approach 
reduces transaction costs and minimises uncertainty, and the primacy given by the 
realist school to member states as the principal actors in the EC system, Moravcsik 
differentiated his liberal intergovernmentalism by stressing the importance of 
domestic politics in influencing the changing interests of states (Moravcsik 1991: 48). 
He has argued that preferences of national governments in EC negotiations are 
determined by domestic societal forces, the identity of important societal groups, the 
nature of their interests and their relative influence on domestic policy (Moravcsik 
1993: 483), subject to some “agency slack” (1993: 484) where societal forces delegate 
power to governments and, in doing so, allowing government agents a wider range of 
discretionary powers in EC negotiations. 
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In exploiting agency slack, Moravcsik argues that national governments have not been 
passive agents, but have used EC institutions as part of a two-level game to increase 
autonomy in relation to domestic interests (1993: 515). In this sense, Moravcsik has 
argued, EC institutions may have in fact strengthened the state by allowing the 
manipulation of domestic constituencies so that they accept common policies 
(according to Richardson 1996: 52). For Moravcsik, “the unique institutional structure 
of the EC is acceptable to national governments only insofar as it strengthens their 
control over domestic affairs, permitting them to attain goals otherwise unachievable” 
(1993: 507). Yet the unique institutional structure of the EC is also likely to 
undermine the autonomy of national governments as strengthen it (Richardson 1996a: 
212) because the ability of one member state to influence, let alone control, the EC 
process is extremely limited, in part due to the multiplicity of national interests and, in 
part, due to the propensity of interest groups to realign and reframe previously purely 
national issue areas in response to EC endeavours. 
 
Moravcsik’s approach is based on three key characteristics: the importance of the 
leading role of member states in EC bargaining, lowest-common denominator 
bargaining, and the protection of national sovereignty (Moravcsik 1991: 46). He 
argues that these characteristics are more significant than supranational 
institutionalism in determining outcomes in the EC context. However, as Bulmer and 
Armstrong (1998: 31) argue, it does appear that Moravcsik underestimates important 
aspects of supranational institutional input, over rationalising the negotiation process 
through a “reductionist emphasis on the role of national governments” (Bulmer and 
Armstrong 1998: 33). 
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In reality, the impact of EC institutions on outcomes in the EC regulatory process 
goes beyond simple bargaining efficiencies for member states (Sandholtz 1996: 405). 
Functionalism also envisages that regulatory powers will be delegated to the EC 
institutions where this is deemed more efficient than individualistic action on the part 
of the member states. But transfers of competence to the EC institutions also create 
conditions for “agency losses”, namely the potential for EC institutions not only to 
reflect the intentions of the member states, but also to pursue their own agendas. 
Overall, then, the functionalist expectation would be that member states are only 
prepared to accept the involvement of EC institutions in regulatory policy-making in 
so far as such involvement is in their own national interests. The role of institutional 
actors in the EC regulatory process will be addressed later in this chapter. 
 
Multi-level governance 
 
Avoiding an approach reliant on intergovernmental interpretations of the EC 
regulatory process, the literature on multi-level governance (Hooghe 1996; Leibfried 
and Pierson 1995; Marks 1993; Marks et al 1996; Scharpf 1994) and related work on 
new institutionalism (Bulmer 1994 and 1998) is based on the premise that the 
sovereignty of member states is not being confronted directly. EC institutions are 
considered political actors rather than agents in a relationship where member states 
are principals. 
 
In this sense the Commission is learning to behave like a political actor (Sandholtz 
1996: 411-412) and, as a result, regulatory policy-making is multi-level rather than 
interstate (Marks 1993; Marks et al 1996). Instead of being explicitly challenged, 
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member states are being encouraged to participate in multi-level regulatory policy-
making because they see the intrinsic benefits of decisional reallocation to the EC 
level. 
 
Multi-level governance explanations anticipate that the Commission can manipulate 
access to information and regulatory policy-making and shape political coalitions 
(Sandholtz 1996: 411). This is because member states derive diverse benefits from a 
complex array of bargains that are not divisible into separate deals that EC regulatory 
policy-making becomes a set of linked compromises that could not possibly be 
extracted from the larger-body and made free-standing (Sandholtz 1996: 411). This 
means that member states have an interest in a range of EC regulatory bargains, even 
when this involves inefficiencies and awkward compromises. When there is an EC 
common policy they dislike, national governments are unlikely to simply walk away 
because it would mean the abandonment of other bargains that produce clear benefits 
(Sandholtz 1996: 411). 
 
Policy networks 
 
An important aspect of multi-level governance explanations of regulatory policy-
making is an emphasis on policy networks (Borzel 1998; Coleman and Perl 1997; 
Dowding 1995; Hassenteufel 1995; Jordan and Schubert 1992; Kenis and Schneider 
1991).  Multi-level governance explanations stress that what happens at one level of 
policy-making reverberates and affects the others, so that different policy networks at 
multiple levels are intertwined (Zito and Egan 1998: 96).  The policy networks 
explanation may assist in understanding of ways in which ideas are translated into 
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proposals in the EC regulatory policy process (Richardson 1996b: 4), especially in the 
technical areas of 'low politics' (Hoffmann 1966) where the emphasis will be on the 
importance of ideas, knowledge and expertise rather than pure ‘interest’. 
 
The policy networks explanation stresses the importance of the structural relationship 
between institutions (Rhodes and Marsh 1992) within which policy networks can be 
seen as a cluster of actors connected by resource interdependencies (Grant, Perl and 
Knoepfel 1999: 5).  Exchange of resources occurs between actors in the network, 
usually involving more than one resource.  Resource exchanges include information, 
finance, legal competences, time and consensus. Mature policy networks are 
characterised by stability over time and shared procedural norms (‘rules of the game’) 
that govern conflict resolution procedures. 
 
The policy networks explanation concerns itself with interests at national and regional 
level that shape the direction and content of regulation (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 
1993: 48-58) and provides some insights into how the policy process defines and 
constrains EC regulatory outputs (Rhodes, Bache and George 1996: 377 and 381-
385).  Because EC regulation often deals with complex and technical areas, regulators 
need access to high levels of expertise and knowledge throughout the policy 
formulation, decision-making and implementation stages (Zito and Egan 1998: 95). 
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Historical institutionalism 
 
“Historical institutionalist” arguments suggest that gaps develop in member state 
control over EC regulatory policy-making because there will be short-term electoral 
concerns, due to unintended consequences, due to the shifting preferences of national 
decision makers, and because policy reversal will become progressively more costly 
(Pierson 1996). 
 
For historical institutionalists, the term “institutions” is used to refer to all formal 
rules, compliance procedures, and standard operating practices that structure the 
relationship between individuals and various units of the polity and economy (Hall 
1986: 19). Historical institutionalism is concerned with the way that relatively stable 
routines frame policy-making behaviour. It suggests that institutional arrangements 
are not neutral, but embody beliefs and ideas that provide an advantage to some actors 
over others (Jordan 1999: 24). Once created, institutions take on a life of their own, 
acting as intervening variables between the preferences of actors on the one hand, and 
regulatory outcomes on the other. More significantly, institutions are said to constrain 
the choices available in regulatory policy-making and modify actor preferences. In 
this sense, institutions lend a path-dependent character to regulatory policy-making in 
the face of actor preferences and (necessarily incomplete) information on the nature of 
policy problems (Pierson 1996, 1997). 
 
In terms of consolidation and revision of EC regulation, historical institutionalism 
makes a potentially useful contribution to explanations of EC regulatory policy-
making (Hall and Taylor 1996). The institutionalist perspective envisages that, once a 
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regulatory choice is made, it both precludes and facilitates alternative future choices 
(Krasner 1984: 225). This approach views regulatory policy-making as a branching 
model within which the choice of a particular fork then makes it difficult to follow a 
regulatory path that has earlier been rejected (Jordan 1999). 
 
Historical institutionalists would predict that, with the passage of time, the possibility 
of departing from a particular regulatory route decreases (Arthur 1989). This is due to 
the fact that interest groups learn how new institutional systems operate and mobilise 
their resources according to the incentives they create, locking them into place. 
Institutional factors thus prevent flexibility in regulatory policy-making. Once 
regulatory choices have been made, the preferences of policy actors are shaped and 
defined by their response within a closely defined framework (March and Olsen 1984, 
1989). 
 
In the context of EC regulatory policy-making, it is possible to identify a complex 
web of formal and informal institutions. In seeking to explain the interactions between 
agency and structure within that web, institutionalists begin from the 
intergovernmentalist perspective that member states are utility-maximising actors 
capable of dominating the policy process. They then proceed to show that institutions 
structure and restrict the terrain upon which member states attempt to alter existing 
policies and adopt new ones (March and Olsen 1989: 53-67). 
 
Pierson (1996, 1997) and Jordan (1999) suggest that this model of historical 
institutionalism explains why member states periodically lose control of particular 
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policy areas and find themselves locked into new forms of regulatory consolidation or 
regulatory entrenchment that do not entirely suit their needs. 
 
European Commission entrepreneurship 
 
Returning to the work of Majone, whose conception of EC regulation was set out in 
Chapter 1, Majone’s expectation was that the insulation of the Commission from 
partisan politics and electoral results may further contribute to the ability of the 
Community to rely on policy entrepreneurship as such an important feature of EC 
regulatory policy-making (Majone 1996: 78). The issue of political independence of 
regulators is generally considered essential for the credibility of regulatory policies 
(Majone 1996: 270) yet this is problematic for politicians because in a democracy 
political agendas have a short time scale. The delegation of regulatory powers to 
politically independent agencies is thus an important way in which governments can 
commit themselves to regulatory strategies that would not be credible in the absence 
of such delegation. 
 
While Majone attributes the willingness of member state governments to accept the 
independence of EC regulators to an issue of political credibility, he also recognises 
that, in practice, national governments are often driven by considerations of political 
expediency that provide the motivation to interfere with regulatory decisions or to 
limit regulatory discretion and creating an ambivalent attitude towards regulatory 
independence (Majone 1996: 270). The lack of clarity as to the limits of political 
independence of EC regulators is particularly problematic given the Treaty-based 
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requirement that the Commission pursue common Treaty objectives in an even-
handed and non-partisan way. 
 
Majone points out that, in practice, EC Commission officials are not immune from 
political influences from the member states and from elsewhere within the 
Commission (Majone 1996: 272). Yet, while recognising that pressure from member 
states may be difficult to withstand, the fact that the final regulatory policy-making 
decisions are taken by the Commission only when it meets as a collegiate body is also 
significant. The need to achieve a majority within the Commission college is of 
crucial importance in curbing political interference in regulatory policy-making, albeit 
with the inherent risk of sub-optimal decisions in the resultant outputs. 
 
Within the European Commission, departmental culture may also be a significant 
factor in determining how an EC regulatory approach is formulated (see also Cini 
1996: 223; Bulmer and Armstrong 1998: 59; Hooghe 2001). The extent to which the 
nationality of specific individuals, or groups of individuals, working within the higher 
echelons of a particular Directorate General of the Commission may influence the EC 
regulatory approach that is adopted will be the subject of particular analysis in 
relation to the case studies reported in the next two chapters of this thesis. 
 
As a general principle, it should be recalled that the European Commission has a legal 
right of initiative in proposing new EC regulation. EC regulation is thus defined, 
developed and formulated through agreement among the member states on the basis 
of proposals made by the European Commission, but the earliest stages of the 
regulatory process take place before this, within the Commission.  
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This stage of policy formulation has been characterised as informal and fluid (Gold 
1993), the informality of the process allowing the Commission to choose, on a 
pragmatic basis, whether or not to ask a committee of experts to assist in the 
preparation of a regulatory initiative. The informal and fluid nature of this process has 
been accounted for largely in terms of the Commission’s responsibilities to propose 
regulation that reflects the complexity of existing law, practice and traditions in the 
member states (Gold 1993). In achieving this task, the distinctive approach of the 
Commission towards new regulation has been viewed traditionally in terms of its 
openness to new ideas and its accessibility to client groups (Wallace, Wallace and 
Webb 1983). 
 
These client groups include member states and non-state actors (for instance industry 
and public action non-governmental organisations), with the involvement of particular 
actors varying depending on the nature of the issue at stake (Nugent 1991). Generally, 
however, it can be said that during the process of formulating new EC regulation 
member states and non-state actors will seek to influence the form and content of 
proposed EC regulation. For non-governmental actors, pressure is exerted by lobbying 
(in either a pre-emptive or reactive way) targeted directly at the Commission or 
indirectly via national governments who in turn take forward particular interests 
during intergovernmental negotiations (Mazey and Richardson 1992). 
 
As member states and non-state actors seek to influence new EC regulation the ways 
that the Commission and the Council engage in negotiation are constantly shifting and 
evolving the interpretation and application of EC Treaty provisions are themselves an 
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important stimulus for new EC regulation (Weale and Williams 1994).  It was via the 
Single European Act, for instance, that the European Commission was able to reassert 
its own procedural authority in relation a wide spectrum of policy issues. 
 
For Pollack institutional arrangements in the European Community give the 
Commission considerable formal and informal agenda-setting powers (Pollack 1997). 
Within this institutional structure, Pollack views member states as “principals” that 
delegate specific tasks to supranational “agents”, namely the European Commission, 
which in turn develops areas of autonomous regulatory influence. For Pollack, the 
activities of the Commission in EC regulatory policy-making become autonomous of 
member state influence because the latter cannot exercise complete control where this 
is costly or where member state preferences diverge and sanctions may be ineffectual. 
 
In this context, new governance explanations of the EC regulatory model (Majone 
1996; Kreher and Meny 1997; Beyers and Dierickx 1998; Hix 1998; Wessels 1998; 
Skou Andersen and Rasmussen 1998) assume that EC regulation becomes “positive 
sum” when policy responsibility is delegated to independent institutions that act in the 
public interest but at arm’s length from majoritarian institutions (e.g. national 
governments, parliaments and the Council of Ministers). 
 
However, this does not fully account for the growth of EC regulation that has been 
experienced. It is to the Commission’s propensity to engage in policy 
entrepreneurship that this chapter will, therefore, now turn. 
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Policy entrepreneurship 
 
Majone, whose explanation for the growth of EC regulation was set out in Chapter 1, 
characterises the Commission as a corporate actor interested in expanding regulatory 
policies in order to enhance its own powers (Majone 1994a). However, having 
relatively few personnel or financial resources of its own, it depends on member states 
to provide policy expertise. 
 
The role of the Commission can be seen as that of “agenda setter”, where the agenda 
setter is able to select its most preferred solution among a range of options (Scharpf 
1999: 75). In performing this role, the Commission is confronted with a variety of 
regulatory proposals from different member states and, from this multitude of 
proposals the Commission chooses the ones that it wants to put on the legislative track 
(Héritier 1996: 152). In this sense, “one European measure may be modelled after the 
regulatory style of one member state” (Héritier 1996: 149). 
 
The existence of large margins of regulatory discretion allows the Commission to play 
the role of policy entrepreneur (Majone 1998a: 24) and to determine the extent to 
which the opportunity for EC regulation will occur (Wendon 1998). Policy 
entrepreneurs are described as being constantly searching for windows of opportunity 
to push their preferred ideas (Kingdon 1984). The Commission’s capacity for taking 
advantage of windows of opportunity (Cini 1996: 221) is a significant feature of the 
EC regulatory process. 
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Policy windows will open infrequently, usually when three separate policy streams 
(problems, politics and policy ideas) come together (Majone 1996: 74). As policy 
entrepreneurs come together to search for solutions to a particular problem, a stream 
of policy ideas will be generated. The entrepreneurs must then try to take advantage 
of a receptive political climate to promote their solution to a policy problem. 
 
A successful policy entrepreneur possesses three qualities: firstly, he must be taken 
seriously either as an expert, as a leader of a powerful interest group or as an 
authoritative decision maker; secondly, he must be known for his political 
connections or negotiating skills; thirdly, he must be persistent (Kingdon 1984: 189-
190).  
 
Majone (1998a) has attributed Commission officials with qualities of successful 
policy entrepreneurship unmatched by national civil servants. Their qualities are due 
to the way Commission officials are recruited, the structure of their career incentives 
and the crucial role of the Commission in policy initiation (Majone 1994a: 91; 1998b: 
25). Eichener (1992) supports the view that the “structural conditions of recruitment 
and career favour a tendency to support new ideas and to pursue a strategy of 
innovative regulation which attempts to go beyond everything which can presently be 
found in the Member States”.  
 
In relation to the single market programme, Sandholtz and Zysman (1989) argue that 
the success of the initiative should be viewed in terms of “elite bargains formulated in 
response to international structural change and the Commission’s policy 
entrepreneurship” (Sandholtz and Zysman 1989: 97). Within this version of the 
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model, Sandholtz and Zysman suggest that three factors combine to influence 
decisions in broad policy sectors: domestic politics, the Commission’s initiative and 
the role of business elites.  
 
Cowles (1995) has also identified the role of a coalition of elite industrialists, meeting 
within the European Round Table of Industrialists, as a significant factor supporting 
completion of the internal market. The role that elites comprising industry non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) and their public interest counterparts 
representing, for instance, environmental and consumer concerns, play in the EC 
regulatory process will be discussed in greater detail during the analysis of case study 
material undertaken in subsequent chapters. 
 
Bulmer and Armstrong (1998: 35) have criticised Sandoltz and Zysman’s approach on 
grounds that, for an article presenting Commission entrepreneurship as the motor for 
the single market programme, it is strange that there is no detail on how this 
entrepreneurship affected how the Commission’s 1985 White Paper on Completion of 
the Internal Market was drawn up, arguing only that the Commission’s approach had 
much to do with “policy learning”, that is to say learning from the failures of the old 
harmonisation approach of EC regulation and from the lessons of the European Court 
of Justice Cassis de Dijon judgement. Policy learning and the role of the European 
Court of Justice in opening windows of opportunity that the Commission, as a policy 
entrepreneur, could utilise, are discussed later in this chapter. 
 
Policy entrepreneurs can break up existing equilibria in order to create new and more 
profitable political outcomes through agenda setting, strategic behaviour and the 
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introduction of new policy dimensions into political debate (Riker 1986). This 
strategy, for example, has been attributed to the introduction by the Commission of 
the concept of working environment into the debate on appropriate EC regulation of 
health and safety at work (Majone 1998a: 26), inspired by the regulatory philosophy 
of the Netherlands and Denmark, which first introduced the concept of working 
environment into their legislation (Eichener 1992). 
 
The nature, timing and quality of many EC regulatory developments cannot be fully 
understood without taking into consideration other factors such as the policy 
entrepreneurship of the Commission or the activism of powerful actors who cannot 
wait for incremental task expansion to produce policy outputs they want (Majone 
1996: 66). Supranational institutions such as the Commission have, of course, 
interests of their own, such as growth and survival, which are separate from the sum 
of the national interests of the member states (Majone 1996: 73). 
 
The Directorate General of the Commission responsible for a particular policy area 
forms what Majone (1994a: 90; 1996: 73) describes as the “central node” of a vast 
“issue network” which include national experts, academics, consumer and other 
public interests groups, economic interests, professional organisations and sub-
national governmental organisations. Commission officials consult widely and 
operate less as technical experts alongside other technical experts than as policy 
entrepreneurs (Majone 1994a: 90; 1998b: 24) at the hub of the issue network, 
constantly looking for ‘windows of opportunity’ through which to push their preferred 
ideas. 
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Over relatively long time periods, the Commission exhibits considerable persistence 
in its policy proposals, with many regulatory initiatives achieved many years after 
policy proposals were originally made. A successful policy entrepreneur has been 
characterised as being one who, acting through agenda setting and strategic 
behaviour, especially through the introduction of new policy dimensions to political 
debate, “probes until he finds some new alternative, some new dimension that strikes 
a spark in the preferences of others” (Riker 1986: 64). The Commission can act in this 
way breaking up existing coalitions and equilibria in order to create new and more 
profitable outcomes (Majone 1998b: 26). 
 
Majone (1994a: 91; 1996: 74) suggests that this tendency to favour innovative 
regulatory solutions means that even national experts may find the Community a more 
receptive forum for their ideas than their own national government. In this context, 
Eichener (1992: 52) has described the origins of the 1989 Directive on the safety of 
machinery where the crucially important technical annex of the Directive was drafted 
by a UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE) inspector who originally sought to 
reform the UK regulatory approach. Having failed to persuade the policy makers in 
his own country, the HSE inspector brought his ideas about risk assessment to the 
Commission, where they were welcomed by Commission officials and eventually 
became the basis for EC health and safety at work legislation. 
 
In view of the claims by proponents of intergovernmental accounts of the EC 
regulatory process that it is under the control of the most powerful member states, it is 
instructive to note here that both Eichener and Majone point out that the Machinery 
Directive and other equally innovative directives in the area of occupational safety 
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were inspired by the regulatory philosophy of two small countries – the Netherlands 
and Denmark, which first introduced the concept of working environment into their 
legislation - and was initially opposed by Germany, which sought to preserve the 
power and traditional approach of its own regulatory bodies (Eichener 1992; Majone 
1998b: 26). 
 
For Majone, some of the best examples of policy entrepreneurship at Community 
level are in the field of social regulation (1996: 76). Using James Q. Wilson’s (1980: 
36) taxomony of regulatory policies according to the pattern of distribution of benefits 
and costs, Majone (1998b: 130) argues that, in the case of most social regulation, the 
costs are borne by a small segment in society. The costs of cleaner water or safer 
working conditions, for example, are borne at least initially by particular segments of 
industry. Scharpf (1999: 98, quoting Vogel 1995, 1997) notes that many 
environmental regulations will add only marginally to the costs of production, so that 
the downward pressure exerted by economic interests will be relatively week. On the 
other hand, Majone agrues that the incentive to organise is strong for the opponents of 
the policy but weak for the beneficiaries, with the effect that social regulation can 
only be passed if there is a policy entrepreneur to mobilise public opinion (Majone 
1996: 77). It can also be suggested that the absence of a clearly defined clientele 
group does make it harder to maintain the momentum in a particular policy area 
(Grant et al 2000: 202). The benefits of EC regulatory developments in relation to 
health and safety at work or environmental policy may not be immediately obvious or 
tangible to citizens who might otherwise be adversely affected by poorer working 
conditions or long-term environmental degradation. 
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The insulation of the Commission from partisan politics and electoral results further 
contribute to the ability of the Community to rely on policy entrepreneurship as such 
an important feature of EC regulatory policy-making (Majone 1996: 78). 
 
For Majone (1998b: 25), adequate explanations of the EC regulatory process must 
also take account of the dynamics of relationships of mutual interdependence between 
EC institutions. Thus the Commission was able to act in an entrepreneurial manner in 
response to the Cassis de Dijon decision of the European Court of Justice to advance 
the mutual recognition principle and produce a programme of legislative proposals to 
complete the Single Market (Alter and Meunier-Aitsahalia 1993: 26). 
 
Fitting together all the variables influencing the EC regulatory process (including 
budgetary constraints, bureaucratic and economic interests, the poor credibility of 
intergovernmental agreements and the highly technical nature of most regulatory 
policy-making) Majone (1994a: 92) suggests that we begin to see not only the origins 
and growth of EC regulation, but also its increasingly innovative character.  
 
For Majone (1998b: 26), in order to understand the development and growth of EC 
regulation, it is important to distinguish between different manifestations of the 
phenomenon: quantitative growth, regulatory complexity, task expansion and 
“deepening”, that is, genuine policy innovation. For Majone, while member states and 
third parties must bear a considerable share of the responsibility for the quantitative 
growth and complexity of EC regulation, where the policy entrepreneurship of the 
Commission becomes important is in explaining the progressive deepening of 
innovative EC regulation (Majone 1998b: 30). Majone challenges the view that 
 109
genuine policy innovation is unlikely if not impossible (Majone 1996: 62). While 
Majone acknowledges that his own demand and supply model of EC regulation (see 
Chapter 1) seeks only to explain the quantitative growth of regulation (Majone 1998b: 
26), he is also prepared to acknowledge that a satisfactory model of the EC regulatory 
process should also be capable of explaining the ability of the Commission to 
innovate with respect to the regulatory practices of all or most member states (1996: 
63). He identifies social regulation as offering greater scope for entrepreneurship and 
innovation than traditional EC policy areas (Majone 1998b: 30). 
 
For Majone, it is precisely this highly selective expansion of EC policy competences 
that neo-functionalist theories fail to explain (1996: 63). While Ernst Haas (1968) 
predicted that since all sectors of the economy are interdependent, the logic of 
functional spillover would eventually bring about a general transfer of policy-making 
powers to the supranational institutions, EC regulatory developments have in fact 
demonstrated that this process was neither inevitable nor automatic (Majone 1993a: 
20), the methodological mistake of the neo-functionalists being the failure to 
distinguish between different policy types or even between regulatory and direct-
expenditure programmes (Majone 1996: 63).   
 
For Majone (1990: 1), the ability of policy-makers to initiate regulation often depends 
more on their skill in utilising existing models than on their ability to invent novel 
solutions since policy innovation is the outcome of a dual process of conceptual 
variation and subsequent selection by political actors from the range of existing policy 
variants. Innovation derived from the range of existing policy models is achieved by 
the community of academic, governmental and other experts who share an interest in 
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a particular policy area, with subsequent selection from the pool of policy variants 
being made in the political arena (Majone 1989: 161-166). 
 
From a structural point of view, the policy-making stage of the EC regulatory process 
is characterised by institutional and policy diversity, with great potential for a clash of 
policy goals. In the absence of innovation (Majone 1996: 62), most EC regulatory 
initiatives would inevitably end in failure as the “result of stalemate” (Héritier 1999: 
1) or a “joint decision trap” (Scharpf 1988: 255). In this sense, innovation is a 
necessary element in the EC regulatory process in order to overcome institutional 
deadlock, the scope for innovation at the policy-making stage being closely linked to 
the accommodation of diversity of interests (Héritier 1999: 35), the more polarised the 
interests requiring accommodation, the more constrained the innovatory options 
available in terms of substantive change in relation to the policy status quo. 
Conversely, where there is a consensus in favour of regulatory change in order to 
tackle common problems, the convergence of interests will be more favourable to 
innovation in regulatory policy-making. What, then, are the main characteristics of 
innovation in the EC regulatory process? 
 
It is under conditions of relative institutional “messiness” (Héritier 1999:8) in the 
European Community that the Commission and European Court of Justice have 
seized opportunities for regulatory growth. The complexity of the EC institutional 
structure itself offers multiple opportunities for creative actors to take policy 
initiatives and see them through by side-stepping obstacles in the regulatory policy-
making process (Héritier 1999: 6), leading to a strong element of policy 
entrepreneurship and the chance to wield influence on the process of policy definition. 
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As Hancher and Moran (1989: 284) put it, “regulation is largely a matter of 
organisational routine, punctuated by occasional opportunities or crises”. 
 
Despite the formal right of initiative accorded to the Commission under the EC 
Treaty, in practice the innovative potential of the Commission in the EC regulatory 
process is tightly controlled (Majone 1988b: 14) by the member states. Yet the 
Commission is motivated by core interests of its own, such as growth and survival, 
separate from the interests of Member States (Majone 1996: 73). Commission 
officials sound out ideas and opinions and operate less as technical experts alongside 
other technical experts than as policy entrepreneurs (Majone 1994b: 90, 1998b: 24) 
choosing preferred regulatory options from its vantage point at the hub of a vast issue 
network. 
 
Majone’s use of the term policy entrepreneurship is linked to the work of other 
authors. Inter-organisational linkages are widely acknowledged as being the subject of 
a large existing literature on network theory which demonstrates the significance of 
policy communities and networks within which “elite coalitions” allocate issues to 
particular arenas, manage the policy agenda and control the range of participants 
allowed into decision making (Hancher and Moran 1989: 291). Operating within issue 
networks, the Commission is constantly looking for windows of opportunity through 
which to push their preferred ideas. 
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Formal windows of opportunity: judicial activism 
 
One important relationship that may prompt windows of opportunity to open in the 
regulatory process is the mutual interdependence (Majone 1998b: 25) between the 
Commission and the European Court of Justice. Through its judgements, the 
European Court of Justice has, on occasion, prompted windows of opportunity to 
open in the EC regulatory process (Majone 1998b: 31). The Commission has then 
been able to act in an entrepreneurial manner in response to this ‘judicial activism’ on 
the part of the European Court of Justice. Judicial activism has arisen where the EC 
Treaty has failed to adequately specify the precise extent of EC competence that have 
also led the European Court of Justice to adopt an expansive role in delivering rulings 
which have been instrumental in shaping EC regulatory policy making (Weiler 1991). 
In relation to the key stimulus for the Single Market Programme, for instance, 
intergovernmentalists emphasise the fact that the Commission’s 1985 White Paper1 on 
mutual recognition merely reflected a change in member state preferences towards 
deregulatory policies (Keohane and Hoffman 1990: 288, quoted in Majone 1998b: 
17).  
 
However, other authors have instead emphasised the impact of the Cassis de Dijon 
decision of the European Court of Justice in advancing the principle of mutual 
recognition and in many respects providing the window of opportunity in which the 
Commission produced a programme of legislative proposals to complete the Single 
Market (Alter and Meunier-Aitsahalia, 1994: 26; Garrett 1992). Garrett and Weingast 
(1991) show how the idea of “mutual recognition” became institutionalised through 
                                                 
1 COM(85) 310 final. 
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the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice in its Cassis de Dijon decision of 
1979.  
 
Garret and Weingast (1993: 176) suggest that “ideas, social norms, institutions, and 
shared expectations may influence both the way actors choose to cooperate and the 
stability of these arrangements over time”, with EC institutions seen as playing an 
important role in providing information and in helping to construct a shared belief 
system, in the context of the single market initiative this taking the form of the 
Commission’s White Paper on Completion of the Internal Market of 1985, which 
introduced a new phase of EC regulatory policy-making, characterised by reduced 
emphasis on harmonisation of national regulations and greater reliance on the 
principle of mutual recognition (see also Majone 1997: 157). Bulmer and Armstrong 
(1998: 36), who provide a helpful critique of Garrett and Weingast’s work, also 
acknowledge that the Cassis de Dijon case indirectly provided a potential new route 
map to the goal of the common market (Bulmer and Armstrong 1998: 20). 
 
Although the Court’s ruling did not mention the mutual recognition principle by 
name, following the Cassis ruling, in July 1980, the Commission sent an interpretive 
Communication to the member states, the European Parliament and the Council, 
stating that, the Cassis judgment would serve as the foundation for a new approach to 
harmonisation. The prospect of mutual recognition resulting in competition among 
rules was not greeted enthusiastically by the member states, the Legal Services of the 
Council delivering a counter-interpretation of the Cassis ruling (Majone 1998b: 18), 
stating that the Commission’s interpretation was excessive. However, the 
Commission’s interpretation prevailed, with the Council ultimately endorsing the 
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strategy set out in the Commission White Paper on Completion of the Internal Market 
at the Milan meeting in June 1985. The idea of mutual recognition had a powerful 
influence on the development and implementation of the internal market programme 
(Majone 1993c: 18) and, in this instance, it appears that shifting arenas from the 
Commission to the European Court of Justice were an important source of official 
windows of opportunity, giving rise to regulatory growth in both qualitative and 
quantitative terms. 
 
The most striking feature of the new approach was the combination of extensive 
deregulation at the national level with re-regulation at EC level (Majone 1991a: 23; 
1993b: 71; 1994a: 97). Majone suggests that it was international regulatory failure 
rather than market failure which explains the willingness of member states to delegate 
regulatory powers to the Community (Majone 1993b: 21), EC regulation amounting 
to a necessary curb to excessive or counter-productive regulation by national 
authorities (Majone 1993b: 24). This apparently paradoxical combination of 
deregulation and re-regulation has been called ‘regulatory reform’ (Majone 1991a). 
For Majone, the relationship between policy and institutionalised ideas (or meta-
policy) is dialectic and, rather than disclosing new possibilities, ideas only codify 
initial practice, but at the same time rationalise, evaluate and transform that same 
practice (Majone 1993c: 18). So, ultimately, our understanding of the way a policy 
develops cannot be separated from the institutionalised ideas and theories by which 
the policy is guided and evaluated (Majone 1989: 146-149). 
 
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, Majone argues that the function of post-
decision arguments is to transform a single play into a sequential game by facilitating 
 115
communication and monitoring (Majone 1993c: 18). The importance of transforming 
a single play into an iterated game has been demonstrated by game theory, where the 
prisoners’ dilemma situation allows more complicated strategies than simply ‘co-
operate’ or ‘defect’. Majone points out that, when the game is repeated, patterns of 
co-operation emerge that would be highly unlikely in a single play. The “giving 
reasons” requirement changes “one-shot” situations into iterated or sequential games, 
hence it is an efficient institution designed to facilitate co-operation among policy 
actors (Majone 1993c: 19). 
 
Informal windows of opportunity: stealth and incremental change 
 
In addition to Kingdon’s conception of official windows of opportunity that occur 
during periods of institutional reform, Héritier (1999: 11) suggests that there is a 
second, more informal, type of window which occurs on a day-to-day level of EC 
regulatory policy-making in between the key intergovernmental meetings. By stealth 
and incremental change, the Commission’s entrepreneurial activities consolidate and 
broaden the scope of EC policy competence. In some respects, it is the incremental 
growth in regulatory instruments over a long time frame that is more innovative in 
terms of creating opportunities for growth in EC policy than the higher profile 
institutional reform packages negotiated at intergovernmental conferences. It is these 
“persistent, small-scale attempts” (Héritier 1999: 12) to develop EC regulatory 
policies that are, in many ways, the cornerstone of innovative regulatory development 
in the EC. 
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One strategy that the Commission has used to bring about innovation is that of 
“linking-up” (Héritier 1999: 94) or packaging together specific regulatory measures 
under the umbrella of a wider regulatory framework initiative. Once member states 
have reached broad consensus on the general objectives of the framework approach, 
more specific measures can follow. In relation to social policy and environmental 
protection measures, for instance, the trend towards action programmes has been 
evident since the early 1970s (in the 1974 Social Action Programme and in the 1973 
First Action Programme on the Environment). The strategy of linking-up allows 
innovation by generating considerable public and political support for the general 
aims of improved social and environmental policy measures. “Social” regulation – 
health and safety at work regulation and environmental regulation in particular – is an 
area where the Commission has made use of the “framework approach” to regulation 
to good effect, whereby the commitment of actors is sought for framework directives 
that are of such a general nature that it is difficult for specific objections to be put 
forward or for the benefits and costs of compliance to be accurately assessed. 
Measures within the scope of framework ‘mother’ directives might therefore initially 
seem quite innocuous (Heritier 1999: 93) but subsequent ‘daughter’ directives (for 
example, relating to health and safety on temporary and mobile construction sites) 
then increasingly specify regulatory duties that automatically derive their legitimacy 
from the previously agreed general framework directive (in this example, the 
Framework Directive on Health and Safety in the Workplace). In this sense, a 
bureaucratic momentum (Grant et al 2000: 202) can be built up through a framework 
Directive approach, with the series of daughter Directives that follow. 
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Committees 
 
Once a window of opportunity for EC regulatory activity has been opened, the initial 
drafting stages will be crucial on the form and content of legislative measures 
ultimately adopted. Cini (1996: 147), for example, notes that a final proposal adopted 
by the Council typically contained at least 80 per cent of the original Commission 
draft. 
 
During this initial drafting stage of the EC regulatory process, although there are a 
multitude of influences upon the Commission (Cini 1996: 146), in practice the task of 
determining the content of new regulatory instruments will often lie with “small and 
powerful committee able to make far-reaching decisions” (Milward 1992: 336). In 
part, the Commission’s network of advisory committees is a mechanism to assist in 
the interest aggregation process (Cini 1996: 148). It is also an opportunity for the 
Commission to have access to expertise that may not exist in-house within the 
Commission Directorate Generals. While it is normally compulsory for the 
Commission to consult with expert committees during the policy formulation process, 
there is no obligation on the Commission to take on board the advice that it receives 
and perhaps the most significant role played by advisory committees is to give the 
Commission the opportunity to sound out potential opposition to a policy proposal 
(Cini 1996: 148). 
 
Although the earliest management committees started with the Common Agricultural 
Policy in the 1960s, the importance of what is termed the “comitology” system, 
namely the network of advisory, management and regulatory committees that oversee 
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and in some cases control the policy formulation stage of the EC regulatory process 
(Bradley 1992: 693) came to the fore in 1986 when, in recognition that there was no 
real control of the ad hoc committee structure that had emerged, the member states 
solution was to condition the exercise of delegated power on the approval of a 
committee composed of member state representatives (Craig and de Burca 2003: 
150). The Single European Act modified Article 202 (ex Article 145) in order to 
provide a secure foundation for the existence of this delegation and to provide for a 
more orderly organisation of the committee structure. The modified Article 202 
required the Council to establish rules and principles that would in future govern the 
operation of implementing committee procedures (see also Bulmer and Armstrong 
1998: 26; Cini 1996: 162).  
 
The activities of the comitology system were subsequently set out and tightly 
controlled by Council Decision 87/373/EEC of 13 July 1987.2 A new Decision 
99/468/EC was adopted on 28 June 1999 to ensure greater consistency with choice of 
committee procedure, greater involvement of the European Parliament, improvement 
in the information given to the Parliament, and to make the committees more 
accessible to the public (see also Joerges and Vos 1999; Lenaerts and Verhoeven 
2000).3 
 
The comitology system consists of a large number of advisory, management and 
regulatory committees. Regulatory and management committees can block a 
Commission measure and transmit an issue to the Council, the latter having the power 
                                                 
2 Council Decision 87/373/EEC of 13 July 1987 laying down procedures for the exercise of 
implementing powers conferred on the Commission, OJ L 197/3, 18.7.87.  
3 Council Decision 99/468/EC of 28 June 1999 laying down the procedures for the exercise of 
implementing powers conferred on the Commission, OJ L 184/23, 17.7.99.  
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to overrule the Commission (Majone 1998b: 15). Given the Council’s apparent 
control over the comitology system, it might be concluded that the EC regulatory 
process is only possible when member states’ preferences converge. In practice, the 
Council acts only rarely on the complex technical matters dealt with by the 
comitology committees and is generally supportive of the Commission’s original 
proposals (Majone 1998b: 23). In the past, the Commission has reported 
overwhelming (98 per cent) support for its regulatory proposals from the various 
committees (Eichener 1992, quoted in Majone 1998b: 23). 
 
The Commission’s lack of own resources and its reliance on external experts for 
advice and technical assistance in regulatory policy-making are also important in this 
respect and accord with Berry and Berry’s observation in the United States context 
that “theories of individual and organisational innovation have stressed the 
importance of financial resources…and other characteristics reflecting the potential of 
the potential adopter…as contributors to innovation.  Similar kinds of resources are 
often held to be critical for government innovation” (Berry and Berry 1999: 183).  For 
Héritier (1996: 152) this has led to an ever-growing reliance on epistemic (or 
knowledge) communities. 
 
Epistemic communities 
 
The Commission’s lack of own resources and its reliance on external experts for 
advice and technical assistance in regulatory policy making has led to an ever-
growing reliance on “epistemic”, or knowledge, communities (see also Héritier 1996: 
152). Epistemic communities are networks of professionals with recognised expertise 
 120
and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant 
knowledge within that issue area (Haas 1992b). The literature on epistemic 
communities (see also Adler 1992; Christensen 1996; Haas 1990; Richardson 1996b; 
Zito 1994) suggests that EC regulatory policy-making in areas with a significant 
technical content is a function largely left to technical experts (Peters 1996: 72). The 
greater the conditions of uncertainty in the EC regulatory policy-making about how 
information should be interpreted (Richardson 1996a: 13-14), the more important the 
role of epistemic communities will be in providing and interpreting information and 
ideas (Haas 1992a, quoted in Richardson 1996a: 15). Although member states are able 
to set the framework for the Community solution (Rehbinder and Stewart 1985: 213, 
quoted in Majone 1998b: 15), it is technical experts meeting within epistemic 
communities who operate largely beyond the control of the Council and are able to 
develop innovative approaches towards regulation. 
 
This positioning of epistemic communities in the EC regulatory process can lead to 
two possible outcomes. The first possible outcome is that, free from the institutional 
constraints of the Council-Commission relationship, new regulatory approaches and 
new modes of thinking will emerge from the comitology system. However, a second 
outcome is more common. That outcome is entrenchment of established norms and 
values amongst a common community of scientific and technical experts. The 
significance of ‘comitology’ (Baldwin and Cave 1999; Buitendijk and van Schendelen 
1995; Joerges and Neyer 1997; Pedler and Schaefer 1996; St. C. Bradley 1997; Vos 
1997; Wessels, 1998) in the EC regulatory process is that technical experts will often 
form the core of these committees. This occurs because of the functions of the 
committee system and has also been attributed to the fact that epistemic communities 
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often operate in a self-contained policy environment (Haas 1992a) where there is a 
lack of external standards of proof for justifying their claims (Peters 1996: 72). In EC 
environmental policy-making, for example, different national interpretations of 
scientific evidence are often difficult to separate from genuine disagreements about 
appropriate standards. Clear examples of this emerge from the case study of the 
Drinking Water Directive, where attempts to revise and update regulation were 
hindered by different interpretations of the toxicological data relating to maximum 
admissible concentrations of pesticides in drinking water. 
 
The system of committees of national experts that are intended to assist the 
Commission, and at the same time limit its regulatory policy-making discretion, have 
also been identified as a contributory factor in regulatory complexity by introducing a 
strong technical basis into the EC policy-making process (Majone 1995b:12; 1998b: 
28). Moreover, Majone (1998b: 23) suggests that national experts have significantly 
increased the quality of Commission proposals (see also Weiler 1988; Dehousse et al, 
1992), committees tending to provide a good deal of copinage technocratique 
between Commission officials and national experts (Majone 1998b: 23) who are 
genuinely interested in problem solving rather than in defending national interests 
(Eichener 1992). Yet a narrowing of the range of policy options considered may result 
from the biases of the knowledge communities (Grant et al 2000: 204) represented on 
the expert committees themselves. 
 
In fact, the strategy of “insulating policy drafting in expert circles” (Héritier 1999: 59) 
can itself be an effective device of innovation in the EC regulatory process. The 
benefit of insulating draft regulation within a community of experts is that the policy 
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cannot subsequently be challenged in the formal decision-making process due to a 
lack of necessary expertise (Joerges and Vos 1999). Not all policy areas lend 
themselves to this avenue for innovation. Expert-dominated committees are most 
important when the issues under consideration are of a technical nature (Sebenius 
1992) that cannot readily be dealt with by political decision-makers (Héritier 1999: 
59). This allows technical experts, who consider themselves to be part of an 
“epistemic community” (Haas 1992a) with a greater interest in establishing an 
optimal problem solution than in representing national interests, to exert a 
considerable amount of influence over the content of resulting regulation. Once the 
results of deliberations by committees of experts are subsequently presented to the 
Council for adoption into regulatory form, it is often difficult for political elites to 
unravel the economic and social impact of the proposed standards because the 
solutions proposed by experts are not readily understood by those outside the narrow 
constituencies of epistemic communities. 
 
This technical bias (Majone 1995a: 13) may also have the consequence that, by the 
time a Commission proposal reaches the Council of Ministers, all technical details 
will have been worked out (see also Majone 1998b: 24), without sufficient attention 
being paid to the cost effectiveness or practical implementation problems (Majone 
1995a: 12). A reluctance of the Council to engage in difficult and time-consuming 
control over highly technical aspects of EC regulation, coupled with the lack of 
central oversight at the Commission level, may well result in EC regulatory policy 
outcomes with consequences other than those intended. Social and environmental 
problems, for instance, are not just technical issues that can be dealt with by 
regulation designed by technical experts. 
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The economic interests of third parties, namely specialists in various aspects of 
regulation such as lawyers, accountants, engineers or safety experts may also 
compound regulatory complexity (Majone 1998b: 28) by “gold plating” EC 
regulatory proposals. Majone suggests that these groups care more about the process 
than the product of regulation since complexity increases the value of their expertise, 
the “red tape” being a private interest that arises because a complex regulatory 
environment allows for specialisation in rule making and “rule intermediation” (Kearl 
1983; Quandt 1983).  
 
If policy-makers are attempting to draw lessons from regimes that are similar in terms 
of institutional, economic and cultural characteristics, it might be argued that, instead 
of expanding the number of ideas and actors involved in decision making, the 
likelihood is that a relatively small number of actors will consistently draw lessons 
from each other (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996: 355). The literature on epistemic 
communities, primarily Haas (1992a), describes networks of experts who supply 
knowledge to authoritative policy actors in a way that helps to legitimise the decisions 
made by actors by giving them an external source of ‘scientific’ authority. States 
require the input of epistemic communities because ‘the forms of uncertainty that tend 
to stimulate demands for information are those which arise from the strong 
dependence of states on each other’s policy choices for success’ (Haas 1992a: 4). 
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Advocacy coalitions 
 
What the epistemic communities literature does not do, but advocacy coalition 
literature does rather well, is help to explain how the potential conflicts among policy 
communities will be resolved (Peters 1996: 72). The main proponent of advocacy 
coalitions, Sabatier (1988a), recognises that policy-making processes are not random. 
This is because policy problems and ideas attract coalitions of actors. An advocacy 
coalition can include a variety of actors, including elected or agency officials, interest 
group leaders or researchers, who share a particular belief system in the form of a set 
of basic values, causal assumptions and problem perceptions (Richardson 1996a: 17). 
Patterns emerge because policy problems and ideas attract co-operation between 
actors. Actors involved in regulatory policy-making ‘learn’ from each other and from 
past experience. 
 
Peters (1996: 72) describes advocacy coalitions as being something of a “quasi-
market” for policy ideas, where conflicts over policy are often about ideas and the 
technical content of policy. In this context, advocacy of ideas is the means by which 
the participants learn about their policy options and attempt to create a viable 
consensus over a policy option. Although this process cannot alter the fundamental 
perspectives of the participants (their ‘core values’), arguments over more technical 
issues can often identify a zone of agreement and with that there emerges a possibility 
of effective regulation (Peters 1996: 72). 
 
For Sabatier, policy change is likely to occur because actors attempt to translate their 
belief systems into action and because of systemic events, such as changes in socio-
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economic conditions or governing groups, which affect resources and present external 
constraints on the coalition. One of Sabatier’s hypotheses is that there will be “policy 
learning” across belief systems when there are sufficiently prestigious coalitions to 
participate and the beliefs are dominated by professionals’ norms (Sabatier 1988b: 
118). Sabatier (1988b) focuses on the relationship between knowledge and interests in 
his “advocacy coalition” framework. Sabatier looks at how aggregations of 
individuals with shared belief systems, comprising knowledge, perceptions and core 
values, operate within policy-making. An advocacy coalition can include actors from 
a variety of positions (elected and agency officials, interest groups, researchers) who 
share a particular belief system and demonstrate a non-trivial degree of coordination 
over time (Richardson 1996: 17). 
 
Unlike the largely technocratic nature of epistemic communities, advocacy coalitions 
seek out defined policy goals. Within a particular policy area, “actors can be 
aggregated into a number of advocacy coalitions composed of people from various 
organisations who share a set of normative and causal beliefs and who often act in 
concert. At any particular point in time, each coalition adopts a strategy(s) envisaging 
one or more institutional innovations which it feels will further its objectives” 
(Sabatier 1988a: 133, quoted in Richardson 1996: 17). The advocacy coalition 
framework shares with the epistemic community approach an emphasis on influential 
non-state actors, but rejects the idea that the influence in groups will be determined by 
the relative power of those actors (Rosamond 2000: 126). Rather, advocacy coalitions 
are engaged in “policy oriented learning” (Sabatier 1988a). 
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Related to advocacy coalition explanations are suggestions that the EC may be 
moving towards a model of regulatory policy-making that is neither national or 
supranational, but rather based on institutionalised arrangements that promote policy 
transfer or “policy learning” (Majone 1996: 268-269). Policy learning is what happens 
when governments learn from each other by sharing information on how policies have 
been constructed and how they have succeeded or failed (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996; 
Peters 1997). 
 
Hence we begin to see the potential of policy learning to be a significant factor in the 
EC regulatory process, particularly in the context of the scenario envisaged by this 
thesis whereby EC regulation emulates prior national approaches, being based on 
consensus and co-operation rather than purely on the intergovernmental bargaining 
suggested by the regulatory competition explanations of authors such as Héritier. 
 
Assessment 
 
Over the past two chapters, we have come full circle in our consideration of interests, 
actors and institutions influencing the EC regulatory process. In the later sections of 
Chapter 3, the significance of theories of regulatory policy-making based on ideas of 
diffusion, learning and policy transfer that were first outlined in Chapter 2 of the 
thesis have again come to the fore. In the next two chapters case studies of EC 
regulation of insurance services and drinking water quality will be set out to test the 
validity of the central argument presented by this thesis, that diffusion and learning, 
leading to co-operation and the emergence of a broad consensus on a preferred 
approach, can help explain why emulation, innovation and re-regulation best 
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characterise the EC regulatory process. Before doing so, the main points raised in this 
chapter are set out below: 
 
• From the analysis of theoretical approaches outlined in this chapter it would 
seem that the European Commission recognised the new possibilities for EC 
regulation that emerged when consensus was achieved on the goal of 
completing the internal market when the European Court of Justice engaged in 
judicial activism and gave its ruling in the Cassis de Dijon case. 
 
• The Commission has responded to windows of opportunity and demonstrated 
its own entrepreneurial characteristics as it seeks opportunities for EC 
regulation. 
 
• Particular EC regulatory approaches followed are influenced by policy 
learning in the sense that member states and the Commission learn from their 
own experiences and the experiences of others. 
 
• Member state preferences, policy entrepreneurship on the part of the European 
Commission and judicial activism on the part of the European Court of 
Justice, supported subsequently by elite bargains, with experts meeting as 
epistemic communities in technical committees all contribute to subsequent 
EC regulatory activity. 
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• In particular, explanations based on policy learning leading to co-operation 
and the emergence of a broad consensus help to explain the tendency for a 
particular EC regulatory approach to emerge. 
 
• The next task of this thesis is to undertake detailed analysis of the evidence 
collected in relation to case studies of insurance services and drinking water 
quality, using the three core concepts of emulation, innovation and re-
regulation in the EC regulatory process as conceptual lenses through which to 
reappraise the basic hypotheses drawn from the literature review. Using the 
conceptual lenses provided by emulation, innovation and re-regulation, the 
next chapters will attempt to throw further light on whether regulatory 
competition has in fact been the dominant form of interaction in the EC 
regulatory process - as the literature on EC regulation often asserts - or 
whether, in fact, a more co-operative, consensual approach derived from 
diffusion and learning should be given greater prominence alongside 
competition when seeking to explain outcomes of the EC regulatory process. 
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CHARACTERISING EC REGULATION: 
EMULATION, INNOVATION AND RE-REGULATION 
 
CHAPTER 4 
 
EMULATION AND RE-REGULATION: 
THE CASE OF INSURANCE SERVICES 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter undertakes detailed case study analysis of EC regulation to liberalise 
insurance markets. It does so in order to provide evidence of how emulation – one of 
the particular styles or processes of regulation that the thesis argues best characterise 
EC regulation - operates in practice. It also examines how re-regulation – the third 
core concept identified in this thesis - involving regulatory refinement and 
clarification, was subsequently achieved. The first part of the chapter sets out the 
background to EC regulation of insurance services in order to provide the context for 
the subsequent analysis of case study material. The second part of the chapter then 
describes the key factors that led to the emergence of an opportunity for EC regulation 
of insurance services. The third part of the chapter reviews the negotiation of EC 
regulation of insurance services. The fourth part of the chapter examines the adoption 
of new EC regulation on insurance services. The fifth part of the chapter addresses the 
impact and subsequent re-appraisal of EC regulation of insurance services. The 
concluding section then summarises the key findings of the case study and, using the 
conceptual lenses of emulation and re-regulation, considers evidence to support the 
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key assertion of this thesis that diffusion and learning leading to consensus and 
cooperation have characterised the EC regulatory process in relation to insurance 
services to a greater extent than has regulatory competition, as anticipated in the 
dominant literature identified in earlier chapters. 
 
Background 
 
The origins of EC regulation of insurance services can be found in the provisions of 
the EC Treaty on right of establishment found under Articles 52 to 58 (now 
renumbered 43 to 48) and on freedom to provide services, found under Articles 59 to 
66 (now Articles 49 to 55). Articles 43 to 48 required the removal of restrictions on 
the right of individuals and companies to maintain a permanent or settled place of 
business in a member state. Articles 49 to 55 required the removal of restrictions to 
the provision of services between member states, whenever a cross-border element is 
present, resulting either from the fact that a provider is not established in a state where 
the services are supplied, or that the recipient has travelled (or where the provision of 
services takes place by telecommunications) to receive services in a member state 
other than that in which he or she is established (see also Craig and de Burca 2003: 
765). 
 
The nature of insurance and, in particular, the long time periods that may elapse 
before payouts are required has tended to lead to highly regulated insurance markets 
in nearly all member states. However, the form of that regulation has varied (see also 
McGee 1998: 7).  
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Historically, the approach to policyholder protection taken in Germany, for instance, 
has involved close control over the business activities of insurers. National authorities 
approve and supervise the specific rates and conditions applied by insurers. This form 
of supervision is used to ensure that consumers are not subjected to the risk of 
insolvency from insurers engaged in irresponsible underwriting activities. The 
scrutiny of business returns then assumes secondary importance to the standardisation 
of policies and rates available to the consumer. Prior to EC regulation to liberalise 
insurance markets, variations on this highly regulated model of insurance supervision 
were followed in most EC member states. 
 
In contrast to the highly regulated model of insurance supervision found in other EC 
member states, the UK has adopted a more liberal regulatory approach, focusing on 
the establishment of strict solvency requirements based upon scrutiny of returns and 
the maintenance of safety net funds, financed by compulsory contributions from all 
insurers and then available to meet the obligations to policyholders of any insurer that 
may become insolvent. 
 
The European Commission, perceiving different approaches to the regulation of 
insurance services as being an important factor in segmenting national markets, saw 
its task as being to introduce measures to ensure coordination of insurance supervision 
throughout the Community. 
 
Since the late 1970s the EC regulatory approach to the liberalisation of insurance 
services in the single market has been to seek to end the prescriptive supervisory 
approach followed in the majority of member states. The EC regulatory focus in 
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relation to insurance services has therefore been to allow undertakings from member 
states where there is no standardisation of policies and rates to offer their products 
across frontiers by according them the right of establishment and freedom to provide 
services in other member states. The scenario envisaged is that direct competition 
with companies operating out of more liberalised markets forces national authorities 
with more heavily regulated markets to relax their controls so that their domestic 
insurers are not at a disadvantage when competing for business in their own country 
or abroad. 
 
Although the regulation of reinsurance dates back to 1964, according to Pool (1992: 
179) it was the complexity of differing national approaches to supervision of 
insurance markets that delayed EC regulation until the 1970s. 
 
The first steps to liberalise insurance markets throughout the EC were taken in 
Council Directive 73/239/EEC on the taking up and pursuit of the business of direct 
insurance other than life assurance4 (hereafter the First Non-Life Directive). Taking 
as its legal basis Article 57(2) (now Article 47(2)) of the EC Treaty, the First Non-
Life Directive specified admissible legal forms of insurance undertakings, restricted 
the activities of those undertakings to insurance and immediately derived activities, 
and required that all classes of insurance should be supervised, with the member state 
where the head office is located having general control and supervising solvency 
margins. 
 
                                                 
4 OJ L 228/3, 16.8.73. 
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Each member state where the insurer was established was required to supervise the 
undertaking. The object was to satisfy each EC member state that insurance 
undertakings operating in their territory, but licensed elsewhere, were financially 
secure and offered minimal risk of insolvency to their policyholders. The principal 
measures related to minimum capital and solvency levels. Each country was free to 
set higher requirements for insurers established in that country, in which case such 
requirements must not discriminate against insurers from other EC member states. 
The principle of the right to establishment laid down in the First Non-Life Directive 
therefore had the effect of preventing national governments from erecting barriers 
around their own markets. 
 
In the same year as the First Non-Life Directive, Council Directive 79/267/EEC on 
the taking up and pursuit of the business of direct life assurance5 (hereafter the First 
Life Directive) was also adopted. Taking as its legal basis Articles 49 and 57 (now 
Articles 40 and 47) of the EC Treaty, the First Life Directive was based on the 
approach previously taken in the First Non-Life Directive but its regulatory 
arrangements were more complex because: (i) the solvency margin rules took account 
of the varying mix of types of risk covered and investment in different types of 
insurance; and (ii) the role and definition of life companies differed from one member 
state to another, so the Directive avoided the harmonisation of national supervisory 
standards. Instead, the First Life Directive made provision for each member state to 
decide for itself what life companies could do within its borders; (iii) the problem of 
composite undertakings (i.e. those carrying out both life and non-life insurance) was 
addressed, with the Directive requiring that no new composites or branches could be 
                                                 
5 OJ L 63/1, 13.5.79. 
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formed, although existing ones could continue. The multiple authorisation system 
under the First Life Directive set out the principle that the country where the insurer 
has an establishment (whether a head office, branch or agency) authorises the insurer 
and is responsible for the supervision of the technical reserves. 
  
However, although the first generation of EC insurance directives allowed insurers 
better access to other national markets, subject to authorisation on specified 
conditions and supervision by the host state, they did not in themselves achieve full 
liberalisation in the market for insurance services since each branch of an insurance 
company established in another member state was still subject to regulation by 
national authorities if it wished to enter that market.  Furthermore, member states that 
traditionally operated highly regulated insurance markets, particularly Germany, 
initially resisted further attempts to liberalise the EC insurance sector. This situation 
was to change once a window of opportunity opened in the regulatory process. 
 
The opportunity for EC regulation of insurance services 
 
Key factors 
 
The stimulus for additional EC regulation to liberalise insurance markets came from 
four sources: (i) the European Commission’s 1985 White Paper on Completing the 
Internal Market; (ii) the Single European Act, 1986, which introduced qualified 
majority voting on the adoption of EC regulation in the Council of Ministers; (iii) the 
European Court of Justice judgement in 1986 on the right of establishment and 
freedom to provide services in relation to German insurance markets; and (iv) the 
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Cecchini Report of 1988 on the benefits of completing the internal market, which 
identified the characteristics of the economic sector and the potential new market 
opportunities that would emerge. These factors, it is suggested in this chapter, created 
the conditions under which consensus in favour of the liberalisation of insurance 
markets led to enhanced co-operation between member states, leading to agreement 
on new EC regulation in the form of the Second and Third Generation Insurance 
Directives. 
 
White Paper on Completing the Internal Market 
 
The European Commission’s 1985 White Paper proposals to complete the internal 
market stressed the importance of ensuring the free circulation of financial products 
and made explicit the link between the Cassis de Dijon judgement on free movement 
of goods and what had to be done next for insurance policies and other aspects of 
financial services.6 The view of the European Commission was that it should be 
possible to facilitate the exchange of financial products at the Community level, using 
a minimal coordination of rules (especially on such matters as authorisation, financial 
supervision and re-organisation, etc.) as the basis for mutual recognition by member 
states of what each does to safeguard the interests of the public.7 
 
                                                 
6 It will be recalled that the significance of the Cassis de Dijon ruling was that it affirmed that the 
principle of free movement of goods set out in Article 30 (now Article 28) of the EC Treaty could 
apply to national rules  which did not discriminate against imported products, but which inhibited trade 
because they were different from the trade rules applicable in the country of origin.  See case 120/78 
Rewe-Zentrale AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung fűr Branntwein [1979] ECR 649. 
7 Commission of the European Communities (1985) Completing the Internal Market: White Paper 
from the Commission to the European Council Milan, 28-29 June 1985), COM(85) 310 final, Brussels 
14 June 1985, para 102, page 27. 
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The White Paper stressed that such harmonisation, particularly as regards the 
supervision of ongoing activities, should be guided by the principle of “home country 
control”, meaning attributing the primary task of supervising the financial institution 
to the competent authorities of its member state of origin, to which would have to be 
communicated all information necessary for supervision. The authorities of the 
member state which is the destination of the service, whilst not deprived of all power, 
would have a complementary role. There would have to be a minimum harmonisation 
of surveillance standards, though the need to reach agreement on this must not be 
allowed further to delay the necessary and overdue decisions.8 
 
As regards insurance undertakings, the White Paper pointed out that the 1973 Non-
Life and the 1979 Life Directive had been adopted to facilitate the exercise of the 
right of establishment and to co-ordinate rules and practices for the supervision of 
insurers and particularly of their financial stability. The White Paper also pointed out 
that a high degree of de facto co-operation between supervisory authorities was 
already in place and that the ground had thus been prepared for freedom of services 
across frontiers, which the European Commission felt should not present 
insurmountable problems.9 
 
The Commission nevertheless noted that a Directive intended to facilitate the exercise 
of freedom of services in non-life insurance by spelling out the part to be played by 
the various supervisory authorities in cross-frontier operations had not yet been 
                                                 
8 Ibid., para 103, page 28. 
9 Ibid, para 105, page 28. 
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adopted by the Council of Ministers and that further aspects of freedom to provide 
services with regard to life assurance was also required.10 
 
The proposals from the European Commission that followed took the form of a two-
stage regulatory strategy. This innovative “staged” regulatory approach was 
developed by the European Commission specifically in relation to financial services 
regulation. The Second Generation Insurance Directives were finally adopted in 1988, 
two years after the deadline set in the European Commission’s White Paper, with the 
Third Generation Insurance Directives adopted in 1992, a year after the White Paper 
deadline. 
 
In the light of these statements, the White Paper set out a timetable for the Council of 
Ministers to adopt the proposal for a Directive to facilitate freedom to provide 
services in insurance other than life insurance, which had originally been proposed in 
1975 with a revised proposal published in 1978,11 by a new deadline of 1986. 
Furthermore, the While Paper set out a timetable for adoption of a new proposal for a 
Directive for freedom to supply services in the field of life insurance, which would be 
published in 1987 with adoption by the Council of Ministers expected by 1991.12 
 
The Single European Act 
 
A second key factor in the re-emergence of consensus in the EC regulatory process in 
the 1980s was the Single European Act, signed in 1986, which marked the shift in 
decision-making arrangements in the Council of Ministers from unanimity to 
                                                 
10 Ibid., para 105, page 29. 
11 COM(75) 516 and COM(78) 63.  
12 Ibid., section 1.2, page 26. 
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qualified majority voting. The Single European Act represented a political 
commitment to the target date for completion of the internal market by the deadline of 
1992. It was the centrality of the internal market project that explains why member 
states supported the Act (see also Craig and De Búrca, 2003: 19). In terms of 
substantive changes, the Single European Act introduced into the EC Treaty Article 
8A (now Article 18), which set out the internal market aim of “progressively 
establishing the internal market over a period expiring on 31 December 1992”, and 
defined the internal market as “an area without internal frontiers in which the free 
movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured”. 
 
To ensure that EC regulation deemed necessary to complete the internal market was 
put in place in a timely manner, qualified majority voting by the Council of Ministers 
was introduced into a range of areas that had previously been dealt with under 
unanimity, and a new Article 100A (now Article 95) was added by way of a 
derogation from the “harmonising” provision of Article 100 (now Article 94). Article 
100 required unanimity in the Council when adopting Directives to approximate 
national measures affecting the establishment or functioning of the common market, 
while Article 95 instead allows for qualified majority voting when adopting measures 
to achieve internal market objectives of Article 8A. 
 
The Single European Act therefore encouraged consensus in favour of new EC 
regulation designed to facilitate market liberalisation because the prospect of being 
outvoted in a qualified majority decision in the Council became politically 
unpalatable for member states. With regard to insurance markets, qualified majority 
voting improved the likelihood that member states with heavily regulated insurance 
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markets, and Germany in particular, would be willing to compromise in favour of new 
EC regulation designed to ensure liberalisation. 
 
The European Court of Justice ruling on insurance services 
 
Chapter 3 argued that one important relationship that may prompt windows of 
opportunity to open in the regulatory process is the mutual interdependence between 
the Commission and the European Court of Justice. Through its judgements the Court 
of Justice has, on occasion, prompted windows of opportunity to open in the EC 
regulatory process. The Commission has then been able to act in an entrepreneurial 
manner in response to this ‘judicial activism’ on the part of the European Court of 
Justice. Judicial activism has arisen where, as noted previously in this thesis, the EC 
Treaty has failed to adequately specify the competences of the EC institutions. This 
has led the European Court of Justice to adopt an expansive role in delivering rulings 
which have been instrumental in shaping EC regulatory policy-making. This is 
precisely what happened in relation to EC regulation of insurance services when, on 4 
December 1986, the European Court of Justice gave its judgement in Case 205/84 
Commission of the European Communities v Federal Republic of Germany 
concerning the freedom to provide insurance services and right of establishment.13  
 
The case arose when, on 14 August 1984, the European Commission brought an 
action before the Court, under Article 169 (now Article 226) of the EC Treaty, for a 
declaration that, by applying the Versicherungsaufsichtsgesetz (insurance supervision 
law), the Federal Republic of Germany had failed to fulfil its obligations with regard 
                                                 
13 Case 205/84 European Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany [1986] ECR 3755. 
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to freedom to provide services and right of establishment under the Treaty. The 
German insurance supervision law in question required that, where insurance 
undertakings in the European Community wished to provide services in the Federal 
Republic of Germany in relation to direct insurance businesses through salesmen, 
representatives or agents or other intermediaries, such persons must be established 
and authorised in the Federal Republic of Germany. 
 
The European Commission referred separately to the fact that, in bringing into force 
the Versicherungsaufsichtsgesetz, the Federal Republic of Germany had failed to 
fulfil its obligations under Articles 59 and 60 of the Treaty and under Directive 
78/473/EEC of 30 May 1978 on the coordination of laws, regulations and 
administrative practices relating to Community co-insurance. This was because the 
German insurance law required that, in relation to Community co-insurance 
operations, the leading insurer (in the case of risks situated in the Federal Republic of 
Germany) must be established in that state and authorised there to cover the risks 
insured also as sole insurer. 
 
Furthermore, by fixing through the Bundesaufsichtsamt fur das Versicherungswesen 
(Federal insurance supervision office), in the context of Directive 78/473/EEC 
excessively high thresholds in respect of the risks arising in connection with fire 
insurance, civil liability of aircraft insurance and general civil liability insurance, 
which may be the subject of Community co-insurance, so that as a result co-insurance 
as a service is excluded in the Federal Republic of Germany for risks below those 
thresholds, the European Commission claimed that the Federal Republic of Germany 
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had failed to fulfil its obligations under Articles 1(2) and 8 of Directive 78/473/EEC 
and under Articles 59 and 60 of the EEC Treaty. 
 
The European Commission also brought equivalent actions against the French 
Republic (Case 220/83), Denmark (Case 252/83) and Ireland (Case 206/84) in 
connection with the transposition by those states of Directive 78/473/EEC into 
national law. However, the Commission did not include, in its actions against France, 
Denmark or Ireland, claims equivalent to the complaint that the Federal Republic of 
Germany had failed to fulfil its obligations with regard to freedom to provide services 
and right of establishment under the Treaty, even though the other three member 
states had legislation in place that contained restrictions on the supervision of 
insurance undertakings that were similar to those to be found in German law. 
 
The similarity between insurance laws in France, Denmark and Ireland and the 
situation in Germany accounts for the fact that, in Case 205/84, the Irish Government, 
together with the Governments of Belgium and Italy, intervened in support of the 
Federal Republic of Germany. The United Kingdom and Netherlands Governments, 
on the other hand, intervened in support of the European Commission. 
 
While the arguments in Case 205/84 relating to conformity with Directive 
78/473/EEC on co-insurance are outside the scope of this thesis, it is instructive to 
consider in greater detail the arguments presented in relation to application of the First 
Non-Life and Life Insurance Directives. 
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On this point, the Commission and the United Kingdom and Netherlands 
Governments argued that the First Non-Life and Life Insurance Directives were 
intended to facilitate the setting up of branches or agencies in a member state other 
than that in which the head office is situated. They laid down rules governing the 
relationship between, on the one hand, the legislation and the supervisory authority of 
the state in which the head office is situated, and, on the other hand, the legislation 
and the supervisory authority of states in which the undertaking had set up branches 
or agencies. 
 
However, the European Court of Justice noted that the First Non-Life and Life 
Insurance Directives did not concern the activities pursued by the undertaking in the 
context of the provisions of services within the meaning of the Treaty. Consequently, 
the provisions of those Directives could not be applied to the relationship between the 
member state of establishment, where the head office, branch or agency was situated, 
and the member state in which the service was provided. That relationship was 
considered only in the proposal for a Second Insurance Directive. 
 
The two First Generation Directives did not, the European Court of Justice noted, 
harmonise the national rules concerning technical reserves, that is to say financial 
resources which were set aside to guarantee liabilities under contracts entered into and 
which did not form part of the undertaking’s own capital resources. Since the First 
Directives expressly left the necessary harmonisation in that respect to later 
Directives, the Court acknowledged that under Directives 73/239 and 79/267 it was 
for each member state in which business is carried out to lay down rules, according to 
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its own law, for the calculation of reserves, for determining the nature of assets that 
represented such reserves and the valuing of such assets. 
 
The Court recognised that the assets covering business conducted in the member state 
in which the service was provided must be localised in that state and their existence 
monitored by the supervisory authority of that state, although the First Directives 
provided that the state in which the head office was situated had to verify that the 
balance sheet of the undertaking showed equivalent and matching assets to the 
underwriting liabilities assumed in all the countries in which it undertook business. 
The abolition of that requirement of localisation was proposed only in the draft for a 
Second Generation Directive that existed at the time of the case, the Second Directive 
concerning in particular the harmonisation of national provisions relating to technical 
reserves. 
 
The key finding of the Court, as regards the concern with judicial activism and the 
stimulus for subsequent EC regulation, was an acknowledgement that the German 
Government and the Governments intervening in its support had shown that 
considerable differences existed in the national rules in force at that time concerning 
technical reserves and the assets which represented such reserves. In the absence of 
harmonisation in that respect and of any rule requiring the supervisory authority of the 
member state of establishment to supervise compliance with the rules in force in the 
state in which the service is provided, the Court recognised that the latter state was 
justified in requiring and supervising compliance with its own rules on technical 
reserves with regard to services provided within its territory, provided that such rules 
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did not exceed what was necessary for the purpose of ensuring that policy-holders and 
insured persons were protected. 
 
Finally, the Court noted that the First Non-Life and Life Insurance Directives made no 
provision for harmonisation of the conditions of insurance and left each member state 
in which business was conducted the task of ensuring that its own mandatory rules 
were complied with in respect of business carried on within its territory. 
 
The Court noted that the proposal for a Second Insurance Directive defined the scope 
of such mandatory rules and excluded their application to certain types of commercial 
insurance which was defined in detail. In the absence of a Second Directive and in 
view of the considerable differences existing between national rules at that time, the 
Court found that the member state in which the service was provided was justified in 
requiring and verifying compliance with its own rules in respect of services provided 
within its territory. 
 
To summarise, despite the existence of the First Non-Life and Life Insurance 
Directives, the European Court of Justice found that significant barriers to the 
completion of a single market in insurance services were still in place because 
regulations in Germany required an insurance company to be established within its 
territory in order be eligible to offer services in that market were contrary to EC law. 
However, the European Court of Justice also noted that national laws had not yet been 
brought sufficiently into line to guarantee policyholder protection in the insurance 
sector. Until a sufficient degree of harmonisation was achieved, the state where the 
policyholder was resident or where the risk was situated could lawfully impose 
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onerous requirements on the insurer based in another member state, for the “general 
good” (intérêt general). According to the European Court of Justice, these 
requirements could include an authorisation in the host state, which might insist on its 
own rules for: (i) technical provisions, including the calculation of policy provisions 
and the nature and localisation of assets covered; and (ii) general and specific policy 
conditions which determine the nature of the insurance product. 
 
From the European Court of Justice’s judgement in 1986, it was clear that the First 
Generation of Insurance Directives dating back to 1973 and 1979 were insufficient to 
ensure fully a single market. To complete the single market in insurance services, the 
European Commission would have to introduce further legislation to overcome the 
barriers that member states could still impose legitimately on foreign insurers.  
Subsequent rounds of EC regulation would be required. 
 
The timing of the European Court of Justice judgement was crucial. It coincided with 
the Single Market Initiative of legislative measures to remove remaining barriers to 
free movement of goods, services, workers and capital in the European Community 
and with the associated ratification of the Single European Act, which reintroduced 
majority voting, under Article 100A (now Article 95) of the EC Treaty, as the legal 
basis for measures necessary for completion of the single market. 
 
Insurance industry representatives interviewed for the thesis concurred with this. They 
stressed that the main reason why the Second and Third Generation Insurance 
Directives emerged was the European Commission’s long-held intention to liberalise 
the market in this sector. In this sense, the 1986 European Court of Justice judgement 
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provided the catalyst for action to fulfil that long held want, one respondent 
commenting that “every bureaucracy needs a stimulus to get things done”.  As another 
interview respondent put it: “although the 1986 European Court judgement did act as 
a stimulus to the legislative process, the Commission had always intended to apply the 
principles of free movement enshrined in EC law to the insurance market through 
legislation on top of the First Directive.” The window of opportunity for the 
Commission to act had, however, been provided by the 1986 judgement. 
 
Cecchini Report on the benefits of a single market 
 
Publication of the European Commission’s Cecchini Report in 1988 added further 
impetus to the momentum in favour of EC regulatory activity to liberalise insurance 
services. The Cecchini report noted that restrictions on direct cross-frontier insurance 
business between member states remained significant and pointed out that most 
member states (with Germany highlighted as an example) simply did not permit non-
national insurers to solicit directly without a local permanent establishment, with the 
effect of insulating national insurers from outside competition (Cecchini 1988: 41). 
The report predicted significant falls in the price of insurance policies as a result of 
increased competition once EC regulation had been put in place to liberalise insurance 
markets. 
 
Assessment 
 
In the case of EC regulation of insurance markets the opportunity for new regulatory 
activity arose due to a confluence of member state preferences, namely the desire to 
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complete the single market for insurance services and ensure benefits for consumers 
and businesses, and to EC policy entrepreneurship in the form of judicial activism of 
the European Court of Justice in the German Insurance ruling and opportunities 
created by the Single Market Programme. 
 
The window of opportunity that opened for EC regulatory activity in the form of the 
Second and Third Generation Insurance Directives was driven by consensus in the 
insurance industry itself and, following the 1986 European Court judgement, by all 
member states on the need for regulation. It was therefore a regulatory process 
underpinned by the decision to emulate a regulatory approach already in place in one 
EC member state and to learn from the approach deemed successful in another 
regulatory setting. 
 
The White Paper on Completion of the Internal Market, the introduction of qualified 
majority voting as a result of the Single European Act, the ruling of the European 
Court of Justice in the 1986 German insurance case and Cecchini Report, all 
contributed to the new consensus amongst member states that emerged in the late 
1980s in favour of EC regulatory activity to liberalise insurance markets. 
 
Policy entrepreneurship on the part of the Commission, procedural innovation in the 
form of a return to majority voting, the stimulus given by judicial activism on the part 
of the European Court of Justice and the legitimacy given to the EC regulatory 
initiative by the Cecchini Report all worked together to create a consensus in favour 
of liberalised insurance markets, engendered by a spirit of co-operation between 
member states, leading to new EC regulatory outputs from the policy-making process. 
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So were the events leading to the emergence of new EC regulatory activity to 
liberalise insurance markets really the result of a competitive game between leaders 
and laggards, as commentators on EC regulation such as Héritier would suggest? It 
will be recalled from Chapter 2 that the competitive model envisages that being the 
“leader” member state and making the first move does not necessarily imply a policy 
advantage since this may simply trigger the formation of an opposing coalition 
seeking to obstruct the first mover’s advantage. But this did not necessarily happen in 
the case of EC regulation to liberalise insurance markets, where member state 
opposition to liberalised insurance markets fell away, even in Germany following the 
1986 European Court judgement. In the case of EC insurance markets, there was little 
to be found elsewhere in Europe by the way of an alternative to the UK model of 
liberalisation, where the policy towards insurance markets was very much that of a 
heavily regulated, protectionist approach. The distinction was not, then, between the 
stylised characterisation of heavily regulated states in favour of new EC regulation 
versus less regulated member states that might acquiesce to new EC regulation 
without playing a significant role in determining its content, but with no new EC 
regulation the latter’s preferred outcome. 
 
Rather, the situation was one in which the regulatory approach of a member state that 
was an innovative regulator with liberalising tendencies was identified by the 
European Commission, when looking for a efficient regulatory way in which to 
liberalise EC insurance markets as part of the Single European Market Initiative. The 
UK approach was seen by the European Commission to be proven and working 
effectively in terms of both providing increased competition in the insurance services 
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sector and providing appropriate safeguards in terms of regulatory supervision. But 
why, then, did more heavily regulated member states exhibit preferences that 
supported EC regulation in favour of the liberalising approach? 
 
In part, this may have been the result of the Commission’s predisposition to regulate 
on the liberalisation of insurance markets, with member states effectively stepping 
back from being innovators, in their place the Directorate General of the Commission 
responsible for that particular policy area taking the lead. It is also clear that the 
judicial activism of the European Court of Justice was significant. 
 
In Héritier’s terms this was a shift in the decisional arena that played an important 
part in promoting progress towards agreement on a new EC regulatory approach. In 
this context, the judicial activism of the European Court of Justice played an 
important role as the institution that established principles on which the Commission 
was later able to regulate further. The emergence of a window of opportunity through 
judicial activism was perhaps also significant because the European Court of Justice 
could not, in the same way as a political body, avoid taking a decision simply because 
the political and economic environment is hostile to a given solution (Héritier 1999: 
35) and could therefore provide a fresh stimulus to the regulatory process. 
 
The European Commission was certainly opportunistic in seizing the moment to 
propose a new round of regulatory activity in the insurance sector in keeping with an 
entrepreneurial characterisation of its role. Applying this observation to the more 
general context of EC regulation, what appears apparent is a sense in which a range of 
factors influencing regulatory outcomes become mutually reinforcing. 
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The European Court of Justice judgement, the existence of qualified majority voting 
for single market measures in the Council of Ministers and the policy 
entrepreneurship of the European Commission, which sought to exploit the window of 
opportunity opened by the European Court of Justice case and the Single Market 
Initiative to promote further liberalisation of financial services markets, all 
contributed to the creation of conditions of policy space – the opportunity for new EC 
regulation to liberalise insurance markets. 
 
But how far was a member state like Germany, in Héritier’s characterisation a 
“laggard” in regulatory terms in relation to the liberalisation of insurance markets, 
actually coerced into regulatory change as the outcome of a competitive struggle of 
differing regulatory approaches? To what extent was Germany a “loser”, overcome by 
overwhelming forces in favour of liberalising regulatory change as part of a 
competitive struggle of the type outlined in chapter 2 of this thesis? Could a case not 
be made to support the assertion that Germany was behaving entirely rationally by 
seeking to emulate the more liberalised insurance market found in the UK, to the 
benefit of purchasers of insurance services as a result of the increased product range 
and pressures to drive down prices for insurance premiums that increased competition 
would be likely to bring? 
 
The evidence derived from the fieldwork undertaken for this thesis tends to support 
the latter scenario, with policy-makers and key industry officials in Germany stating 
that: (i) there was a strong sense at that time amongst German insurance companies 
that there was an inevitability about the liberalisation of the insurance sector in that 
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country, bringing with it the associated opening up of a previously protectionist policy 
towards the insurance market and increased competition from foreign companies; and 
(ii) in addition to the narrower interests of the German insurance companies 
themselves, the Federal Government, supervisory authorities and consumer groups 
recognised that benefits as well as costs would be likely to accrue as the result of the 
opening up of insurance markets in that country to foreign competition via EC 
regulatory activity. 
 
There is also evidence, again derived from the results of fieldwork undertaken for this 
thesis, that regulatory competition alone may be an insufficient means of accounting 
for EC regulation to liberalise insurance markets across the Community, since policy-
makers and company executives in the insurance sector in Germany did not report a 
struggle or conflict of ideas in regulatory terms prior to new EC measures to liberalise 
insurance markets and, indeed, ultimately saw the inevitability and potential 
advantages of the liberalisation of insurance markets along the lines of the UK 
regulatory approach. 
 
Certainly, the European Court of Justice judgement on insurance in 1986 clarified the 
interpretation of the Treaty of Rome on a judicial level but it was through the 
subsequent EC regulatory process that member state preferences in favour of a 
Community-wide consensus on the need to liberalise insurance markets came about. 
In some respects, this manifestation of member state preferences followed the lead 
taken by the European Commission, presenting the Single Market Initiative’s wider 
goal of removing barriers to trade between member states as an overall policy 
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objective, a guiding principle that needed to be applied to the regulation of insurance 
markets. 
 
The regulatory objectives put forward by the European Commission when it packaged 
together proposals as the Single Market Initiative was given added legitimacy by the 
judicial authority by the decision of the European Court of Justice in the 1986 
insurance case. 
 
But, if the emergence of policy space and the opening of a window of opportunity for 
new EC regulation to liberalise insurance markets had more to do with judicial 
activism, member state consensus on the need for market liberalising regulation and  
European Commission strategies than a competitive struggle between leader and 
laggard member states, how far might diffusion and policy learning theories also 
assist in providing a clearer understanding of the emergence of the opportunity for 
regulatory change in relation to this policy-making issue? 
 
Diffusion, policy learning and EC regulation to liberalise insurance markets 
 
Given the fact that EC regulatory activity involves both intervention by a 
supranational body in the form of the European Commission and intergovernmental 
agencies in the form of member state governments, it is unlikely that the internal 
determinants model described in Chapter 2 will alone offer a sufficient degree of 
sophistication to account for the emergence of an opportunity to regulate at 
Community level. It will be recalled from Chapter 2 that the internal determinants 
model (Downs 1976; Regens 1980) assumes that new regulatory measures are 
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attributable to political and economic characteristics internal to the state and carry the 
presumption, inherent in the model, that each state acts independently of others. Berry 
and Berry’s (1999: 178) assertion that the internal determinants model is insufficient 
to account for innovation and emulation also appears to be borne out in relation to 
explanations for the opportunity for new measures designed to liberalise insurance 
markets within the EC regulatory process since, even within a highly regulated state 
such as Germany, the benefits of increased competition leading to lower insurance 
premiums and greater choice for consumers was readily observable when German 
regulators noted other systems at work, particularly those in the UK and the 
Netherlands. 
 
Is it possible, then, that a national interaction model of diffusion (similar to that 
outlined in Chapter 2) might be more appropriate as an explanation for why the 
opportunity for EC regulation to liberalise insurance markets arose? The national 
interaction model assumes that there are multi-lateral communications networks 
between officials of various states, specialists on particular regulatory issues learning 
from one another when they interact and exchange knowledge and experience, and the 
European Community model appears to offer numerous possibilities for interaction, 
diffusion and learning to occur in the ways that the national interaction model 
anticipates. 
 
Council of Ministers meetings between national political figures, technical 
committees of experts, EC-wide groups of industry representatives or interest groups 
and consultations undertaken by the multi-national workforce of the European 
Commission all provide forums for interaction across member states. Departmental 
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cultures and cadres of experts working within the European Commission are 
themselves significant actors in this process. But it is not only what Kingdon has 
termed “policy entrepreneurs”, working within the European Commission services 
and waiting for windows of opportunity to emerge in order to press their particular 
policy demands, that offer the potential for a diffusion of ideas from one member state 
to another. 
 
There is also the possibility of a leader-laggard diffusion model (see Chapter 2), 
regulatory policies being transferred from member states that are pioneers to other 
states that emulate those leaders. Under the leader-laggard diffusion model, a 
regulatory advanced, but highly regulated, state such as Germany follows the 
liberalising tendencies of a country such as the UK where a first mover regulatory 
approach can be observed as having resulted in benefits in terms of both opportunities 
for companies and benefits for consumers, without unanticipated costs of an 
unacceptable magnitude also being incurred. By observing first mover regulation and 
later agreeing to the adoption of the new regulatory approach as the EC model, the 
laggard state may be behaving in an entirely rational and efficient regulatory way, 
minimising the risks involved in new regulation by following the approach already 
taken by a regulatory leader state, even when the subsequent impact of regulation is 
likely to differ and result in sub-optimal outcomes due to different local conditions, 
consumer behaviour and corporate cultures in the laggard state. 
 
Chapter 2 noted indications that, in terms of opportunities for EC regulation, the 
internal determinants model may well assist in accounting for EC regulatory 
innovation by corroborating the characterisation of the EC regulatory process as one 
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within which, like their US counterparts, European Commission policy-making 
officials exploit ‘windows of opportunity’ to choose between regulatory alternatives 
in a way that will achieve the desired regulatory objectives in the most efficient way. 
 
This apparent significance of windows of opportunity appears to confirm Majone’s 
assertion that demand for regulatory initiatives supplied by the Commission often 
comes from member states themselves, Majone himself using the example of pressure 
exerted on the Commission by the UK to liberalise the market for life and non-life 
insurance as part of the Single Market Initiative. So, windows of opportunity for new 
EC regulatory initiatives can open in a co-operative way, not as the result of an 
historical accident, but as the result of a consensual approach being adopted by 
member state governments in the regulatory policy-making process – albeit a 
consensus stimulated, in the case of insurance, by a prior decisional outcome of the 
European Court of Justice. And if new EC regulation can be the result of demand 
from consensual, like-minded member state governments, is it also possible, as 
Majone suggests, that the opportunity for EC regulation can equally be the result of 
demand from non-governmental, public-interest, organisations such as environmental 
and consumer groups who prefer coordinated Community regulatory activity to 
piecemeal national measures, acting alongside the preferences of member state 
governments? Although consumer pressure was largely absent from the initial rounds 
of EC regulation of insurance services, as we shall see later in this chapter, latterly 
this became more significant in relation to the Commission consultation on whether 
EC financial services regulation was meeting consumers’ expectations. In the next 
chapter, closer analysis of the emergence of the opportunity to introduce EC 
regulation to ensure the quality of drinking water intended for human consumption 
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will also offer some insights into whether environmental and consumer pressure was a 
factor in the growth of EC regulation in that area. Before turning to that case study, 
however, this chapter will look more closely at the negotiation, adoption and re-
appraisal of EC regulation of insurance services.  
 
The negotiation of EC regulation on insurance services 
 
Background 
 
Following the model of liberalisation of financial markets pioneered in Europe by the 
UK, and already followed at European Community level in the earlier Second 
Banking Directive, the Second Life and Second Non-Life Insurance Directives dealt 
with cross-frontier insurance. In direct response to the 1986 European Court of Justice 
judgement, the Second Generation Directives separated out cases where there was no 
need for consumer protection (large risks) from those (mass risks) where consumer 
protection remained important. In the latter cases, the Second Generation Insurance 
created full freedom from control in the country where the risk is insured. In other 
cases, where consumer protection was an issue, national supervisory rules could still 
be imposed by the regulatory authorities of member states where the risk is situated 
on the basis of the “general good” principle set out in the European Court of Justice 
judgement. 
 
The Second Council Directive 88/357/EEC on direct insurance other than life 
assurance and laying down provisions to facilitate the effective freedom to provide 
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services14 (hereafter the Second Non-Life Directive) works on the assumption that 
companies intending to insure ‘large risks’ are aware of both the advantages and 
potential dangers of placing insurance with an organisation not established in their 
own country. The Directive focuses its main efforts on protecting the consumer whose 
interests would fall into the latter category of “mass risks”. Accordingly, the Second 
Non-Life Directive provided for financial regulation of “large risks” (defined 
categories of major industrial and commercial policyholders) in the member state 
where the insurer is established. However, in the case of mass risks (i.e. everything 
not defined as large risks) where consumer protection was judged to be important, the 
member state where the risk is situated may insist on authorisation and apply controls 
on cross-frontier business. In the latter case, the Directive did little to encourage 
cross-frontier business because the option remained for the host country to insist on 
its own authorisation procedures. An effective barrier to the creation of a Single 
Market therefore still remained because national supervisory authorities could 
legitimately discriminate against non-domestic providers of insurance services, 
excluding them from the market on grounds that individual consumers required 
additional protection over and above that provided for commercial purchasers of 
insurance policies. 
 
Despite its failure to create a Single Market for insurance companies seeking to sell 
policies to non-commercial customers, the Second Non-Life Directive did create a 
Single Market in the area of greatest commercial need – a policyholder with risks in 
several member states could insure them under a single contract. 
 
                                                 
14 OJ L 172, 4.7.88. 
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The Second Non-Life Directive was followed in 1990 by the accompanying Second 
Council Directive 90/619/EEC on direct life assurance, laying down the provisions to 
facilitate the effective exercise of freedom to provide services15 (hereafter the Second 
Life Directive). The Second Life Directive gave individuals the right to purchase life 
insurance from insurers not established in the policyholder’s country. This means that 
regulatory authorities in member states are no longer able to prohibit their citizens 
from buying life policies from other countries, as many such authorities had done in 
the past. 
 
The Second Non-Life Directive drew a distinction between active cross-frontier 
marketing (“active provision of services”) and approaches from own initiative buyers 
(“passive provision of services”). In the active case, the policyholder’s state may 
claim the right to authorise and to control of technical provisions and assets under its 
own rules. In the passive case, there is no authorisation in the policyholder’s state and 
the technical provisions and assets are supervised in the home state. The underlying 
principle is that although the life policyholder16 may expect protection from his own 
state when insurance is actively sold to him, when he chooses to seek cover in another 
member state on his own initiative, he will receive no protection. However, the state 
where the policyholder is resident can no longer prevent him purchasing a life 
contract unless it is contrary to “ordre public”. This was an important change in many 
member states. 
 
                                                 
15 OJ L 330/50, 29.11.90. 
16 Although a policyholder exercising his initiative in approaching an insurer in another member state 
may in principle do so through an independent broker in his own country, member states have only had 
to allow the latter to take place since 20 May 1996 (three years after the Directive came into force). 
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The Third Council Directive 92/49/EEC on Non-Life Insurance17 and the Third 
Council Directive 92/96/EEC on Life Insurance18 both came into force on 1 July 
1994. This Third Generation of Directives provided a single structure for business 
conducted either on an establishment basis or by cross-border provision of services, 
with the aim that personal insurance policies could be freely sold throughout the EC. 
The most significant feature of the Directives was the shift of regulatory control from 
host country to home country, with the introduction of the ‘single licence’ (commonly 
known as the “passport”), confirming the right of insurers to provide services across 
the EC. The licence would be issued by the ‘home’ member state in which the insurer 
has its head office. The basis for mutual recognition of insurers, deriving from their 
home country authorisations, would be based upon an agreed standard of prudential 
supervision. This would seem to be facilitating new entry competition and achieving 
some element of deregulation. The Third Generation Directives also offered 
purchasers of insurance access to the widest possible market by allowing customers to 
buy from any insurer in the EC. This was therefore a measure in line with the 
predictions of benefits from a Single Market contained in the Cecchini Report (1988). 
 
The new single authorisation arrangements were modelled on the Second Banking 
Directive, during the adoption of which much of the lobbying activity on the future 
format of EC supervisory control of financial services in a more general sense was 
undertaken. Following the Third Generation Insurance Directives, an insurance 
company having its head office in one member state needs to be authorised only in 
that state (the home state) to enable it to cover the entire EC market. It is able to set up 
                                                 
17 OJ L 228/1, 11.8.92. 
18 OJ L 360/1, 9.12.92. 
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branches in a host state or to sell insurance across frontiers, without requiring further 
authorisation from a host country. 
 
These initiatives were, however, subject to the “general good” provision whereby a 
host member state may request that an insurance company under home country 
control should comply with additional legal requirements in the host country so long 
as these are for the general good and that the additional conditions are objective, 
proportionate and non-discriminatory. However, there remains a great deal of legal 
uncertainty as to how far member states can apply the “general good” principle. While 
the limits of additional requirements which may legally be imposed on grounds of 
“general good” have yet to be tested in a case before the European Court of Justice, 
there are concerns amongst insurance firms that the application of the principle could 
be used by national regulatory authorities as legally justifiable grounds for excluding 
foreign competitors from its domestic insurance markets. Despite the market 
opportunities created by the Third Generation Directives, the absence of a definition 
of “general good” in the Third Directives, or clarification of its meaning by the Court 
of Justice, has made risk-averse insurance companies reluctant to undertake 
widespread expansion of their branch network in other member states until such time 
as clearer guidance on its scope is given. 
 
The Third Generation Directives build upon the model of supervision established by 
the First and Second Generation Directives, but remove many of the remaining 
constraints on the establishment of a Single Market in insurance. In addition to the 
single licence they address a number of areas, including technical reserves, asset 
admissibility and policyholder information, deemed necessary to complete the 
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insurance market. Minimum price restrictions are phased out and some national 
regulations are removed. These measures are intended to have a major deregulatory 
effect on the market. 
 
Contrary to the old approach to regulation of standard policy terms found in EC 
member states other than the UK and the Netherlands, prior verification of contracts 
and rates is now prohibited. Member states are able to carry out only subsequent, non-
systematic checks on policies to ensure that their legal provisions protecting the 
general good are being complied with. Insurers are freely able to fix rates they wish to 
charge since any state system of controlling rates, whether in advance or 
retrospectively, is incompatible with the Third Directives. 
 
Assessment 
 
The critical liberalising steps for insurance markets in Europe were taken with the 
Second Generation Directives. Having established the principles of the Single Market, 
in the Second Generation Directives, the Third Generation Directives were less 
contentious. Following the Court of Justice judgements of 1986 and the subsequent 
Second Generation Insurance Directives, firms in national insurance markets where 
the old prescriptive approach to standard policy terms and uniform rates had been the 
norm appear to have displayed an air of acceptance that the Third Generation 
Directives would inevitably follow. 
 
The UK already had an open regulatory stance and operated a relatively liberalised 
regulatory environment for insurance services by virtue of the Financial Services Act 
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1986.19 During negotiations for subsequent EC liberalising measures in the form of 
the Second and Third Generation Insurance Directives, UK insurance companies were 
anxious to ensure that EC regulation was not overly prescriptive. In the event, this 
problem did not arise in the formulation of the Insurance Directives. The Dutch 
insurance industry, whose regulatory regime accorded closely with the UK model of a 
liberalised market, was also particularly supportive of the approach proposed by the 
Directorate General of the European Commission responsible for financial services 
(DG XV). Insurance companies in tightly regulated markets (particularly Germany), 
although less willing to embrace wholeheartedly a liberalised market, did not put 
forward a viable alternative approach to counter EC emulation of the UK model of 
financial service liberalisation. 
 
Not only was the approach taken by the Insurance Directives well established and 
acceptable as far as UK insurance companies were concerned, there were other factors 
working in their favour. At a domestic level, the Department of Trade and Industry 
(DTI) and industry representatives from individual companies and the trade 
associations, the Association of British Insurers (ABI) and the British Insurers’ 
International Committee (BIIC), were considered to be of one mind. The BIIC in 
particular played a leading role in the formulation of the Second and Third Generation 
Directives, according to respondents interviewed for this thesis, seeking influence via 
three routes: the European industry representative body, Comité Européén des 
Assurances (CEA),20 direct links with DG XV officials or the DTI. As a result, it was 
                                                 
19 Subsequently replaced by the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, which provided a framework 
within which the Financial Services Authority (FSA) operates as the UK's sole, statutory, financial 
services regulator. 
20 The title of the CEA in English is the European Federation of National Insurance Associations. A full 
list of the 24 national member associations of the CEA can be found at: 
http://www.cea.assur.org/cea/v2.0/pres/uk/frame03.html 
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felt that there was little in the Directives that differed from the UK Financial Services 
Act, with the result that little in terms of implementation problems would arise in the 
UK context. 
 
EC-wide regulatory emulation of the UK model of insurance supervision was the 
preferred option for British firms and, through the ABI and BIIC, the UK insurance 
industry was supportive of the rule framework proposed by DG XV in the Second and 
Third Directives. The potential for first mover advantages to accrue to the UK 
insurance firms, who would not have to adapt significantly their current compliance 
strategies to a new EC regulatory regime, was not lost on the UK industry. UK 
insurers became strong advocates of the general approach to be taken in the Second 
and Third Directives not only because this suited existing corporate practice, but also 
because it was widely considered to be the most efficient regulatory approach for the 
Community as a whole to take, the only alternative being a more burdensome, 
prescriptive regulatory approach that had been followed in some other member states 
prior to the 1986 European Court of Justice judgement. 
 
In Brussels, the CEA had less influence than organisations representing individual 
national insurance industries due, according to respondents interviewed for this thesis, 
to the divergent views of the leading national member associations – particularly the 
reluctance of member federations from France and Germany to embrace the 
liberalised market approach wholeheartedly. In fact, the problem of reaching 
consensus on regulatory approaches went wider than this specific issue. The CEA had 
historically found it difficult to reach a meaningful consensus on the strategy it 
wished to adopt when lobbying the European Commission. 
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However, lack of consensus and the slow pace of discussions amongst member 
associations during the negotiations for the Second and Third Generation Insurance 
Directives, with no viable alternatives put forward, was thought by interview 
respondents to have diminished the potential influence of the CEA during that time. 
As one interview respondent put it, within the CEA there was an “air of acceptance 
that there was an inevitability” about the process of liberalisation. This evidence of 
lack of consensus, or consensus only at the lowest common denominator, amongst 
European-level trade associations is not unique to the insurance sector but was 
particularly marked in this instance. Another respondent commented that, while the 
French and German insurance industries had been traditionally heavily regulated and 
hence were more cautious and still tended towards prescriptive regulation and 
protectionism during negotiation of the Second and Third Generation Insurance 
Directives, the Spanish and Italian insurance federations had shown themselves to be 
more open, trying to learn from the experience of the UK and keen to benefit from a 
more open approach. 
 
Although respondents interviewed for this thesis stressed that the UK model for 
liberalisation of financial services was adopted by the European Commission because, 
essentially, it was the most appropriate regulatory approach to take, with other 
markets in Europe at that time much more heavily regulated, industry representatives 
also acknowledged that personalities matter. 
 
Directorate General XV of the European Commission adopted a sympathetic 
approach towards the UK model of financial services regulation during the crucial 
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period of EC regulatory negotiation not only because the UK approach was seen to 
offer the only viable model for liberalisation of insurance markets, but also because 
the key senior officials within DG XV at the time of the Second and Third Generation 
Insurance Directives were all UK nationals.  
 
The European Commissioner responsible for financial services (Sir Leon Brittan), the 
Director General of DG XV (Geoffrey Fitchew) and the Head of the DG XV 
Insurance Division (Brian Pool) might, as UK nationals, be naturally expected to 
gravitate towards their familiarity with the UK system of regulating insurance markets 
during the initial period of formulating and presenting proposals for EC measures. It 
meant also that all the senior policy makers in Brussels were familiar with the UK 
regulatory approach. 
 
According to interview respondents, the nationality of key Commission officials also 
ensured that the UK Government received good access during the policy-making 
stages of the Second and Third Generation Insurance Directives. The subsequent 
appointment of another UK national (John Mogg) as Director General of DG XV and 
a Dutchman (Gisbert Wolff), equally sympathetic to the UK deregulatory approach to 
financial services, as Head of the Insurance Division continued the same tradition 
That the resulting EC regulatory approach closely followed the UK model was, 
according to interview respondents, therefore unsurprising. 
 
Aside from the access accorded to the UK Government during the regulatory process, 
interviewees also pointed out that the strong presence of sympathetic Commission 
officials ensured that the UK insurance industry enjoyed good access during 
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negotiations and, indeed that the Commission services often turned directly to UK 
industry experts for technical advice during the policy formulation stage when the 
impact of new Community regulation was being assessed. As one interview 
respondent put it: “the Commission was aware of the tremendous amount of expertise 
within companies and was receptive to new ideas and comments that industry put 
forward”. There is also some evidence that DG XV sought to form alliances with 
supportive national industry associations (particularly from the UK) during the 
negotiation phase in order to build support for its proposals at the earliest stages.  
 
However, what was perhaps of equal importance to the nationalities of Commission 
staff in determining EC regulatory outcomes in relation to the liberalisation of 
insurance services was the departmental cultures within that part of the Commission. 
 
Whether departmental cultures can be differentiated from factors relating the the 
nationalities of key personnel is difficult to unpack with any degree of certainty. 
However, what can be said is that the liberalising approach of the staff in DG XV was 
in marked contrast to the approach taken by the Consumer Policy Services of the 
European Commission, which also retained a strong interest in financial services 
matters through consumer protection considerations. 
 
The Green Paper on Financial Services: meeting consumers’ expectations 
 
The differences between the departmental cultures in the Commission and the fact 
that the Commission does not behave as a homogenous whole, but may represent a 
number of competing interests, each perhaps championed via Directorates General, 
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has been widely acknowledged. It can be seen clearly in the 1996 Commission Green 
Paper on Financial Services: meeting consumers’ expectations21 which, although 
calling for written responses to be sent to DG XV, clearly had the imprint of 
Consumer Policy Services in the issues it raises in the text. Indeed, it is generally 
considered to have been an achievement by DG XV to act as the contact point for 
responses to the Green Paper since comments may well have received a rather 
different interpretation had the initial contact point within the Commission been the 
Consumer Policy Services. 
 
The Green Paper considered the specific protection of a particular category of user of 
financial services – the private consumer – on the basis that it was a category that 
generally needs a higher level of protection than more experienced or powerful users. 
Furthermore, although the financial services Directives were targeted primarily at the 
financial sector, they were also concerned with the rights and interests of the 
consumer and contained provisions that safeguard consumers’ rights to correct and 
complete information. Furthermore, all the Directives were intended to secure the 
stability and trustworthiness of the financial services sector by imposing strict 
prudential rules and minimum capital requirements. However, the Commission’s view 
in the Green Paper was that a number of problems had been encountered by 
consumers. These problems included the refusal to sell financial services to non-
residents, the lack of information and the fraudulent activities of unscrupulous 
intermediaries.22 The Green Paper also raised particular concerns about distance 
selling of financial products and the granting of cooling-off periods in financial 
services (where, although EC regulation gave consumers the right to withdraw from a 
                                                 
21 COM(96) 209 final, 22 May 1996. 
22 Ibid., page 1a. 
 168
contract for life insurance within a certain number of days, no equivalent provision 
existed in relation to non-life insurance).23 
 
In particular, the Green Paper set out the Commission’s wish to engage in a wide-
ranging debate with all interested parties, in particular focusing on the following 
questions: 
 
• To what extent are consumer interests already adequately taken care of under 
Community and national law, for example as regards consumer information, 
transparency, legal protection and redress mechanisms? 
 
• To what extent does existing legislation provide an adequate level of 
consumer protection in the specific case of distance selling of financial 
services? 
 
• Are consumer interests or the operation of the single market prejudiced by 
differing national consumer protection standards? 
 
• What are the obstacles preventing consumers from fully benefiting from the 
single market in financial services? 
 
• What other major consumer concerns not dealt with in this Green Paper should 
the Commission be made aware of? 
 
                                                 
23 Ibid., page 13. 
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• Does the introduction of new technologies and new marketing techniques call 
for additional consumer protection rules in the area of financial services?24 
 
In response to the 1996 Green Paper, firms closely allied themselves with DG XV, 
while consumer groups put their case via DG XXIV (the Directorate General 
responsible for consumer affairs). The emergence of DG XXIV as a significant player 
in the EC regulatory process in the mid-1990s under the leadership of a Greek 
Director-General (Spyros Pappas) was largely undermined in this instance because 
DG XV took ownership of the consultation process and identified itself as the contact 
point for comments from stakeholders, reputedly to the dismay of DG XXIV, which 
had prepared much of the initial text of the Green Paper. It appears to indicate that the 
traditionally more influential role of DG XV within the Commission had not been 
wholly overturned by the growing importance of consumer protection on the EC 
policy agenda during this period. One interview respondent commented that the Green 
Paper “reflected a DG XV view of the world rather than the consumer protection view 
of the world held by DG XXIV”. 
 
The results of the consultation on the Green Paper were published in the 1997 
Commission Communication Financial Services: Enhancing Consumer Confidence – 
Follow-up to the Green Paper on “Financial Services: Meeting Consumer 
Expectations”.25 The Communication noted that the consultation identified 
differences of view between the main parties. The financial services industry 
generally emphasised the need to ensure the full functioning of the single market, 
existing Directives needing to be properly implemented and fair competition 
                                                 
24 Ibid., page 15. 
25 SEC(97) 1824 final. 
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achieved. Consumers raised serious concerns about the content of EC regulation 
because it lacked specific consumer protection provisions even though consumers 
often lacked technical expertise on financial services products of an increasing 
complex nature.  
 
In response, the Communication set out a number of proposals for new or amended 
Directives but also stated that legislation is not appropriate for all the problems 
identified, with other means (notably a dialogue between industry and consumers) 
more appropriate to improve information, market transparency and the potential for 
resolving consumer problems and complaints.26 Specifically, in relation to insurance 
contracts, the Communication noted that further measures were necessary to set 
common minimum requirements for insurance contracts for consumers. However, in 
line with submissions to the consultation process made by the insurance industry, the 
Communication also stated that such measures should not lead to undesirable 
standardisation of products and to the stifling of innovation. Crucially, again in line 
with the industry viewpoint, the Communication proposed that this issue should be 
included in the dialogue between industry and consumers, rather than through re-
regulation as favoured by consumer groups. Insurance industry submissions, rather 
than those of consumer groups, appeared to have prevailed in relation the decision to 
avoid substantive re-regulation of insurance services designed to enhance consumer 
protection. Informal consultations between industry and consumers, underpinned by 
the acknowledgement of the need to avoid overly burdensome and restrictive EC 
regulation, won the day. 
 
                                                 
26 Ibid., page 4. 
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The adoption of additional EC regulation to liberalise insurance markets 
 
Returning to the Second and Third Generation Insurance Directives, EC regulation 
appears to fall firmly into the category of EC regulatory emulation. As one 
interviewee put it, “the Second and Third Generation Insurance Directives closely 
follow the UK model. They take a liberal approach towards insurance regulation”. 
Furthermore, another interview respondent commented that the outcome of the 
regulatory process was in many ways a fait accompli with much of the consultation on 
the Second and Third Generation Directives taking place before the adoption 
precisely because the approach taken was built on the UK regulatory model and 
because there was general consensus that it was efficient in regulatory terms to 
emulate the successful UK approach. 
 
Little consideration was given to the desirability of considering competing regulatory 
approaches. The emphasis was on diffusion of the UK regulatory model, with the 
European Commission and EC member states keen to learn from the UK approach. 
 
Industry representatives interviewed stated that they were satisfied that the European 
Commission had listened to industry views and had acted on its advice where 
appropriate. The Commission appears to have done this in part as a strategy of 
building alliances with others sympathetic to its preferred regulatory approach and 
also as a pragmatic strategy of using the technical knowledge and expertise of 
interested parties to refine and improve the proposal before adoption. As one 
interview respondent commented: “the Commission is now willing to build coalitions, 
seeking out member states or national agencies that agree with its proposals to come 
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on board and provide technical advice to DG XV”. By identifying sympathetic non-
governmental actors to form alliances with and to act as providers of technical 
expertise, at the adoption stage of the EC regulatory process the European 
Commission appears less concerned with considering competing regulatory 
approaches and more inclined to learn from prior experiences of its preferred 
regulatory approach in the national context, using the advice and information it 
receives to refine and hone its regulatory proposals before they are adopted. 
 
Impact of EC regulation on insurance services 
 
From a UK perspective, there appears to have been relatively little of a contentious 
nature in the Second and Third Generation Insurance Directives. EC regulation did 
not result in a major change in the way that national markets operate. Domestically in 
the UK, this was largely due to the first mover advantages that accrued by virtue of 
the fact that insurance companies operating in the UK had already adapted to the 
operating conditions required by the Insurance Companies Act 1982 and the Financial 
Services Act 1986. The extent to which the Second and Third Generation Insurance 
Directives replicated (or ‘emulated’) the prior regulatory framework in the UK meant 
that no fundamental change was required in order to implement EC regulation, nor in 
the subsequent compliance strategies of the firms themselves. Together with the 
insurance industry in the Netherlands, where a similarly liberalised market operated 
prior to the Second and Third Generation Insurance Directives, the insurance market 
in the UK faced the least disruption of any national insurance sector in the EC as a 
result of Community-level regulatory changes. On the contrary, initially at least EC 
regulatory change was seen to offer opportunities to companies already operating 
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effectively in the UK since the opening up of previously highly regulated markets 
elsewhere in the European Community was considered to offer first mover advantages 
to firms already accustomed to deregulated market conditions and able to take 
advantage of home country authorisation and control measures introduced by the 
Third Generation Insurance Directives in particular. 
 
However, the full impact of EC regulation designed to liberalise insurance markets 
was hindered by a climate of legal uncertainty that is incompatible with the principle 
of freedom to provide services in the Single Market. According to interview 
respondents, UK insurers were more likely to be looking towards the Asia-Pacific 
region for growth of business than other European markets. In part this was because 
representatives of the UK insurance sector interviewed stressed that what UK insurers 
needed to enter new markets in the EC was not harmonised laws, since companies had 
been operating under different national rules in more than one country for many years, 
but rather that they needed good distribution networks to sell insurance policies 
locally and good claims and support services in close proximity to the consumer.  
 
In addition, from a regulatory point of view, uncertainty remained about the “general 
good” provisions of EC insurance regulation which allowed a host country to require 
an insurance company subject to home country control to comply with additional 
legal requirements. The uncertainty as to how the “general good” principle would be 
invoked in the host member state proved a disincentive to the development of cross-
border provision of services and the entry of foreign companies into parallel national 
markets. 
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Regulatory reappraisal: clarification of the “general good” principle in EC 
regulation to liberalise insurance services 
 
European Court of Justice 
 
The concept of “general good” is based on the case law of the European Court of 
Justice. It was developed initially in the context of the free movement of services and 
goods and was subsequently applied to the right of establishment. Case C-55/94 
Gebhard27 related to access to the profession of lawyer, an area where harmonisation 
of the conditions for taking up and carrying on the activity is very limited in 
comparison with insurance, with the effect that the possibilities for relying on the 
general good were much more extensive than in the insurance sector where 
regulations are extensively harmonised. The Court in Gebhard noted that “the taking-
up and pursuit of certain self-employed activities may be conditional on complying 
with certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action justified 
by the general good, such as rules relating to organization, qualifications, professional 
ethics, supervision and liability”.28  
 
However, despite these cases, the European Court of Justice has never given a 
definition of the “general good”, preferring to maintain its evolving nature. It has 
expressed its opinion in individual cases on the possibility of deeming a given 
national measure to be aimed at achieving an imperative objective serving the 
“general good” and has specified the line of reasoning to be followed in determining 
whether such a measure may be enforced by one member state against a trader from 
                                                 
27 Case-55/94 Reinhard Gebhard v. Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano [I-
1995] ECR I-4165, paragraphs 25 to 27. 
28 Ibid., paragraph 35. 
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another member state who is operating within the territory of the former. The Court 
has, however, spelt out the strict conditions to be met by national measures which are 
aimed at achieving an imperative serving the “general good” if they are to be validly 
enforced against that trader.  
 
It was in Gebhard that the Court noted that “national measures liable to hinder or 
make less attractive the exercise of fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty 
must fulfil four conditions: (i) they must be applied in a non-discriminatory manner; 
(ii) they must be justified by imperative requirements in the general interest; (iii) they 
must be suitable for securing the attainment of the objective which they pursue; and 
(iv) they must not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it”.29 This was 
subsequently confirmed in the Court’s judgements in Case C-415/93 Bosman30 and 
Case C-250/95 Futura.31 
 
European Commission clarification of the “general good” principle 
 
The first step towards re-regulation in the form of clarification of how the “general 
good” principle should be interpreted came in the European Commission’s 
communication to the Council of 28 October 1998 on financial services, Financial 
Services: Building a Framework for Action,32 which was drawn up at the request of 
the Cardiff European Council meeting of June 1998. In the Communication, the 
Commission identified differences in interpretation of the Community rules and the 
resulting legal uncertainty as one of the factors preventing the single market in 
                                                 
29 Ibid., paragraph 37. 
30 Case C-415/93 Union Royal Belge des Sociétés de Football Association ASBL & others v. Jean-
Marc Bosman [1995] I-4921. 
31 Case C-250/95 Futura Participations SA Singer v. Administration des Contributions  [1997] I-2471. 
32 COM(98) 625 final. 
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financial services from functioning properly. The approach proposed by the 
Commission was subsequently adopted as an Action Plan33 by member states at the 
Cologne European Council meeting on 4 June 1999. 
 
The Action Plan included adoption of a Commission interpretive communication on 
freedom to provide services and the “general good” in the insurance sector, among the 
priority objectives for helping to ensure that the single market operated more 
effectively, particularly in the light of the Third Generation Insurance Directives 
92/49/EEC and 92/96/EEC. 
 
Before adopting the Action Plan, the Commission published a draft communication34 
which marked the beginning of a wide-ranging consultation process. Following 
publication of the draft communication, the Commission received numerous 
contributions including those from member states, professional associations 
representing insurers and intermediaries, insurance companies, consumer 
organisations and law firms. It also organised hearings with interested parties. 
 
The “general good” principle allows a host member to require a branch of an 
insurance company under home country control to comply with additional legal 
requirements provided that those requirements are on grounds which are objective, 
proportionate and non-discriminatory. However, there remained uncertainty about 
how far member states could apply the general good principle and the insurance 
industry in the UK was particularly concerned that it could be applied in a restrictive 
way.  
                                                 
33 COM(1999) 232, 11.5.1999. 
34 OJ C 365/7, 3.12.1997. 
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As a result, a Commission interpretive communication on freedom to provide services 
and the general good in the insurance sector was published as document 2000/C 
43/03 on 16 February 2000.35 The Communication noted that while Third Generation 
Insurance Directives 92/49/EEC and 92/96/EEC completed the establishment of the 
single market in the insurance sector by introducing a single system for the 
authorisation and financial supervision of insurance undertakings by the member state 
in which they had their head office, such authorisation enabling an insurance 
undertaking to carry on its insurance business anywhere in the European Community, 
uncertainty may have occurred due to the requirement that an insurance undertaking 
must comply with the conditions in which, for reasons of the “general good”, such 
business must be conducted in the host member state. 
 
In the Communication, the Commission noted that, in many cases, application of the 
“general good” principle resulted in the supervisory authorities applying measures or 
penalties on insurance undertakings wishing to do business in the single market or the 
imposition of certain constraints or conditions regarding the conduct of business on 
their territory. In the view of the Commission, differences in interpretation of the 
“general good” provision were creating legal uncertainty, both as regards the 
arrangements applicable to them in the different member states and as regards the 
content of the products they wished to offer. 
 
The Commission suggested that differences in interpretation could seriously 
undermine the operation of the mechanisms set up by the Third Generation Insurance 
                                                 
35 OJ C 43/5, 16.2.00. 
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Directives and were thus likely to deter insurance undertakings from exercising the 
freedoms created by the EC Treaty which the Third Directives set out to promote and, 
hence to restrict the free movement of insurance services. The Commission pointed 
out that these differences were also preventing those seeking insurance from having 
access to insurance undertakings elsewhere in the Community and to the range of 
insurance products available within the single market in order to select the one that 
best fitted their needs in terms of cover and cost. 
 
Assessment 
 
• The stimulus for additional EC regulation to liberalise insurance markets came 
from four sources: (i) the European Commission’s 1985 White Paper on 
Completing the Internal Market; (ii) the Single European Act, 1986, which 
introduced qualified majority voting on the adoption of EC regulation in the 
Council of Ministers; (iii) the European Court of Justice judgement in 1986 on 
the right of establishment and freedom to provide services in relation to 
German insurance markets; and (iv) the Cecchini Report of 1988 on the 
benefits of completing the internal market.  
• The sources that provided a stimulus for additional EC regulation to liberalise 
insurance markets created the conditions under which consensus in favour of 
the liberalisation of insurance markets led to enhanced co-operation between 
member states, leading to agreement on new EC regulation in the form of the 
Second and Third Generation Insurance Directives. 
• Through its judgements the Court of Justice has, on occasion, prompted 
windows of opportunity to open in the EC regulatory process. The 
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Commission has then been able to act in an entrepreneurial manner in 
response to this “judicial activism”. This is precisely what happened in 
relation to EC regulation of insurance services when, on 4 December 1986, the 
European Court of Justice gave its judgement in Commission v Germany 
concerning the freedom to provide insurance services and right of 
establishment. 
• Negotiation was characterised by consent (generally, despite some initial 
opposition from Germany), collusion (clustering around the UK regulatory 
model of liberalised insurance markets) and an absence of competition 
between different regulatory models (given the consensus in favour of 
liberalised insurance markets as part of the Single Market Programme, there 
was an absence of viable alternatives to the UK regulatory model). 
• The Second and Third Generation Insurance Directives were in line with 
regulatory standards already in operation in the UK. However many UK firms 
subsequently experienced market entry barriers when they attempted to 
operate in other member states. 
• The result was a requirement for regulatory refinement – not in the form of 
second-round regulatory change per se in the form of re-regulation, but in the 
form of clarification of the existing regulatory approach in relation to the 
“general good” principle. 
• The departmental culture of the Directorate General responsible for financial 
services (or, more specifically, the nationalities of key DG XV personnel) may 
have been a factor that contributed to the emulation of the UK regulatory 
approach but, overall, there was member state consensus in favour of EC 
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regulation based on the UK model, co-operation between member states 
leading to adoption of the Second and Third Generation Insurance Directives. 
• The need for second round regulatory change came in terms of regulatory 
refinement. Firstly, this was through the consultations on meeting consumers’ 
expectations, the outcome of which strongly reflected the wishes of the 
insurance industry for informal consultations with consumers and the 
avoidance of unnecessarily burdensome re-regulation. Secondly, although the 
Commission’s interpretive Communication on the “general good” stopped 
short of formal re-regulation by providing guidance on how the principle 
should be applied by member state supervisory authorities, it made clear that a 
formal definition on the “general good” would be left to the European Court of 
Justice to provide. 
 
Postscript 
 
On 5 November 2002 the European Parliament and the Council adopted Directive 
2002/83/EEC concerning life assurance.36 This repealed and replaced First Council 
Directive 79/267/EEC, Second Council Directive 90/619/EEC and Third Council 
Directive 92/96/EEC on life assurance. Directive 2002/83/EEC retained the regulatory 
approach followed in the earlier EC regulatory instruments but introduced additional 
measures relating to the coordination of financial guarantees required of life assurance 
undertakings and the clarification of the powers of supervisory authorities. With 
respect to the “general good” provision, it specified that member states must not 
prevent a policy holder from concluding a contract with an authorised assurance 
                                                 
36 OJ L 345/1, 19.12.2002. 
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undertaking as long as that does not conflict with the legal provisions of the general 
good in the member state of the commitment.37 In effect, therefore, a definition of the 
“general good” principle is still lacking and this awaits definition by the European 
Court of Justice, if and when the Court finds itself in a position to elucidate on this 
matter. On the other substantive issue of insurance services regulation addressed in 
this Chapter, namely meeting consumer expectations, Directive 2002/83/EEC is 
silent. 
                                                 
37 Article 33, ibid., page 27. 
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CHARACTERISING EC REGULATION: 
EMULATION, INNOVATION AND RE-REGLUATION 
 
CHAPTER 5 
 
INNOVATION AND RE-REGULATION: 
THE CASE OF DRINKING WATER QUALITY 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter provides a case study of EC regulation to ensure drinking water quality. 
It does so in order to demonstrate how innovation - the second core concept of EC 
regulation identified in this thesis – operates in practice as innovative scientific 
standards come to the fore in EC regulation as the result of consensus and co-
operation. In the case of drinking water quality, the scientific standards embodied in 
EC regulation came to the fore as the result of consensus and co-operation rather than 
by member states competing with one another in order to influence the content of EC 
regulation. The chapter also reviews how those standards then became entrenched in 
EC regulation, even when updated scientific information became available which 
indicated that more appropriate standards could be adopted in revised EC regulation. 
It does so by using the third core concept of EC regulation identified in this thesis -  
re-regulation. 
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The structure of the chapter is as follows. Firstly, to illustrate the context for the case 
study, the chapter explains the origins of EC environmental policy, and EC water 
policy in particular, to demonstrate why a consensus emerged in favour of EC 
regulatory activity in this policy area. Secondly, the chapter explains how, through the 
opening of a window of opportunity for EC regulatory activity, consensus grew in 
favour of EC regulation of drinking water quality, culminating in the 1980 Directive. 
Thirdly, the negotiation of EC regulation of drinking water quality is examined with 
particular attention paid to the role of scientific expertise or, more precisely, scientific 
uncertainty in the EC regulatory process. Fourthly, the impact of EC regulation of 
drinking water quality is considered. Fifthly, attempts to achieve second round 
regulatory change, resulting in the 1998 Directive on drinking water quality, are 
reviewed in order to explain why EC regulation remained entrenched in 1980 
standards, despite the emergence of more scientifically accurate toxicological 
information in the late 1990s. The concluding sections emphasise that, following a 
process of attempted re-regulation, standards enshrined in EC regulation of drinking 
water quality remained locked in a sub-optimal trajectory, in spite of attempts to 
achieve regulatory revision, because the consensus and co-operation that had 
characterised earlier EC regulatory activity had broken down. This final section will 
demonstrate that, even when there is a fragmentation of the consensus that previously 
existed in favour of innovative regulatory standards that were earlier considered 
appropriate, regulatory entrenchment rather than regulatory revision can result. 
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Background 
 
Origins of EC environmental policy 
 
Before considering the extent to which EC regulation of drinking water quality can be 
characterised by the term innovation, it necessary to explain the context in which EC 
regulation of this issue occurred in the first place. With regard to EC regulation of 
environmental issues, it is noteworthy that there was no reference to environmental 
policy at all in the Treaty of Rome of 1957. Environmental issues were not, initially, 
an issue of great significance in the period of post-war recovery but, as public interest 
in the problems associated with pollution grew, it became increasingly apparent to 
political leaders that the European Community should involve itself in a set of 
environmental problems that did not respect national boundaries. What is sometimes 
regarded as the EC’s first environmental regulation was adopted in 1967, with a 
Directive dealing with standards for classifying, packaging and labelling dangerous 
substances, but its real focus was on the facilitation of trade. Subsequent legislation 
built on the 1967 Directive, notably the 6th amendment of 1979 which provided for 
the pre-market control of hazardous chemicals. This might more genuinely be 
regarded as the starting point for EC environmental regulation. 
 
Between 1967 and 1987, when the Single European Act introduced for the first time 
an “Environment” title into the EC Treaty, 150 separate pieces of environmental 
legislation were adopted. During this initial period of piecemeal expansion of EC 
environmental regulation, the European Commission proved creative in the use of 
Article 94 (formerly Article 100) of the EC Treaty, which allowed for the 
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approximation of member state laws that directly affect the establishment and 
functioning of the common market,38 and Article 308 (formerly Article 235) which 
allows for the adoption of Community measures where necessary to attain, in the 
course of the operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the 
Community where the Treaty has not provided the necessary powers.39 
 
This development of environmental competence was given a major impetus at the 
Paris Summit on 20 October 1972 when heads of state or of government emphasised 
the importance of a Community Environmental Policy and called upon the European 
Commission to draw up, before 31 July 1973, an environmental policy.40 
 
In 1973 the Commission published the First Action Programme on the Environment, 
which emphasised the harmonisation of national policies between member states. This 
was adopted by the Council on 22 November 1973.41 The First Action Programme on 
the Environment set out the objectives of Community Environmental Policy as being 
to improve the setting and quality of life, and the surroundings and living conditions 
of the peoples of the Community, procuring an environment providing the best 
                                                 
38 Article 94 (ex Article 100) EC Treaty: “The Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from 
the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament and the Economic and Social 
Committee, issue directives on the approximation of such laws, regulations or administrative 
provisions of the Member States as directly affect the establishment or functioning of the common 
market”. 
39 Article 308 (ex Article 235) EC Treaty: “If action by the Commission should prove necessary to 
attain, in the course of the operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the Community 
and this Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, the Council shall, acting unanimously on a 
proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, take the appropriate 
measures”. 
40 A step had already been taken in this direction with the formation of an Environment and Consumer 
Protection Unit within the European Commission in 1971. In 1972 this became an Environment and 
Consumer Protection Service with 15 staff members attached to the Industrial Policy Directorate, DG 
III. 
41 Declaration of the Council of the European Communities and of the Representatives of the 
Governments of the Member States meeting in the Council on 22 November 1973 on the Programme 
of Action of the European Communities on the Environment, OJ C 112/1, 20.12.73. 
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conditions of life and to reconcile this expansion with the increasingly imperative 
need to preserve the natural environment. 
 
In 1981 a reorganisation of the Commission in the light of Greek accession resulted in 
the transfer of environmental responsibilities from DG III to a reformulated DG XI. 
There was not, however, a separate environment portfolio for a Commissioner until 
the appointment of Carlo Ripa de Meana in 1989. 
 
While the development of environmental policy was handicapped by the lack of any 
basis in the treaties, except from that provided tangentially by Articles 100 and 235, 
this deficiency was remedied by the Single European Act in 1987 which provided, in 
Articles 130(r-t) (now Articles 174-176), a new treaty basis for environmental 
regulation. 
 
The signing of the Act in 1986 formally added new substantive areas of Community 
competence (see also Craig and de Búrca, 2003: 20) and gave a considerable impetus 
to EC environmental regulation and, between 1989 and 1991, more EC environmental 
legislation was enacted than in the previous 20 years combined (Vogel 1996: 127). 
The additions made by the Single European Act covered co-operation in: economic 
and monetary union; social policy; economic and social cohesion; research and 
technological development; and environmental policy. In this respect, while the 
internal market goals of the Single European Act were a significant driver of 
subsequent EC regulation such as in relation to liberalisation of insurance markets, the 
social and environmental policy amendments have been acknowledged as a 
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significant recognition of autonomous Community competence in these fields, not 
merely a side-effect of EC market-integration goals (Craig and de Búrca, 2003: 21). 
 
Three features of the Single European Act are worthy of particular note. Firstly, 
paragraph 1 of Article 130(r) (now Article 174) gave explicit recognition to the 
improvement of environmental quality as a legitimate Community objective in its 
own right, with EC environmental regulation no longer required to be justified in 
terms of its contribution to economic integration.42 Secondly, the precautionary 
principle was incorporated into the EC Treaty by virtue of paragraph 2 of Article 
130r.43 Thirdly, paragraph 3 of Article 130r set out the requirement that, in preparing 
its policy on the environment, the Community shall take account of available 
scientific and technical data.44   
 
Although the precautionary principle was never clearly defined, it was described by 
former EC Environment Commissioner Margot Mallström as directing the EC to 
                                                 
42 “Community policy on the environment shall contribute to pursuit of the following objectives: 
- preserving, protecting and improving the quality of the environment; 
- protecting human health; 
- prudent and rational utilisation of natural resources; 
- promoting measures at international level to deal with regional or worldwide environmental 
problems.” Paragraph 1 of Article 130r (now Article 174). 
43 “Community policy on the environment shall aim at a high level of protection taking into account 
the diversity of situations in the various regions of the Community. It shall be based on the 
precautionary principle and on the principles that preventive action should be taken, that environmental 
damage should as a priority be rectified at source and that the polluter should pay. 
 In this context, harmonisation measures answering environmental protection requirements 
shall include, where appropriate, a safeguard clause allowing Member States to take provisional 
measures, for non-economic environmental reasons, subject to a Community inspection procedure.” 
Paragraph 2 of Article 130(r) (now Article 174). 
44 “In preparing its policy on the environment, the Community shall take account of: 
- available scientific and technical data; 
- environmental conditions in the various regions of the Community; 
- the potential benefits and costs of action or lack of action; 
- the economic and social development of the Community as a whole and the balanced 
development of its regions.” Paragraph 3 of Article 130r (now Article 174). 
 188
“take action when the science is not clear, but where there is reasonable cause for 
concern” (Agra Europe, 4 February 2000: EP/6). 
 
Following the Single European Act, EC environmental regulation, the principles set 
out in Article 174 (formerly Article 130r) of the Treaty have been acted upon by the 
Commission into a set of inter-related objectives for EC water policy (European 
Commission, 1996, p. 5). Accordingly, the Treaty requires that a high level of 
protection be given to human health and that the precautionary principle, a concept 
derived from German environmental law, is applied. O'Riordan (1992: 2) sees the 
precautionary principle resting on four assumptions: prudent action in advance of 
scientific certainty; shifting the burden of proof onto the would-be developer to show 
no unreasonable harm; ensuring that environmental wellbeing is given legitimate 
status; and developing best practice techniques in the pursuit of management 
excellence. In the context of water policy this means that standards are based on 
recognised scientific knowledge and that a cautious approach is adopted, maintaining 
higher standards and using the best available techniques wherever there remains 
scientific uncertainty about the effects on the aquatic environment. 
 
Preventive action which stops environmental damage from occurring is preferred to 
action which remedies problems once they have occurred. Certainly in the case of 
water conservation, once a sensitive ecosystem has been destroyed it may be 
impossible to repair.  Preventing pollution at source is also preferable to end-of-pipe 
solutions so, for example, action which ensures that natural sources of water used for 
drinking are not contaminated is preferred to expensive treatment to make supplies 
suitable for human consumption. Following on from preventive action is the principle 
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that environmental damage should be rectified once it has been identified and that the 
polluter should pay for the cost of measures to repair the damage and discontinue the 
activity that has caused it. Finally, EC water policy should take account of the 
principle of sustainable development, namely that environmental concerns should be 
balanced against socio-economic factors and the requirement for increased amounts of 
fresh water to meet demand (European Commission 1996: 8). 
 
The Commission also recognised that water policy requires coherent integration, both 
into other EC policy areas and by way of effective implementation of policy at the 
national and local level (European Commission, 1996: 6). This particularly pertains to 
the relationship between water policy and agricultural policy, since much of the 
aquatic pollution that water standards are designed to deal with originates from 
intensive farming production methods. 
 
Origins of EC water policy 
 
Water quality came to the fore as the focus of EC regulatory activity for practical 
reasons: aquatic pollution was a more tangible form of degradation than other 
environmental incidents such as those affecting air or soil quality. Water pollution 
could not be ignored because its effects were highly visible, particularly when marine 
life suffered. In addition, EC regulation was generally considered more appropriate 
than differing national approaches because water pollution was a common problem 
for all member states - it held no respect for national boundaries, with pollution 
incidents in major rivers such as the Rhine leading to environmental damage in a 
number of member states. 
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As a result, water policy is one of the oldest and most heavily regulated issue areas in 
EC environmental policy, with its origins to be found in the First Action Programme 
on the Environment of 1973. The First Action Programme on the Environment 
identified water pollution as an issue where priority action was required (see Bell 
1997: 439) and set out the task of laying down scientific criteria for the degree of 
harm of the principal forms of water pollution on the basis of parameters set down by 
a common methodology. However, the Action Programme went on to acknowledge 
that the determination of standards with respect to water pollution could be 
provisional in the first instance. Provisional status was accorded to standards for water 
pollution in tacit recognition of the fact that in the early 1970s relatively little was 
known, scientifically, about what constituted safe levels of pollutants in water. 
 
In policy terms, water was divided into various categories.  These included fresh 
water, marine water, groundwater and surface water. Different policies were adopted 
towards rivers, lakes, estuaries, coastal waters, open sea and underground aquifers.  
Water was also distinguished by its socio-economic uses, such as drinking water 
supplies, water used by agricultural and industry, water used for leisure and tourism 
and water requiring a particularly high level of conservation. 
 
Yet, although EC regulation has historically found it useful to divide water into 
different categories for administrative purposes, it is important to remember that water 
itself does not recognise these distinctions. As the European Commission 
acknowledged (European Commission 1996: 1c), in reality, water flows freely 
between the various categories and often performs a number of functions 
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simultaneously. Due to the natural characteristics of water, it cannot easily be 
compartmentalised into administrative, policy-motivated, categories. 
 
The earliest EC regulation of water quality legislation dates back to 1975, regulatory 
activity driven not only by the agenda of the First Action Programme on the 
Environment but also by the public perception that ever higher water quality standards 
were required to ensure public health and prevent further environmental degradation. 
 
Since 1975 there have been over 20 EC regulatory measures that deal directly with 
water policy or are closely related to it (Haigh 1995: 4.2-1). These have included: the 
Surface Water Directive (75/440/EEC); the Bathing Water Directive (76/160/EEC); 
the Dangerous Substances Directive (76/464/EEC); the Fish Water (78/659/EEC) and 
Shellfish Water (79/923/EEC) Directives; the Groundwater Directive (80/68/EEC); 
and the Drinking Water Directive (80/778/EEC). 
 
It is with Drinking Water Directive 80/778/EEC that this thesis is particularly 
concerned. This is because there were difficulties in immediately establishing a 
general methodology for defining water quality objectives, with initial work in terms 
of EC regulation to be based on the information already gathered by member states. 
EC regulatory innovation followed and new standards were duly adopted as the EC 
norm. These were not, however, the standards of provisional status that were 
envisaged in the First Action Programme. Rather, they were fully-fledged 
environmental standards enshrined in EC regulation. 
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The opportunity for EC regulation of drinking water quality 
 
Under natural conditions, sources of drinking water possess few chemical properties 
likely to have an adverse effect on human health. Yet one consequence of intensive 
farming has been the dramatic increase in residues of chemical substances, 
particularly nitrates and pesticides, in drinking water supplies. This is attributable to 
such factors as the use of pesticides as an aid to increasing crop yields, the use of 
pesticides as weed killers, and the incautious disposal of unused pesticides that may 
allow them to leach into aquifers. The pesticides most commonly found in high 
concentrations in sources of drinking water tend to be the herbicides Atrazine, 
Simazine, Diuron, Glyphosate, Isoproturon (IPU) and Mocoprop. Some, for example 
Atrazine, are recognised as having carcinogenic properties. 
 
When rainfall is heavy, pesticides are washed into surface water (rivers, streams, 
lakes and reservoirs) often within a matter of hours after spraying or dumping. In such 
cases the pesticides will tend to disperse. In contrast, pesticides accumulating in the 
groundwater system may remain for up to thirty years, though their presence may not 
be initially identified. With heavy rainfall and the groundwater system containing 
cracks and fissures the pesticides may enter the system rapidly, though in other cases 
they may be removed by contact with the soil before they reach the underground 
water source. 
 
Public awareness of the implications of pesticide residues in drinking water first came 
to prominence in the early 1960s when the carcinogenic properties of DDT (dichloro-
diphenyl-trichloro-ethene) were officially acknowledged. At the same time Rachel 
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Carson’s book Silent Spring (1962: 168) highlighted the concern that “what we have 
to face is not an occasional dose of poison which has accidentally got into some 
article of food, but a persistent and continuous poisoning of the environment”. By the 
1970s, the public perception that water pollution incidents had become much more 
common meant that the issue became emotive throughout the European Community 
and a clear consensus began to emerge that EC-level environmental regulation should 
be introduced to prevent further aquatic pollution. In particular, due to public 
expectations that water be clear and safe, attention focused on concerns over the 
public health risks associated with pesticide residues in drinking water. 
 
In the light of public concerns over the use of pesticides, the First Action Programme 
on the Environment set out its intention to establish reference parameters for the uses 
and functions of drinking water. These parameters were, according to the Action 
Programme, to be based on the collection of information in order to work out a 
common method for deciding the measures necessary to achieve and maintain quality 
objectives in the future. 
 
Negotiation of EC regulation of drinking water quality 
 
Chapter 2 of the First Action Programme stated that the aim of EC regulation would 
be to establish standards in order to limit or prevent the exposure of targets as a means 
of achieving or approaching quality objectives. In relation to toxic chemical 
substances present in water intended for human consumption, the Action Programme 
stated that a proposal from the Commission should be submitted as quickly as 
possible and at the latest by 31 December 1974. In particular, it specified that 
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“maximum use will be made of the results already achieved at national and 
international level, particularly the work done by the WHO”.45 
 
However, relying on World Health Organisation (WHO) information on toxicological 
aspects of water quality was to prove problematic. While EC regulation also sets out 
quality and health parameters for microbiological content, nitrates and lead in 
drinking water, it was with respect to pesticide residues that scientific uncertainty was 
to prove the driver for innovative standard-setting. The 1958 and 1963 WHO 
International Standards for Drinking Water that were available did not refer to the 
Maximum Admissible Concentrations (MACs) for individual pesticides at all, while 
the 1971 WHO International Standards for Drinking Water made the general 
observation that pesticide residues which may occur in community water supplies 
make only a minimal contribution to the total daily intake of pesticides for the 
population served. No WHO MACs were therefore available for individual pesticides 
prior to the adoption of Directive 80/778/EEC. The drafters of the Directive could not 
rely on following WHO standards for pesticide MACs since none existed. Instead 
they opted to develop innovative standards that aimed at zero pesticide content in 
drinking water. 
 
In the context of the advice regarding pesticide residues contained in the 1971 WHO 
International Standards, when the European Commission published its proposal for a 
Directive relating to the quality of water intended for human consumption in 1975, the 
limit values for maximum permissible quantities of pesticides in drinking water were 
                                                 
45 Ibid., n. 3 above. 
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set at 0.1 microgramme per litre (μg/l), this being the smallest quantity of individual 
pesticides that could be detected in water by toxicological analysis. 
 
As noted above, the First Action Programme on the Environment had set the deadline 
of 31 December 1974 for the Commission to submit a proposal for EC regulation on 
toxic substances present in drinking water. In the event, the proposal was only 
submitted to the Council by the Commission on 31 July 1975.46 The original proposal 
was much shorter than the version finally adopted, the former consisting of only 13 
articles. The standard for pesticides that was finally adopted in the Directive 
80/778/EEC was set in this original 1975 proposal. It was included in Annex I, which 
contained the drinking water standards, under Table D (“undesirable or toxic 
factors”), but no explanation is given in the text as to why the standard for pesticides 
was set at that level (see also Faure 1994: 54). Furthermore, when the European 
Parliament gave its opinion on the proposal on 9 February 1976,47 no amendment was 
proposed with respect to Annex I, so the parameters proposed for pesticides remained 
unchallenged. 
 
On 15 July 1980 Council Directive 80/778/EEC relating to the quality of water 
intended for human consumption48 (hereafter referred to as Directive 80/778/EEC) 
was adopted. It took as its legal base Articles 100 and 235 of the EEC Treaty. The 
justification for EC regulation in relation to drinking water quality is set out in the 
preamble of the Directive which states that, in view of the importance for public 
health of water for human consumption, it is necessary to lay down quality standards 
with which water must comply.  
                                                 
46 OJ C 214/2, 18.9.75. 
47 OJ C 28/27, 9.2.76. 
48 OJ L 229/11, 30.8.80. 
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The preamble justifies the use of Article 100 on grounds that a disparity between 
provisions already applicable or in the process of being drawn up in the various 
member states relating to the quality of water for human consumption may create 
differences in the conditions of competition and, as a result, directly affect the 
operation of the common market. The use of Article 235 as a legal basis for the 
Directive is justified on grounds that the approximation of laws relating to the quality 
of drinking water intended for human consumption is required to meet the aims of the 
Community with regard to the improvement of living conditions, the harmonious 
development of economic activities throughout the Community and a continuous and 
balanced expansion. 
 
The preamble also justified the need for Community action by referring back to the 
1973 Action Programme on the Environment, which provided for the setting of 
standards to apply to toxic chemical substances and to bacteria presenting a health 
hazard which are present in water intended for human consumption and the definition 
of physical, chemical and biological parameters corresponding to the different uses of 
water and, in particular, to water for human consumption.49 
 
Given the extent of public concern about the impact of environmental pollution on the 
quality of drinking water, the draft Directive received widespread support from 
member states and was unanimously adopted without substantive discussion on 
whether the parameters set out in the annex of the Directive were appropriate or 
whether substantial cost implications were likely to result. 
                                                 
49 Declaration of the Council of the European Communities and of the Representatives of the 
Government’s of the Member States meeting in the Council of 22 November 1973 on the Programme 
of Action of the European Communities on the Environment, OJ C 112/1, 20.12.73. 
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Directive 80/778/EEC set out quality and health parameters for microbiological 
content, nitrates, pesticides and lead in water intended for human consumption or for 
use in food or drink. It also laid down guidelines for water quality monitoring. 
Without even convening an advisory committee of scientific experts to look at the 
most appropriate parameters, officials working within DG CI, the Environment 
Directorate General of the Commission, took responsibility for setting the MACs for 
particular toxic substances, including pesticides. The model of epistemic communities 
of elite technical experts operating within tightly knit networks and committees 
envisaged by the European integration and policy-making studies outlined in chapter 
3 of this thesis did not, therefore, apply in this instance. 
 
As a result, Annex I, Table D, of Directive 80/778/EEC requires, under heading 55, 
that the MAC for pesticides and related products when substances are considered 
separately in drinking water was to be 0.1 μg/l and that the MAC for total pesticides 
in drinking water was to be 0.5 μg/l. Pesticides and related products were defined in 
Annex I, Section D, under heading 55 as: insecticides (sub-divided into persistent 
organochlorine compounds, organophosphorous compounds and carbamates); 
herbicides; fungicides; polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) and polychlorinated 
terphenyls (PCT)s. 
 
That the MACs set for pesticides in Directive 80/778/EEC were set at 0.1 and 0.5 μg/l 
can be traced back to concerns at the time in relation to adverse toxicological effects 
of pesticides, especially DDT (see also Bache and McGillivray 1997: 151). 
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However, detecting pesticides from drinking water completely was no easy task in the 
late 1970s when the drinking water quality standards set out in the Directive were 
being formulated. Scientific expertise was such that no organochlorine pesticides 
could actually be detected in water by toxicological analysis in amounts smaller than 
0.1 μg/l. As a result, the maximum admissible concentration for pesticide content in 
water was set at 0.1 μg/l because this was the smallest amount that could be detected 
by toxicological analysis. Since the public perception was for drinking water to 
contain absolutely no pesticides, the requirement was for EC regulation to eradicate 
pesticides from drinking water completely (see also Premazzi and Ziglo 1994: 95). It 
was therefore scientific uncertainty rather than scientific expertise that was the main 
driver for the pesticide limits set in Directive 80/778/EEC. The 0.1 μg/l maximum 
admissible concentration effectively became a surrogate for zero in EC environmental 
regulation. 
 
Individuals who had followed the legislative process leading to Directive 80/778/EEC 
and were subsequently interviewed for this thesis confirmed that the decision on 
pesticide MACs in Directive 80/778/EEC were set because persistent organochlorine 
pesticides such as DDT were receiving a great deal of adverse publicity in the late 
1970s and there was pressure to ensure that drinking water should contain no 
pesticides at all. Given that there was no evidence that pesticides existed in drinking 
water at all in quantities smaller than 0.1 μg/l, because the level of analytical detection 
at that time was not sufficiently sensitive to detect smaller amounts, respondents 
interviewed for this thesis also confirmed that 0.1 μg/l became a surrogate for zero. 
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This view has been corroborated further by Faure (1995: 322), who commented in 
relation to organochlorine pesticides that: “for practical reasons the standard was set 
at the minimum concentration…that could be detected by the analytical methods 
available at the time…and there was no evidence that the proposed standard was in 
danger of being exceeded because for many pesticides the level of analytical detection 
was not sufficiently sensitive”. 
 
The picture that begins to emerge is therefore one in which, by virtue of the 
Commission seizing public health concerns as a window of opportunity to 
compensate for its lack of clear policy competence under the original EC Treaty and, 
by acting as a policy entrepreneur, it was able to respond to reports of environmental 
degradation and water pollution to initiate innovative regulatory standards at EC 
rather than national level. 
 
The Commission was also able to promote regulatory activity at EC rather than 
national level because it also engaged in an exercise of consensus building amongst 
national governments on the basis that agreeing to high environmental standards for 
all member states was an objective best pursued collectively through Community 
legislation. Where there is a consensus in favour of regulatory change designed to 
tackle common problems, the convergence of interests may favour innovation in 
regulatory policy-making.  
 
In reality, the effects of persistent organochlorine pesticides were receiving such 
adverse publicity precisely because that same scientific community was issuing dire 
warnings suggesting that the water-borne pesticides would have adverse toxicological 
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effects. It was this scientific concern that became translated into a public debate, 
followed by consensus amongst member states that EC measures were required. In 
this context, all member states saw the benefits of EC regulation in this policy area 
and recognised that the delegation of discretionary regulatory policy-making powers 
to supranational Community institutions was a logical approach to take. 
 
Hence, member states anxious to demonstrate environmental credentials to their 
domestic electorates, agreed to adopt new EC regulation on drinking water quality 
standards. Having established the need for EC regulatory activity, the task of 
producing appropriate toxicological standards to be enshrined in EC regulation was 
then delegated to representatives of the scientific community, established as an EC 
committee of experts. 
 
Assessment 
 
This thesis has suggested that, in a general context, when the opportunity for new 
regulatory activity arises it is likely that this will emerge because there is a consensus 
amongst actors as to the existence of a particular policy problem, and a widespread 
belief that co-operating to achieve policy solutions via EC regulation is the most 
appropriate way forward for all concerned. 
 
In the case of drinking water, the opportunity for new EC regulatory initiatives arose 
due to consensus on the need to address concerns about drinking water quality and, it 
should also be acknowledged, EC policy entrepreneurship in the form of policy 
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expansion by DG XI. The window of opportunity that opened for EC regulatory 
activity was therefore driven by consensus on the need for regulation. 
 
In the face of widespread scientific uncertainty about the toxicological effects of 
individual pesticide residues in drinking water, the maximum permissible 
concentration of pesticides were set at 0.1 μg/l as a proxy for zero. EC regulators thus 
engaged in a high degree of regulatory invention, namely the generation of new ideas. 
In the absence of prior national standards to deal with new problems recently 
identified by new scientific techniques, there was little scope for emulating existing 
national standards, such as occurred in relation to insurance services regulation. In the 
absence of prior national standards, regulatory invention was the only viable option 
for EC regulation of drinking water standards. 
 
Impact of EC regulatory change on drinking water quality standards and the 
drivers for re-regulation 
 
This section focuses on the impact of Directive 80/778/EEC on the UK where high 
compliance costs were not anticipated at the time the Directive was adopted. In the 
UK, a number of factors may account for the willingness of the Government to accept 
the standards set out in the Directive without any apparent dissent. Bache and 
McGillivray (1997: 152), for instance, note that more time seems to have been spent 
contemplating whether water authorities would have sufficient legal powers to enter 
private and commercial properties to carry out their monitoring obligations than on 
how much the Directive would cost to implement, but these did not prevent adoption 
of a Directive which departed radically from a domestic policy tradition of “hostility” 
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towards statutorily prescribed standards (Richardson, Ogus and Burrows 1989: 42, 
quoted in Bache and McGillivray 1997: 152). 
 
Richardson (1994: 143) suggests there was a widely held view that non-compliance 
with agreed provisions would present few legal or political difficulties, while Haigh 
and Lanigan (1995: 22, quoted in Bache and McGillivray 1997: 152) suggest that “the 
idea that British water might not be clean enough to pass tests which would also have 
to be met by continentals with supposedly dirtier water probably did not occur to the 
British Government”. In this context, Bache and McGillivray (1997: 152) suggest that 
the UK saw itself as a “leader rather than a laggard in the provision of clean water 
supply” to such an extent that “no problems were anticipated in resisting the European 
Commission should EC standards not be met on time”. 
 
Under the terms of Directive 80/778/EEC, formal compliance was required by July 
1982. The UK originally intended to implement the Directive by incorporating its 
requirements within the existing statutory obligation on water authorities and local 
authorities to provide “wholesome” water supplies. In September 1982 the UK 
Government sent formal notification of compliance to the European Commission. The 
Department of Environment of the UK Government subsequently issued Circular 
20/82 as guidance for water supply companies on implementation of the Directive, 
placing responsibility for its administration on the statutory water and local authorities 
and stating that “the Secretaries of State [for the Environment and for Wales] will 
regard compliance with the terms of the Directive as a necessary characteristic but 
not a complete definition of any water that is to be considered wholesome” [emphasis 
added] (quoted in Ward et al 1995). This was the first time that quality standards were 
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prescribed in legally binding terms to facilitate compliance with the Directive in 
relation to the supply and monitoring of drinking water quality (Bache and 
McGillivray 1997: 153). 
 
At that stage the UK took the view that it was sufficient to achieve the EC’s specified 
standards through averaging across a series of samples whereas the EC regarded the 
standards as absolute and not to be exceeded at all. Industry experts and government 
officials interviewed for this thesis confirmed that the UK Government initially 
interpreted the Directive in a way that was intended to minimise compliance costs for 
the benefit of its domestic water suppliers. 
 
However, in 1986 Friends of the Earth lodged a formal complaint with the European 
Commission, claiming that the UK Government had not adequately implemented the 
Drinking Water Directive into national law, citing the continual high levels of nitrates 
in drinking water in England and Wales. In 1988 Friends of the Earth lodged a similar 
complaint relating to pesticides. 
 
Following the Friends of the Earth complaint, in 1989 the European Commission 
commenced legal proceedings against the UK under Article 169 (now Article 226) of 
the EC Treaty, for non-implementation of the Directive, arguing that the Directive 
should be implemented by legislative means rather than by a Department of 
Environment Circular or similar administrative methods.50 
                                                 
50 “If the Commission considers that a Member State has failed to fulfil an obligation under this Treaty, 
it shall deliver a reasoned opinion on the matter after giving the State concerned the opportunity to 
submit its observations. 
 If the State concerned does not comply with the opinion within the period laid down by the 
Commission, the latter may bring the matter before the Court of Justice.” Article 169 (now Article 226) 
EC Treaty. 
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In November 1992, the European Court of Justice found the UK to be in breach of its 
obligations to implement Directive 80/778/EEC by failing to ensure that water used 
for food production purposes was covered by the 1989 implementing regulations and 
by failing to comply with the MAC for nitrate in 28 supply zones in England.51 
Although the ruling of the European Court of Justice referred to the UK’s failure to 
implement fully the Directive prior to the privatisation of the industry in 1989 (see 
ENDS Report 1992) and related to the UK’s failure to comply with nitrate and lead 
rather than pesticide MACs set out in Directive 80/778/EEC, it focused attention on 
the desirability of revising the pesticide limits set out in the Directive, taking account 
of improvements in toxicological monitoring and detection standards since the 
Directive had been adopted. 
 
Formal implementation of the Directive in the UK had been achieved in the context of 
privatisation of the water supply industry in October 1989 when the Water Act 198952 
and the Water Supply (Water Quality) Regulations (SI 1989 No. 11470)53 set, for the 
first time in UK law, clearly defined toxicological drinking water quality standards. 
However, from 1989 onwards the UK has accepted the Commission’s interpretation 
that the Directive sets absolute standards that all drinking water must reach. Under the 
UK Water Industry Act 1991, the obligation to provide water supplies that comply 
with the standards set out in the UK Water Supply Regulations 1989 passed to the 
newly privatised water companies, which produce annual monitoring results. The 
Drinking Water Inspectorate (later incorporated into the Environment Agency) was 
established to enforce the provisions. 
                                                 
51 Case C-337/89, 25.11.92. 
52 Consolidated by the Water Industry Act 1991 and the Water Resources Act 1991. 
53 Amended by the Water Supply (Water Quality Amendment) Regulations 1989 and 1991. 
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To comply with Directive 80/778/EEC, water supply companies in the UK undertook 
large-scale capital expenditure to install new filtration plant capable of removing 
pesticides from drinking water supplies, particularly using carbon filtration processes. 
In some cases this was preceded by ozone treatment, which separates pesticides from 
water molecules prior to carbon filtration, so making the latter process more effective. 
 
While the installation of new plant and equipment may not have been solely to 
remove pesticides but to improve the taste and odour of drinking water as well, it was 
estimated that the total cost of new investment and associated operating costs incurred 
by UK water supply companies between 1989 and 1994 was in the region of £1bn 
(OFWAT 1994).54 These costs were then passed on to consumers in the form of 
higher water charges to consumers. The perception that EC regulation was the cause 
of rising water prices began to grow in the minds of the UK public. 
 
Given the cost implications, by the early 1990s the question of drinking water quality 
had become a political issue with consequences and cost implications out of all 
proportion to those originally anticipated when the UK Government voted in favour 
of the Directive in the Council of Ministers seven years previously. The opportunities 
to pass on the compliance costs to new, privatised water companies in England and 
Wales became both politically and economically expedient. It is difficult, however, to 
avoid the view that the UK Government had underestimated the implications of the 
Directive. 
 
                                                 
54 The Office of Water Services (OFWAT) is the economic regulator for water and sewerage services 
in England and Wales. 
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Regulatory reappraisal: the opportunity for EC re-regulation on maximum 
permissible pesticide limits in water intended for human consumption 
 
The initiative to engage in regulatory reappraisal of Directive 80/778/EEC, leading to 
re-regulation, came from the UK. The reasons for the UK enthusiasm for regulatory 
reappraisal of the Directive can be traced back to September 1982, when the UK 
Government set formal notification of compliance to the European Commission, as 
noted above the Department of the Environment subsequently issuing Circular 20/82 
as guidance on implementation of the Directive for the UK water suppliers. 
  
So, from 1989 onwards, although the UK formally accepted the European 
Commission’s interpretation of the Directive as setting absolute standards with which 
all drinking water must comply, the UK Government began to exert pressure for 
revisions to Directive 80/778/EEC. The UK’s grounds for arguing for a revision of 
Directive 80/778/EEC were fourfold. First, the costs of compliance with the standards 
set out in Directive 80/778/EEC exceeded the benefits to health from complying with 
them. In the case of the UK, with its emphasis on “end of pipe” solutions, the effects 
of compliance on water charges were considered onerous. Second, there was a risk 
that existing or new agricultural products under development would breach a standard 
relating to their concentration in water that had no bearing on questions of health. 
Third, allowable pesticide residues in foodstuffs exceeded those permitted by the 
Directive, thus suggesting that the Directive was of little relevance to human health. 
Fourth, that the maximum admissible concentration of pesticides specified in 
Directive 80/778/EEC (0.1 μg/l) were out of line with updated scientific evidence, 
particularly revised and updated parameters produced by the WHO. The UK argued 
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that toxicological standards for individual pesticides (rather than the blanket 0.1 μg/l 
proxy for zero) should therefore be adopted (see also Premazzi and Ziglo 1994: 95).  
 
Support for these arguments came from a number of sources. The views of the 
Director General of Water Services indicated his concerns at the effects of 
inappropriate pesticide level standards (OFWAT 1993). The UK water supply 
companies advocated revision of pesticide MACs in the Directive based on WHO or 
equivalent guidelines and suggested that the cost burden of measures to prevent 
pesticide pollution should be placed upon pesticide users and manufacturers rather 
than the water suppliers (Water Industry Co-ordinator 1994). 
 
In their report to the Department of the Environment, the consultancy organisation 
WRc (1995) commented that “the [maximum admissible] concentration is arbitrary: it 
has no scientific significance in terms of effects on consumers’ health”. The report 
went on to argue that the economic impact of complying with toxicologically based 
standards would not be very different. Referring to the individual toxicological limits 
issued by the Department of the Environment (Department of the Environment 1989), 
the report commented that these follow the WHO recommendations. Generally these 
limits are above the 0.1 standards set in the 1980 Directive, so compliance with these 
would remove any economic impact, since the actual pesticide levels found tend to be 
less than the WHO guidelines. 
 
The content of the WHO guidelines is worthy of further discussion here, given their 
particular significance during discussions on re-regulation in the form of EC 
regulatory refinement and reappraisal. 
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World Health Organisation Guidelines 
 
The WHO first published its International Standards for Drinking-Water in 1958 to 
assist governments in dealing with contaminated drinking water and its impact on 
health, ranging from massive outbreaks of infectious and parasitic diseases, on the one 
hand, to subtle toxicological effect, on the other. The WHO parameters were 
subsequently revised in 1963 but, as noted earlier in this chapter, it was not until the 
1971 version of the International Standards for Drinking-Water that the WHO 
suggested that pesticide residues that may occur in community water supplies make 
only a minimal contribution to the total daily intake of pesticides for the population 
served. 
 
Due to continued research on water quality and rapid improvements in toxicological 
testing standards, much more detailed health-based values for pesticides were first set 
out in the 1984 WHO Guidelines for Drinking-Water Quality. By the mid-1980s, 
therefore, scientific uncertainty was being replaced by more accurate evidence on the 
toxicological values of individual pesticides. 
 
In terms of philosophy and content, the 1984 Guidelines proved to be a significant 
departure from the old International Standards. The 1984 Guidelines are advisory in 
nature, based solely on the impacts on human health of the various substances and 
organisms concerned. Standards have, by their nature, to take other considerations 
into account such as social, economic, environmental, political and financial 
considerations and have to balance a number of criteria. However, not all pesticides 
were included in these guidelines. A second edition of the Guidelines was published 
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in 1993 and a third edition appeared in 2004.55 Health-based values for individual 
pesticides were added and amended in successive versions.  
 
The second edition of the WHO Guidelines in 1993 was the first to set out safe 
parametric values higher than 0.1 μg/l for certain pesticides. Some examples of WHO 
Guidelines for MACs of individual pesticide residues in drinking water, as contained 
in the current (third) edition of the WHO Guidelines for Drinking Water Quality 
(2004, amended 2005) are set out below. 
 
Glyphosate, a broad-spectrum herbicide used in agriculture for weed control, was 
reported in the WHO toxicological review as exhibiting low toxicity. Glyphosate was 
not evaluated in the first two editions of the Guidelines for Drinking Water Quality, 
published in 1984 and 1993 but, in the addendum to these Guidelines, published in 
1998, a health-based value of 5 μg/l was derived for glyphosate. 
 
Lindane, an insecticide on fruit and vegetable crops and for seed treatment, was 
reported in the WHO toxicological review as being toxic to the kidney and liver. In 
the first edition of the Guidelines, published in 1984, a health-based guideline value 
of 3 μg/l was recommended for lindane. The 1993 Guidelines revised this guideline 
value down to 2 μg/l and this health-based value remains in the third edition of the 
WHO Guidelines. 
 
On the other hand, WHO guidelines for MACs of other pesticide residues are lower 
than the blanket parametric value of 0.1 μg/l set down in EC regulation. Atrazine, a 
                                                 
55 WHO Guidelines for Drinking-Water Quality, available at: 
http://www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/dwq/guidelines4/en/index.html. See also: 
http://whqlibdoc.who.int/hq/2000/a68673_introduction_2.pdf  
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selective pre- and early post-emergence herbicide, was reported in the WHO 
toxicological review as having the potential to induce mammary tumours in mice. 
Atrazine was not evaluated in the first edition of the Guidelines for Drinking Water, 
published in 1984, but the 1993 Guidelines established a health-based guideline value 
of 0.002 μg/l for atrazine in drinking water.  
 
2,4-D (2,4-dichlorophenoxyacetic acid), a systemic herbicide used for control of 
broad-leaved weeds, was reported in the WHO toxicological review as having the 
potential to cause two forms of cancer in humans: tissue sarcomas and non-Hodgkin 
lymphoma. 2,4-D was given a health-based guideline value of 0.1 μg/l when the first 
edition of the Guidelines for Drinking Water, published in 1984, but the 1993 
Guidelines established a health-based guideline value of 0.03 μg/l. 
 
Isoproturon, a selective, systemic herbicide used in the control of annual grasses and 
broad-leaved weeds in cereal crops, was reported in the WHO toxicological review as 
being a promoter of liver tumours. Isoproturon was not evaluated in the first edition of 
the Guidelines for Drinking Water Quality, published in 1984, but the 1993 
Guidelines calculated a health-based guideline value of 0.009 μg/l for isoproturon in 
drinking water. 
 
Mecoprop, a herbicide, was reported in the WHO toxicological review as being a 
cause of liver disease. Mecoprop was not evaluated in the first edition of the 
Guidelines for Drinking Water Quality, published in 1984, but the 1993 Guidelines 
established a health-based guideline value of 0.01 μg/l. 
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Simazine, a pre-emergence herbicide for use with crops, was reported in the WHO 
toxicological review as being a cause of mammary tumours. Simazine was not 
evaluated in the first edition of the Guidelines for Drinking Water Quality, published 
in 1984, but the 1993 Guidelines established a health-based guideline value of 0.002 
μg/l for simazine in drinking water. 
 
Regulatory reappraisal: negotiation of EC re-regulation to set maximum 
pesticide limits in water intended for human consumption 
 
The drafters of Directive 80/778/EEC had foreseen the need for reappraisal and 
revision of the standards contained in its annexes, the preamble stating explicitly that 
the reference methods of analysis defined in the annexes to the Directive must be 
speedily adapted to scientific progress and technical progress and that, on order to 
achieve this, close co-operation would be required between the member states and the 
Commission within a committee responsible for the adaptation to scientific and 
technical progress. In the light of the imperfect and imprecise data on which decisions 
about the parameters set out the Directive were made, this expectation of reappraisal 
and revision of standards at some time in the future is perhaps not surprising. 
 
From a toxicological point of view, the opportunity to reappraise Directive 
80/778/EEC came because of the increased sensitivity of modern analytical 
techniques for detecting pesticide residues in drinking water (see also Faure 1994: 
58). However, as this section of the thesis will demonstrate, it proved politically 
difficult to modify the pesticide standard in a way that might be interpreted as a 
relaxation of environmental objectives. 
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Procedurally, the first step to renegotiation of Directive 80/778/EEC was taken at the 
European Council meeting in Edinburgh on 11 and 12 December 1992, at which 
guidelines were agreed for reassessing the scope of Community legislation in the light 
of the principle of subsidiarity, at that time a new legal principle introduced in the EC 
Treaty by Article 3b (now Article 5) of the Treaty on European Union (see also CEPR 
1993).56 The Edinburgh European Council meeting, which took place against the 
backdrop of the Danish “no” vote in the Danish referendum on ratification of the 
Treaty on European Union, approved an overall approach to the subsidiarity principle 
as a dynamic concept to be applied in the light of the objectives set out in the Treaty 
(Bulletin of the European Communities 12-1992: 7). 
 
In the light of application of the principle of subsidiarity, the Edinburgh European 
Council noted that, on the environment, the Commission intended to simplify, 
consolidate and update existing texts, particularly those on air and water, to take new 
knowledge and technical progress into account (Bulletin of the European 
Communities 12-1992: 17). 
 
This meant that water policy measures that could be undertaken most effectively at 
member state level should not be undertaken at EC level. Even when EC action was 
taken, subsidiarity also required that the detailed implementation of water policy 
                                                 
56  “The Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty and of 
the objectives assigned to it herein. 
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action, in 
accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed 
action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and cannot be sufficiently achieved by 
reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community. 
Any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of this 
Treaty.” Article 3b (now Article 5) EC Treaty. 
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should be left to the member states where this was more appropriate. Action at 
national or local rather than EC level may be considered appropriate because 
environmental conditions in the EC are likely to vary widely between member states. 
Water policy that was appropriate in one member state (for example in the UK, where 
water is relatively fast flowing and contaminants in water are dispersed relatively 
quickly) may be entirely inappropriate in another (for example in Spain, where water 
shortages have been a frequent problem).  
 
The Commission therefore sought to apply flexibility to ensure that the most 
appropriate policy is implemented in a particular region (European Commission 1996: 
7). However, because water pollution does not observe national boundaries, it may 
well have impacts across a number of member states. Where there is potential for 
trans-frontier pollution, there is often sufficient justification for the EC to act 
(European Commission 1996: 8). 
 
At the beginning of 1993, therefore, and in the light of member state agreement on the 
need for measures to be taken to reassess the scope of Community legislation in the 
light of the greater need to consider application of the principle of subsidiarity, the 
Commission announced its intention to include the 1980 Drinking Water Directive as 
part of a wider review of older EC regulatory measures. In effect, as Bache and 
McGillivray (1997: 165) put it, the subsidiarity principle was being “used by Member 
States as an argument for repatriating some control over water policy”. 
 
The Commission undertook a review of Directive 80/778/EEC based the evaluation of 
published studies and available data. On a number of issues, the Commission 
 214
requested the opinion of its Scientific Advisory Committee to Examine the Toxicity 
and Ecotoxicity of chemical compounds (CSTE). The assessments made by the WHO 
and its recommendations on guidelines for drinking water quality published in 1993 
were taken into account, together with the experience gained during the 
implementation of Directive 80/778/EEC. The Commission also considered 
information provided in connection with the Drinking Water Conference it organised 
in September 1993, as well as other expert advice.57 
 
In preparation for the September 1993 conference the UK Permanent Representation 
to the European Communities (UKREP) submitted a “non-paper” to the Commission 
on 18 August 1993 (United Kingdom Permanent Representation to the European 
Communities 1993). The non-paper put forward some general proposals about the 
way in which the Directive should be revised and made some specific proposals for 
individual parameters and about monitoring and enforcement. 
 
The UK non-paper called for a revised Directive to accord fully with the principles of 
subsidiarity and the guidelines agreed at the Edinburgh European Council and should 
be based on sound scientific knowledge, with standards adopted taking into account 
the benefits for consumers and the likely costs of achieving them. 
 
With respect to pesticides, the UK non-paper argued that it was appropriate that 
values should be set with satisfactory margins of safety determined on the basis of the 
best scientific and medical knowledge available. It noted that the Commission was 
likely to be considering revising the standards for some parameters in the light of the 
                                                 
57 According to COM(94) 612 final, page 7. 
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revised WHO guideline values and noted that, in the view of the UK, the values in the 
revised Directive should be based on the guideline values about to be published by the 
WHO, these values being recommended following extensive reconsideration by 
experts taking into account the latest scientific and medical evidence. In the view of 
the UK, the WHO guideline values provided for wide margins of safety, represented 
precautionary values and, therefore, there was no need for the EC to take a different 
view on parameters covered by those guidelines. 
 
The UK non-paper went on to recommend that the revised Directive should adopt 
individual guideline values for the pesticides to be included in the new WHO 
guidelines since there was no direct scientific or medical evidence to support the 
blanket MAC of 0.1 μg/l for every pesticide. The result of the 0.1 μg/l set by Directive 
80/778/EEC was, according to the UK non-paper, large and unnecessary expenditures 
on treatment and therefore costs to water consumers, or unwarranted limitations on 
agricultural practices, without any gains to the health of the population. Furthermore, 
the UK non-paper argued that the MAC of 0.5 μg/l for total pesticides was in practice 
unenforceable and therefore should not be included in a legal instrument. 
 
In member states other than the UK, there appears to have been less support for 
change. Other member states argued that, since the precautionary principle is 
enshrined in Article 130(r) (now Article 174) of the EC Treaty, there is no place for 
pesticides in drinking water at all if there remains any scientific doubt about their 
safety, so the 0.1 μg/l limit should be retained as a precursor to the total elimination of 
pesticides in drinking water. 
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On 23 and 24 September 1993 the European Commission hosted its consultation 
event, a conference in Brussels where interested parties presented their views on 
Directive 80/778/EEC and the need for revision.58 The views expressed at the 
conference and the information given subsequently to the Commission were taken 
into account in the preparation of the proposal to revise Directive 80/778/EEC. These 
included the views set out by the UK Government in its ‘non-paper’, submitted the 
previous month. 
 
However, the UK approach was opposed by Friends of the Earth, which claimed that 
“a relaxation of the pesticide standard would be politically convenient for the UK 
because it would legalise the current situation whereby supplies to around 14.5 
million people in England and Wales had exceeded the standard at times in 1992 
[and] a total of 50 different pesticides have been detected in drinking water supplies 
during the last three years” (Friends of the Earth 1993a).  
 
Friends of the Earth argued against reliance on the WHO guidelines on grounds that a 
degree of scientific uncertainty existed regarding the way in which degradation may 
create new compounds whose effects are not known and further that the effects of 
interactions between different toxic chemicals cannot be predicted. The Friends of the 
Earth position was that no pesticides should be allowed in drinking water at all and 
advocated that all pesticides which exceeded the 0.1 μg/l maximum admissible 
concentration should be banned outright. 
 
                                                 
58 “Pesticides in EC Drinking Water – the Limit Value May be Raised”, Pesticide News, No. 22, 
December 1993, page 10. Available at:  http://www.pan-uk.org/pestnews/pn22/pn22p10.htm. 
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On 28 October 1993, Friends of the Earth published additional Comments on the Non-
Paper by the United Kingdom: Revision of the Drinking Water Directive – 
80/778/EEC (Friends of the Earth 1993b).  The Friends of the Earth paper challenged 
the notion that a MAC of 0.5 μg/l for total pesticides was unenforceable, arguing that 
the MAC was in place to guard against pesticide use strategies which might result in 
the presence of larger numbers of smaller amounts of pesticides, which would distort 
the original intent to avoid the presence of pesticides in water. 
 
It was subsequently agreed at the Brussels European Council on 10-11 December 
1993 that the Commission would suggest a simplification or recasting of certain 
existing legislative acts in the light of the application of the principle of subsidiarity. 
In the explanatory memorandum to the subsequent proposal to revise Directive 
80/778/EEC, the European Commission traced back its decision to undertake a 
fundamental review of the Directive to this Brussels meeting and the Edinburgh 
European Council a year previously. 
 
The Commission proposal to revise Directive 80/778/EEC 
 
The European Commission published its proposal for a Council Directive to revise 
Directive 80/778/EEC on 4 January 1995 as COM(94) 612 final. The explanatory 
memorandum of the proposal acknowledged that, although Directive 80/778/EEC had 
been the driving force behind the overall improvement in drinking water quality over 
the proceeding decade, providing governments and water suppliers with a stable and 
predictable base for their investment programmes, the Directive also had 
shortcomings. In particular, the Commission recognised that, since Directive 
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80/778/EEC was based on a proposal made originally in 1975, its ideas and standards 
corresponded to what was thought to be appropriate 20 years previously. 
 
The explanatory memorandum to COM(94) 612 final also acknowledged that, in the 
light of the subsidiarity principle, embodied in the Treaty on European Union, there 
was a requirement to reconsider the Directive, confirmed at the Edinburgh European 
Council in December 1992, the conclusions of the Edinburgh Council stating: “On the 
environment, the Commission intends to simplify, consolidate and update existing 
texts, particularly those on water, to take new knowledge and technical progress into 
account”. 
 
In particular, the Commission agreed that it was necessary to reorient drinking water 
rules and regulations towards compliance with essential quality and health 
parameters, leaving member states free to add secondary parameters if they saw fit. 
This meant in practice that the revised drinking water quality directive would define 
general parameters, some of which would be fixed in technical terms at Community 
level and others at national level. 
 
According to the explanatory memorandum, the Commission viewed the single most 
important proposal in COM(94) 612 final as being the reduction from 50 μg/l to 10 
μg/l as the maximum permissible concentration of lead in drinking water. This change 
was in accordance with the latest recommendations of the WHO and was seen by the 
Commission as being necessary in order to protect infants, young children, and 
pregnant women from the neuro-toxic effects that are known to contribute to IQ 
deficits, learning and behavioural problems. 
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However, COM(94) 612 final was also significant because it retained the 0.1 μg/l 
maximum admissible concentration for individual pesticides in spite of the UK’s 
attempts to replace the uniform standard with scientific parameters based on WHO 
assessments of risk to human health in the case of individual pesticides. A footnote to 
the COM(94) 612 final did, however, state that the Commission would examine 
whether an individual value can be set for a given substance after an evaluation of 
available scientific information.59 It also acknowledged the role of scientific expertise 
in refining the parameters, undertaking to review standards in the Directive at least 
every two years in the light of scientific and technical progress (Article 14). The draft 
Directive omitted reference to the 0.5 μg/l limit for total pesticides, which was 
generally considered to have little logic in toxicological terms. 
 
By way of explanation, the explanatory memorandum to COM(94) 612 final noted 
that, in the case of pesticides, application of the precautionary principle required that 
the parametric value of 0.1 μg/l should be retained as a matter of principle for each 
individual pesticides, the Commission noting that experience showed that in most 
cases this value could be respected without the need for extra treatment provided that 
pesticides are used in a responsible manner. 
 
No fundamental revision of the MACs for pesticides in drinking water contained in 
Directive 80/778/EEC were proposed by COM(94) 612 final. This was primarily due 
to the opposition to change by all member states except the United Kingdom during 
                                                 
59 COM(94) 612 final, Annex I, Part B, Note 5(3). 
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the renegotiation process and also the public campaign mounted to oppose the UK 
proposals by Friends of the Earth (FoE).  
 
Responses to the Commission proposal 
 
Friends of the Earth argued that, in line with the precautionary principle, pesticides 
should not be allowed in drinking water in quantities capable of analytical detection. 
Consequently, FoE did not favour using WHO MACs because these only offered a 
limited perspective on toxicological considerations arguing, for example, that they did 
not consider the possibility of synergistic effects and that additional complexities 
were posed by mixtures of chemicals and in interpreting toxicological data.60 
 
Rather than assessing new scientific evidence that suggested risks to human health 
would not be increased by a relaxation of maximum permissible concentrations of 
some pesticides in drinking water, it appeared that the regulatory entrenchment that 
characterised reaction to COM(94) 612 final amounted to a public commitment to the 
exclusion of all pesticides in drinking water in the future. 
 
It will be recalled that, when Directive 80/778/EEC was adopted, the Commission 
was led by the idea that environmental contaminants are not acceptable in drinking 
water at all. The actual level reflects what environmental chemists thought to be 
analytically detectable concentrations at that time. At the end of the seventies there 
were few objections to this standard as many thought that pesticides used in 
agriculture could not enter into drinking water. The inclusion of a maximum 
                                                 
60 Friends of the Earth, comments of Drinking Water Directive and Greenpeace, statement on Drinking 
Water Directive, 1993. 
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exceedence standard of 0.1 μg/l for any pesticide in drinking water was therefore 
considered a surrogate for zero. In other words, the regulatory approach taken was 
that drinking water should be free from any pesticides but, in the absence of 
toxicological expertise capable of detecting smaller quantities, scientific uncertainty 
meant that 0.1 μg/l became the threshold. 
 
By 1993, however, the development of sufficiently sensitive analytical methodology 
could provide much more accurate empirical data from monitoring studies on raw and 
drinking water. The WHO had published information on the risks attached to 
pesticides in drinking water that offer a more accurate scientific and medical 
assessment. The adoption of WHO standards as the EC regulatory norm would result 
in the relaxation of the maximum admissible concentrations and more incisive 
variations in levels of pesticides in permitted drinking water, the risks of which would 
each be assessed separately rather than being subject to a blanket limit of 0.1 μg/l. 
 
The agrochemical industry lobby group, the European Crop Protection Association 
(ECPA), therefore recommended that Community MAC levels for pesticides be based 
on thorough reviews of all the scientific data, in particular toxicological data. ECPA 
wanted the EC to use limits based on WHO MACs. The ECPA proposed that 
Community MACs, if exceeded, would trigger a range of remedial actions, arguing 
that this approach would provide protection to the European consumer and 
environment, without imposing excessive costs on the water industry and therefore 
the consumer.61 
 
                                                 
61 European Crop Protection Association position paper on the revision of the Drinking Water 
Directive 80/778/EEC, ECPA, May 3, 1993. 
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EUREAU, the association of water suppliers in Europe, also wanted the Directive 
revised.  It pointed to scientific and technical progress and its own experience with 
implementation and argued that the basis and use of the MAC should be reassessed. 
EUREAU argued that the term MAC should be reviewed to reflect the fact that 
breaking the levels does not necessarily constitute a threat to human health, with 
limits based on the most recent scientific knowledge taking into account the work of 
national and international bodies such as the WHO. 
 
But, despite the efforts of the UK, EUREAU and the ECPA to encourage the adoption 
of WHO toxicological standards in the renegotiated Drinking Water Directive, when 
the new Directive 98/83/EC was finally adopted  on 3 November 1998,62 it retained 
the 0.1 μg/l. In accordance with Directive 98/83/EC, the earlier Directive 80/778/EEC 
was replaced by the newer Directive. Following a five year transition period after 
publication of Directive 98/83/EC, Directive 80/778/EEC was repealed in December 
2003 and at that time the new Directive came fully into force. 
 
Directive 98/83/EC 
 
The rationale for Directive 98/83/EC, as set out in the preamble, is that it was 
necessary to adapt Directive 80/778/EEC to take account of scientific and 
technological progress and so that the Directive could be re-examined in the light of 
the principle of subsidiarity, as enshrined in Article 3b (now Article 5) of the Treaty. 
Accordingly, the new Directive revised parametric values where this was deemed 
                                                 
62 Council Directive 98/83/EC of 3 November 1998 on the quality of water intended for human 
consumption, Official Journal L 330, 05/12/1998 P. 0032 – 0054. Full text available at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31998L0083:EN:HTML. See also: 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/water/water-drink/index_en.html (visited 25 July 2006). 
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necessary to strengthen them in accordance with the latest available scientific 
knowledge based on the WHO Drinking Water Quality Guidelines and the European 
Scientific Committee on Toxicology and Ecotoxicology. 
 
Directive 98/83/EC also seeks to increase transparency by making the point of use of 
the water the point of compliance with the quality standards, by making reference to 
ISO/CEN standards It also includes an obligation to report on quality and an 
obligation to inform the consumer about drinking water quality and measures they can 
take to comply with the Directive, in particular for lead when the non-compliance is 
due to the domestic distribution system (a building’s internal pipes, plumbing, etc.) 
and streamlining legislation to only those parameters essential for health. While the 
old Directive 80/778/EEC contained 66 parameters while the new Directive 98/83/EC 
contains only 48 parameters. 
 
Directive 98/83/EC also differentiated between mandatory indicator parameters and 
between audit and check monitoring. The Directive allowed member states to specify 
additional parameters and standards and to apply tighter standards to existing 
parameters. The Directive also specified remedial action and restrictions for use and 
allows time limited derogations under certain conditions provided that they do not 
constitute a potential danger to human health. 
 
Finally, Directive 98/83/EC included a requirement that at least every five years the 
Commission shall review the standards and monitoring requirements in the light of 
scientific and technical progress. 
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At a seminar organised by the Commission in Brussels in October 2003 to review the 
application of Directive 98/83/EC, the main conclusion was that the Directive did not 
require major revision at present but a start should be made on working towards a 
more risk-based approach to monitoring and standards as recommended in the third 
edition of the WHO Guidelines for Drinking Water Quality. 
 
However, in spite of the significant changes to EC regulation of drinking water 
quality brought about as a result of Directive 98/83/EC, the parametric value for 
MACs of each individual pesticide63 remained at 0.1 μg/l,64 while the parametric 
value of 0.5 μg/l was retained for total pesticides.65 
 
Attempts to move to specific MACs for each individual pesticide instead of a blanket 
parametric value of 0.1 μg/l were defeated by those who argued that drinking water 
must be free of all pesticides.  
 
The irony of this position is that the preamble of Directive 98/83/EC itself suggests 
that the standards set out in the annex are “generally” based on WHO Guidelines for 
Drinking Water Quality (and the opinion of the Commission’s Scientific Advisory 
Committee). This is certainly the case, for example, in relation to the Directive’s 
acceptance of the WHO’s recommended standards in relation to the setting of 
maximum admissible levels of lead pollution, which are adopted in the annex. 
                                                 
63 According to a footnote to the Directive, “pesticides” means: organic insecticides; organic 
herbicides; organic fungicides; organic nematocides; organic acaricides; organic algicides; organic 
rodenticides; organic slimicides; related products (inter alia growth regulators); and their relevant 
metabolites, degradation and reaction products. 
64 The parametric value applies to each individual pesticide. In the case of aldrin, dieldrin, heptachlor 
and heptachlor epoxide the parametric value is 0.03 μg/l. 
65 “Total” meaning the sum of all individual pesticides detected and quantified in the monitoring 
procedure. 
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It would appear, therefore, that the EC regulatory approach to drinking water quality 
is inconsistent with the available scientific data and the expectation that risk 
assessment will be used as a guiding principle in policy-making. The refusal to accept 
arguments for standards based on an average exceedence level rather than a maximum 
for any pesticide and the unwillingness to allow trivial exceedences also suggests a 
non-scientific approach to questions of sampling and sample distributions. 
 
In summary, the stimulus for regulatory reappraisal of Directive 80/778/EEC was the 
fact that compliance costs associated with the Directive were much higher than had 
been anticipated in the UK. Proposals for regulatory revision were therefore made 
with reference to international standard-setting on the part of the WHO.  In the case of 
the 1980 Drinking Water Directive, the approach suggested was by making reference 
to WHO standards, although ultimately attempts to update and revise outmoded EC 
regulatory standards in Directive 98/83/EC proved unsuccessful, with political 
imperatives associated with public concerns about any perceived relaxation of water 
quality standards taking precedence over the logic of new scientific evidence, as set 
out in the WHO guidelines. 
 
Assessment 
 
This chapter has set out the reasons why, based on concerns about the toxicological 
effects of pesticides in drinking water, a consensus emerged on the need for EC 
regulation to address this. The key findings of this case study can be summarised as 
follows: 
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• EC regulation to establish maximum permissible concentrations of pesticides 
in drinking water was innovative in the sense that, in the absence of prior 
national standards, the European Commission adopted a pesticide limit of 0.1 
μg/l as a proxy for zero, given that there was no scientific evidence that 
pesticides existed in drinking water at all in quantities smaller than 0.1 μg/l, 
because the level of analytical detection at that time was not sufficiently 
sensitive to detect smaller amounts of pesticides in water. 
• However, as Richardson (1994) has noted, the EC regulation of water quality 
has had the potential to have major cost implications for the member states. In 
this context, this case study demonstrated how compliance costs associated 
with Directive 80/778/EEC exceeded what had been anticipated in the UK. 
For Maloney and Richardson (1995: 145), it was lack of foresight by part of 
the UK Government at the policy formulation stage that led to subsequent 
difficulties in terms of implementation and failed attempts at revision of EC 
regulatory standards to change the pesticides MAC. 
• Subsequent attempts by the UK to revise the pesticide MACs in Directive 
80/778/EEC only served to entrench standards set out in the original Directive 
and, when regulatory reappraisal did occur and Directive 98/83/EC was 
adopted, it became clear that other member states had rejected the chance to 
update EC regulation in the light of developments in scientific expertise by 
adopting new WHO standards for pesticide limits. Regulatory entrenchment, 
rather than regulatory reappraisal, was the outcome. 
• The message that begins to emerge is that, once environmental standards are 
enshrined in EC regulation, they become extremely difficult to revise, even 
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when the standards set out in the first round EC regulation that were initially 
innovative in the absence of any agreed scientific standards at that time are 
subsequently superseded by updated toxicological information produced by a 
highly-regarded institution like the WHO. From a public policy perspective, 
therefore, member states appear locked into the sub-optimal trajectory (Jordan 
1999: 13) of first round EC regulation and are unable to break out of that 
trajectory through re-regulation and second round regulatory change. 
• This case study demonstrates that on emotive environmental issues such as 
drinking water quality, competition amongst regulatory alternatives may be 
absent, with consensus between member states on the preferred regulatory 
approach and co-operation on achieving adoption of that regulatory approach 
likely to follow.  
• However, change is likely to be difficult to effect during a process of 
regulatory reappraisal once the initial impact of EC regulation has been felt 
with entrenchment of existing standards more likely than a new consensus on 
the need for regulatory change. In the case of drinking water quality, 
regulatory entrenchment occurred even in the face of scientific evidence that 
the adoption of new pesticide limits could be adopted without harming human 
health, based on significant advancements in the accuracy of toxicological 
testing since the original Directive was conceived. Consensus may therefore 
be difficult to replicate in the EC regulatory process. 
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CHARACTERISING EC REGULATION: 
EMULATION, INNOVATION AND RE-REGULATION 
 
CHAPTER 6 
ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT: 
EC REGULATION - WHERE INTERESTS CONVERGE 
 
In this final chapter, the validity of arguments that were set out in the early chapters of 
the thesis will be tested against the evidence presented in the case studies of EC 
regulation of insurance services and drinking water quality. 
 
This thesis began by arguing that EC regulation could be characterised in terms of 
three core concepts: emulation, innovation and re-regulation. By classifying EC 
regulation in terms of these core concepts, the thesis made the case that it is possible 
to shed new light on the factors driving regulatory activity. 
 
The thesis then looked at the use of the term “regulatory competition” and noted that 
it has been used in two different senses. Firstly, to describe the response of national 
regulators to the international competition for mobile factors of production and 
mobile tax bases. Secondly, it has been used by Héritier to describe the fact that 
member states compete with each other in order to influence the content and form of 
EC regulation with a view to minimizing their own adjustment costs. It was in relation 
to the second use of the term that the thesis was chiefly concerned. Specifically, 
Héritier’s use of the term competition does not adequately account for the particular 
regulatory approaches that come to the fore. The thesis argued that, aside from 
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regulatory competition, insufficient attention has been paid to consensus and co-
operation between member states as drivers of EC regulatory activity and set out the 
task of presenting evidence to support this contention. 
 
In order to locate this hypothesis in the context of the established body of academic 
work on EC regulation, Chapter 1 of the thesis reviewed the main reasons why 
regulation has become the dominant policy tool in the European Community, with 
particular attention paid to Majone’s characterisations of the EC regulatory process. 
Specifically, Chapter 1 suggested that Majone’s work contains a number of useful 
insights that are helpful when seeking to articulate the contention that consensus and 
co-operation are under studied factors when seeking to account for emulation, 
innovation and re-regulation in the EC regulatory process. 
 
In this respect, Chapter 1 noted that Majone draws attention to the influence of policy 
learning in the EC regulatory process, Community actions often providing the 
stimulus for national governments to reconsider the logic of traditional policies and 
institutional arrangements. Chapter 1 also noted that Majone has identified the extent 
to which EC regulatory policy-makers have had a tendency to look for models that 
imitate prior regulatory approaches rather than inventing novel solutions. Chapter 1 
then acknowledges Majone’s assertion that, by searching for models to imitate rather 
than seeking originality, imitation affords relief from the necessity of searching for 
optimal decisions and conscious innovations that would expose policy-makers and 
politicians to the severe criticism in the event of regulatory failure. Chapter 1 then 
noted Majone’s claim that the existence of regulatory imitation can be explained fairly 
straightforwardly on grounds of regulatory efficiency. 
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In the light of Majone’s characterisation of the EC regulatory process as being marked 
by imitation (or “emulation”) of prior regulatory approaches, Chapter 1 concluded by 
highlighting the extent to which, according to Majone, member states are prepared to 
act in a consensual and co-operative manner in the EC regulatory context, doing so on 
grounds of regulatory efficiency when agreeing that EC regulation should emulate a 
prior national regulatory approach that has been deemed to work efficiently in at least 
one member state prior to its adoption as the EC norm. 
 
Building on the model of the EC regulatory process described in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 
reviewed explanations of the EC regulatory process in terms of competition, diffusion 
and learning. It began by examining Héritier’s assertion that the EC regulatory 
process is characterised by regulatory competition among member states, each 
seeking to influence the content and form of EC regulation in order to enhance their 
own competitive position in the European market and reduce costs of legal 
adjustment. Chapter 2 then noted that Héritier sees no particular tradition dominating 
EC regulation across the board, but rather “a colourful patchwork composed of 
various instruments and national regulatory styles derived from distinctive regulatory 
backgrounds”.  
 
Chapter 2 also reviewed Héritier’s portrayal of the EC regulatory process as being 
dominated by a group of highly regulated member states that seek to enhance their 
competitive position in the European market and to reduce costs of legal adjustment. 
It noted that, for Héritier, the preferred EC regulatory approach tends to correspond to 
each member state’s own economic interests and regulatory traditions since each 
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seeks to widen the scope of European policy-making according to its own 
preferences, and to transfer its own regulatory style to the European level. These 
member states are seen as the leaders in regulatory terms, likely to provide the model 
for the laggard member states that lack their own traditions of highly regulated 
arrangements. Héritier, it was observed, argues that it is the regulatory achievements 
of highly regulated member states that are presented to the Commission, which then 
decides which approach will be reflected in the EC regulatory approach. 
 
Chapter 2 went on to consider Héritier’s suggestion that the initiator, or “first mover” 
member state has the opportunity to define the scope and nature of problems dealt 
with by EC institutions and shape the content of EC regulation. By defining the 
problem, it is anticipated that the first mover member state is able to anchor its 
approach in draft EC regulation without being seriously challenged by an opposing 
approach of another member state. So, how far is the scenario envisaged by Héritier 
borne out by the evidence presented in the two case studies undertaken for this thesis? 
 
In relation to the case study of insurance services presented in Chapter 4, it is possible 
to see elements of this scenario at work, with the UK regulatory approach given a 
relatively free run as a first mover approach that was subsequently adopted as the EC 
approach. In the light of the evidence presented in Chapter 4, therefore, there is 
evidence that the “leader” and “laggard” model of EC regulation may therefore have 
much to commend it in some instances. However, in relation to the case study of 
water policy presented in Chapter 5, the innovative environmental standards adopted 
in EC regulation are not explained by Héritier’s model of regulatory competition. The 
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limits of her approach are, therefore, apparent where no prior national regulatory 
approach exists that can be emulated. 
 
Yet, even where emulation is apparent, Héritier’s suggestion that the Commission 
chooses the regulatory approach that it wants to put on the legislative track from a 
multitude of policy proposals is not borne out by case study evidence presented in 
Chapter 4 of this thesis because, in the case of EC regulation of insurance services, it 
was not the case that several possible regulatory approaches were presented to the 
Commission at all. Instead, the reality was that the Commission did not have a range 
of member state regulatory approaches to choose from, the UK offering the only 
viable model of market liberalisation and other member states still operating highly 
regulated insurance markets of the type the Commission wished to see opened up to 
greater competition between insurance service providers. Again, this thesis found that 
Héritier’s model did not provide the adequate tools to describe the EC regulatory 
process. 
 
In terms of regulatory efficiency arguments, Héritier’s observation is that the 
Commission’s responsiveness to member state regulatory approaches is no act of 
generosity but, rather, whether or not the Commission responds favourably by 
copying (or emulating) a particular member state approach, will depend on the 
whether the proposal fits into the overall policy-making philosophy of the European 
Community. In the case of prior UK regulation of insurance services, Chapter 4 
demonstrated that UK objectives for liberalised insurance markets and EC objectives 
of completing the internal market were indeed synergistic. 
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Chapter 2 also noted that, Héritier asserts, member states will see themselves as 
“winners” or “losers” from EC regulation, either because they will have low 
adaptation costs or high adaptation costs associated with regulatory compliance. 
However, as Héritier points out, virtually all regulatory decisions involve some form 
of “winners and losers”, so there might be a rational expectation that deadlock in the 
regulatory process might result, with member states motivated by self-interest and 
self-preservation. In order to overcome deadlock, Héritier predicts that the task of the 
EC regulatory process becomes one of interest accommodation and interest 
bargaining. She identifies particular shifts in the decisional arena as being important 
in promoting progress to interest accommodation and interest bargaining of this type. 
In relation to the case studies undertaken for this thesis, judicial activism and the 
opening of windows of opportunity for policy entrepreneurship on the part of the 
Commission received particular attention in terms of what Héritier calls shifts in the 
decisional arena.  
 
In this respect, Chapter 4 noted the significance of both the Cassis de Dijon case, 
which reinvigorated the regulatory programme to complete the internal market, and 
the German Insurance Case, which provided the stimulus for the Second and Third 
Generation Insurance Directives. In both instances, the European Commission seized 
the opportunity created by the Court’s rulings to initiate EC regulation designed to 
complete the internal market for insurance services. These would appear to be 
precisely the type of shifts in the decisional arena that Héritier had in mind. The role 
of Court rulings in stimulating EC regulatory activity is considered in greater detail 
later in this chapter. 
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In relation to drinking water quality, Chapter 5 suggested that it was not judicial 
activism that provided the stimulus for EC regulation, but rather growing public 
concern about the adverse effects of pesticides in drinking water for human health. If 
it is accepted that these case studies provide examples of events leading to interest 
accommodation and interest bargaining of the type that Héritier refers to, although she 
does not describe them as such, the decisional shifts that Héritier identifies would 
therefore appear akin to consensus-building that this thesis has suggested in under 
studied in the context of EC regulatory analysis. 
 
However, in spite of the utility of some aspects of Héritier’s regulatory competition 
model, doubts must be expressed as to whether the Héritier model can alone account 
adequately for the EC regulatory process. In relation to insurance services, Chapter 4 
demonstrated that there appeared to be an absence of competition, since the 
opportunity arose for all member states to reach a consensus on the necessity of the 
Second and Third Generation Insurance Directives and co-operating to achieve the 
liberalisation of EC insurance markets. Furthermore, Chapter 5 showed how public 
concern about the implications of pesticides in drinking water resulted in consensus 
amongst member states on the need for EC regulation and, in the absence of prior 
national standards, it was left to the Commission to propose a standard that could be 
used as a surrogate for zero pesticides, based on the toxicological expertise available 
at that time. The scope for identifying instances of regulatory competition of the type 
envisaged by Héritier therefore appears to be limited in both case studies. 
 
In view of this, it is instructive to review Chapter 2’s consideration of whether 
explanations of the regulatory process derived from diffusion and public policy 
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analysis in the United States are able assist with our understanding of EC regulation, 
as well as the potential for policy learning scenarios developed in the EC context, and 
assist with explanations for the emergence of emulation, innovation and re-regulation 
in the EC regulatory process alongside Héritier’s regulatory competition model. The 
outcome of the review of these three strands of literature undertaken in Chapter 2 was 
that there may be grounds for investigating whether co-operation between member 
states in the EC regulatory process takes place in a manner that ensures the emergence 
of a broad consensus on a preferred EC regulatory approach, this consensual, co-
operative approach assisting our understanding where Héritier’s regulatory 
competition model was found wanting. 
 
Key characteristics of the diffusion model that informed the case studies presented in 
this thesis included the proposition that officials learn about regulatory initiatives 
from their peers and, not being totally isolated, meet state officials and have their 
attention drawn to state innovations by the media. In this context it will be recalled, 
for instance, that senior European Commission officials tasked with drafting an EC 
regulatory approach to insurance services had direct policy experience in UK 
Government and subsequently looked to the UK for an appropriate regulatory 
approach to emulate EC wide. In this sense, it would be fair to say that the diffusion 
of the UK approach to regulating insurance services was achieved in a manner similar 
to that envisaged by literature owing its origins to public policy concerns in the 
United States. As news of the perceived success of the UK regulatory approach 
spread, it is perhaps not surprising that officials from other member states then 
supported the Commission’s proposals to emulate the UK approach. The diffusion 
model’s expectation that states “learn” from one another indeed appeared to be 
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reflected in EC regulatory practice. Furthermore, the expectation that “leaders” in 
regulatory terms tend to be characterised by high economic development was set out 
in Chapter 2 and this prediction appears to reflect the fact that the UK insurance 
market was the most highly developed in the European Community, its first mover 
status in regulatory terms therefore perhaps not being so surprising. 
 
The suggestion that policy makers will look to first mover states as “experimental 
laboratories” that can help to add a sense of predictability to regulatory outcomes was 
also noted in Chapter 2 and this may have some resonance in the context of the 
decision to emulate UK regulation of insurance services at the EC level. 
 
In two respects, then, US public policy analysis appears to have proved helpful in 
identifying characteristics of the EC regulatory process. First, there is an assumption 
that larger member states, such the UK, will on occasion provide the regulatory model 
for the EC to learn from. Second, with regard to recruitment and expertise within the 
European Commission there is some validity in the scenario envisaged by the leader-
laggard model, with some member states having personnel that are more highly 
regarded than their peers from other member states. It is from the former group of 
experts that the Commission and member states are more likely to take their cue (e.g. 
the UK on financial services regulation). EC emulation of the regulatory approach 
previously adopted by one member state thus occurs through the proximity of national 
experts to the centre of EC regulatory policy-making power. 
 
Chapter 2 also noted that the policy diffusion model of Berry and Berry suggests that 
states emulate each other because they are engaged in “competition” for mobile 
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factors of production and mobile tax bases, but that this differs from Héritier’s notion 
of “competition” which is predicated on the notion of bargaining and negotiation 
within the EC institutional structures. Berry and Berry’s use of the term also differs 
because their perception is of competition involving a sub-national process, namely 
US states seeking to emulate one another because they are experiencing pressure to 
conform to regionally accepted standards. In this respect the crucial difference 
between the US and EC regulatory experience is a willingness on the part of 
sovereign EC member states to cede regulatory powers to the European Commission. 
 
What is perhaps of greater relevance to this thesis is the extent to which the diffusion 
model of Berry and Berry asserted that states “learn” from one another, borrowing 
approaches perceived to be successful elsewhere. This led Chapter 2 of the thesis to 
look at the wider literature on learning as a process leading to EC regulation, linking 
back to Majone’s assertion that looking for regulatory models to imitate rather than 
seeking originality is the key to the EC regulatory process because imitation is 
efficient in regulatory terms, in Hancher and Moran’s terms an economical way of 
solving the problem of regulatory design. The efficiency of EC regulatory emulation 
of the UK approach to liberalisation of insurance services, described in Chapter 4, 
again comes to mind in this context. 
 
Finally, Chapter 2 examined how, in Rose’s terms, policy transfer can take the form 
of regulatory emulation where the approach being copied is adopted more or less 
intact or, alternatively, through adjustment of the approach to take account of different 
circumstances, or through hybridisation of different prior regulatory approaches, or 
through the use of inspiration derived from elsewhere that provides the stimulus for 
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developing a novel programme of action.  In terms of the case studies undertaken for 
this thesis, no evidence of hybridisation of this sort was detected. The case of EC 
regulation of insurance services accorded closely with the first scenario envisaged by 
Rose, namely that the UK regulatory approach was adopted more or less intact. The 
case of EC regulation of drinking water quality, on the other hand, demonstrated how 
the EC regulation can be designed where no prior national approach exists that can be 
emulated. From this it can be asserted that the direct copying foreseen by Rose 
certainly exists in the EC regulatory context but that the thesis was unable to confirm 
the existence of the other nuances in the model that he predicts in terms of 
hybridisation. 
 
In the light of the review of the established literature on competition, diffusion and 
learning conducted in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 then turned to the key interests, actors and 
institutions that determine whether competition, on the one hand, or consensus and 
co-operation, on the other hand, can best account for the emergence of emulation, 
innovation or re-regulation as characteristics of EC regulation. In order to do this, 
Chapter 3 undertook a review of established theoretical approaches looking, first, at 
how member state preferences might be accounted for using functionalist 
explanations for the delegation of regulatory powers from member states to the EC 
institutions. Second, in order to avoid an approach that relies on intergovernmental 
interpretations of the EC regulatory process, Chapter 3 reviewed the literature on 
multi-level governance and related work on new institutionalism, which is based on 
the premise that the sovereignty of member states is not being confronted directly but, 
rather, that EC institutions should be considered as actors rather than agents in a 
relationship where member states are principles. Chapter 3 also examined 
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explanations of EC regulatory policy-making that emphasise the significance of 
policy networks, which highlight the importance of ideas, knowledge and expertise, 
rather than purely focusing on interests, in accounting for outcomes from the EC 
regulatory process. Chapter 3 then assessed historical institutionalist explanations of 
why gaps appear in member state control of EC regulatory policy-making, namely as 
the result of short-term electoral concerns which lead to shifting preferences on the 
part of member state decision makers, with the effect that policy reversal becomes 
progressively more costly.  
 
Chapter 3 also returned to an analysis of Majone’s work, with the aim of throwing 
further light on the significance of policy entrepreneurship on the part of the European 
Commission in the EC regulatory process. Majone’s expectation was that the 
insulation of the Commission from partisan politics and electoral results further 
contributed to its ability to utilise policy entrepreneurship in the EC regulatory 
process. When regulatory powers are delegated to politically independent agencies 
like the European Commission, Majone’s expectation was that national governments 
could commit themselves to regulatory strategies that would not have been credible in 
the absence of such delegation. 
 
Applying Majone’s assertion to the case studies of EC regulation of insurance 
services and drinking water quality undertaken in this thesis, it is possible to report 
now that there is evidence of national governments committing themselves to 
regulatory strategies that would not have been credible in the absence of such 
delegation. In the context of the liberalisation of insurance services, for instance, it is 
questionable whether the national authorities in Germany would have been willing or 
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able to introduce national regulation to liberalise markets and emulate the prior 
national approach of the UK given the likely pressure domestically from industry and 
consumer interests to remain a more rigid regulatory approach. Similarly, in relation 
to the quality of drinking water, it is questionable whether the UK Government would 
have been in a position to introduce innovative new toxicological standards that were 
so fundamentally different to the prior approach taken in that member state had it not 
been for the innovative proposals originally put forward by the European 
Commission. 
 
Chapter 3 also noted that Majone had recognised the pressure that the Commission 
may be under from member states to adopt particular regulatory approaches, but that 
Majone felt that because the final regulatory policy making decisions were taken 
when the Commission met as a collegiate body, it may be insulated from much of the 
political interference that would otherwise have resulted in sub-optimal decisions. 
However, Chapter 3 also noted that departmental culture within the various 
directorates general of the Commission might also be a significant factor in 
determining how a particular EC regulatory approach is formulated. 
 
In this respect, it is instructive to recall that the case study of insurance services 
presented in Chapter 4 highlighted the fact that the key Commission personnel were 
all UK nationals, so the fact that subsequent EC regulation of the sector emulated the 
prior approach adopted in the UK is perhaps not surprising. Although the role of 
nationality in determining departmental culture was far less pronounced in the case 
study of drinking water quality presented in Chapter 5, it was nevertheless noted that 
the directorate general responsible for the environment had historically attracted a 
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large number of German nationals, since environmental issues had generally risen to 
prominence earlier in that country than in other member states, and that this was 
underpinned by the fact that the precautionary principle, derived from German 
environmental law, came to be enshrined in the EC Treaty by the Single European 
Act. The precautionary principle, it will be recalled from Chapter 5, was one of the 
factors contributing to the decision not to update the pesticide MACs for drinking 
water quality when EC re-regulation was undertaken in 1998. As a result, regulatory 
entrenchment occurred. 
 
Chapter 3 also noted that, as a general principle, the European Commission retains the 
right of initiative in proposing new EC regulation with the result that, at the earliest 
stages, problem definition and formulation of regulatory solutions are developed 
within the Commission rather than with the overt involvement of member states. In 
relation to the case study of insurance services, Chapter 4 demonstrated how it was 
possible for the direction of EC regulation to be formulated in-house by the 
Commission directorate general for financial services on the basis of emulating the 
regulatory approach already deemed a success in the UK context. Chapter 4 
demonstrated that there was relatively little discussion of policy alternatives and that 
emulation of the UK approach was deemed to be an efficient approach in the EC 
context. In relation to the drinking water quality case study Chapter 5 described how, 
in the absence appropriate toxicological standards in prior national regulation, the 
Commission directorate general for the environment acted in an innovative manner, 
producing a set of regulatory proposals that assumed zero content of pesticides in 
water for human consumption as far as was practicable at that time on the basis of 
toxicological testing ability. The case studies therefore confirmed the proposition, 
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made in Chapter 3, that at the earliest stages of the EC regulatory process it is the 
European Commission that defines the problem and proposes which regulatory 
approach should be adopted as the EC norm. The key role played by the Commission 
in determining whether emulation, innovation or re-regulation should occur in the EC 
regulatory process appeared, therefore, to be underlined by the results of case study 
analysis. 
 
Chapter 3 went on to note that, because the policy formulation stage of the EC 
regulatory process is informal and fluid, the Commission is able to choose, on a 
pragmatic basis, whether or not to ask a committee of experts to assist in the 
preparation of a regulatory initiative. In fact, the case studies of insurance services 
and drinking water quality demonstrated relatively little involvement by committees 
of experts, the Commission instead appearing to decide in-house on the preferred 
regulatory approach to be followed. Despite the technical nature of EC regulation of 
insurance services and drinking water quality it did not appear, therefore, that the role 
of experts was of great significance in case studies of the EC regulatory process 
undertaken for this thesis. 
 
Chapter 3 then noted that the Commission has traditionally been viewed in terms of 
its openness to new ideas. It may well have been precisely this openness that enabled 
the Commission to be receptive to the possibility of emulating the prior success of UK 
regulation to liberalise insurance services and to the possibility of introducing new, 
innovative, environmental standards to regulate drinking water quality. However, 
although the literature review undertaken in Chapter 3 predicted the involvement of 
client groups as a distinctive factor in the Commission’s regulatory policy-making 
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approach, this appears not to have been a significant factor during the earliest stages 
of the EC regulatory process in relation to the two case studies examined.  
 
The situation was somewhat different, however, in terms of re-regulation. Once the 
initial impact of EC regulation had been felt, the case studies demonstrated that non-
governmental actors were active in advocating clarification of how the standards 
contained in first round EC regulation should be applied, in the case of insurance 
services, and in advocating the updating of EC regulation to take account of 
advancements in scientific knowledge and toxicological testing, in the case of 
drinking water quality. Two explanations can be suggested for this relatively late 
involvement of non-governmental actors in the regulatory process. First, it may be 
that during the negotiation of older EC regulatory initiatives, client groups were 
simply less well organised and less sensitive to the likely impact of EC regulation 
than they later became. Second, a plausible argument can be made that once the 
impact of first round EC regulation has been felt, the involvement of client groups is 
likely to come to the fore in a much more pronounced way because the adverse 
impact of the initial round of regulation will by then have been experienced first hand 
and demands for re-regulation are likely to follow on naturally from this as “losers” 
seek recourse to second round regulatory change and “winners” seek to enhance the 
benefits derived from first round regulation. This scenario remains under studied in 
the literature on the EC regulatory process but is identified here as an area where 
further research would be appropriate in the future. 
 
Chapter 3 went on to note that, as member states and non-state actors seek to 
influence the content and form of new EC regulation, the evolving interpretation and 
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application of the EC Treaty provisions are themselves an important stimulus in the 
regulatory process. The case studies confirmed that the EC Treaty can indeed be a 
significant factor in the design and interpretation of EC regulation. In relation to the 
insurance services case study in Chapter 4 the thesis has demonstrated that the 
interpretation of the EC Treaty given by European Court of Justice in its Cassis de 
Dijon decision was crucial in opening the window of opportunity for the Commission 
to engage in additional regulatory activity designed to compete the internal market. 
Chapter 4 also showed how the European Commission’s White Paper on Completion 
of the Internal Market and the subsequent adoption of the Single European Act, with 
all that it entailed in terms of a systematic programme of further EC regulatory 
activity provide ample evidence of the significant role that should be accorded to the 
interpretation and application of EC Treaty provisions in the EC regulatory process. 
In relation to the water quality case study, the impact of the First Action Programme 
on the Environment proved, in the absence of an explicit legal basis for EC 
environmental regulation in the EC Treaty, to be an important driver for the EC 
drinking water quality standards. Later when, as noted above, environmental 
objectives were enshrined in the EC Treaty by the Single European Act, the 
precautionary principle became a significant factor that contributed to regulatory 
entrenchment as attempts to introduce individual MACs for pesticides in revised EC 
regulation on drinking water quality ultimately proved elusive. 
 
Chapter 3 also noted that member states can be viewed as “principals” that delegate 
specific tasks to supranational “agents”, namely the Commission, the activities of the 
Commission then become autonomous of member state influence because the latter 
cannot exercise complete control where it is costly or where member state preferences 
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diverge. In the context of the case studies, it is now possible to confirm that, in 
relation to insurance services, the Commission appears to have taken the lead offered 
by the White Paper on Completion of the Internal Market and the embodiment of the 
goals that it set out in the Single European Act by then acting in a largely autonomous 
way in deciding to emulate a UK regulatory approach. Similarly, in relation to 
drinking water quality, once the objectives set out in the First Action Programme on 
the Environment were endorsed by member states meeting within the Council, the 
Commission used its own discretion in setting innovative drinking water standards 
without interference on the detail of those provisions from member states. The 
expectation that the Commission is capable of action that is autonomous of member 
state influence is, therefore, confirmed by the case study analysis undertaken in this 
thesis. 
 
Furthermore, and crucially for this thesis, in both case studies there appears to have 
been a common factor, namely the absence of a viable alternative to the regulatory 
approach taken by the Commission. In the absence of alternatives, the type of 
regulatory competition envisaged by Héritier when she describes the fact that member 
states compete with each other in order to influence the content and form of EC 
regulations with a view to minimising their own adjustment costs, simply did not 
occur. In the case of insurance services and drinking water quality, the absence of 
viable alternatives instead meant that once broad agreement in favour of EC 
regulatory activity had been achieved, this consensus in favour of action was followed 
by co-operation between member states to operationalise the regulatory approach 
being proposed by the Commission. 
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To re-affirm this, the central tenant of this thesis, namely that emulation, innovation 
and re-regulation in the EC regulatory process are the result of consensus and co-
operation rather than competition have been underlined by the case studies undertaken 
in the preceding chapters. 
 
Chapter 3 of the thesis then went on to suggest that policy entrepreneurship on the 
part of the Commission appears to be of considerable significance because, having 
relatively few personnel or financial resources of its own, the Commission depends on 
member states to provide policy expertise. Certainly, in the case study of insurance 
services, this may have been an important factor behind the Commission’s decision to 
emulate the UK regulatory approach in the sense that it was efficient in policy-making 
terms to do so. In the case of drinking water quality, where considerable effort on the 
part of the Commission appears to have gone into the setting of innovative new 
standards set down in EC regulation, this argument is less well borne out by case 
study analysis. 
 
In this sense, Héritier may have been correct to suggest that one EC regulatory 
measure may be modelled after the regulatory style of one member state. There also 
appears to be considerable merit in Majone’s suggestion, outlined in Chapter 3, that 
the large margins of discretion that exist in the EC regulatory process allows the 
Commission to play the role of policy entrepreneur and to determine the extent to 
which the opportunity for EC regulation will occur. If policy entrepreneurs are to be 
seen as constantly searching for windows of opportunity to push their preferred ideas 
as Majone and Kingdon suggest, the case studies undertaken in this thesis indicate 
that Cini is also correct when she states that the Commission’s capacity for taking 
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advantage of windows of opportunity is a significant feature of the EC regulatory 
process. 
 
By seizing the opportunity to complete the internal market in insurance services and 
to improve the quality of drinking water, once the broad parameters for EC regulatory 
activity had been set by the European Court of Justice or by member states meeting 
within the Council, the Commission has not been slow to act. Indeed the suggestion, 
made in Chapter 3, that windows of opportunity open only infrequently and that 
entrepreneurs must then try to take advantage of a receptive political climate to 
promote their own solution to a policy problem, appears to have particular resonance 
in relation to insurance services, where interview respondents confirmed that the 
Commission’s long-held desire to introduce further EC regulation to complete the 
internal market was finally fulfilled when the opportunity arose. As noted above, to a 
lesser extent the same can be said of EC regulation of drinking water quality, where 
the first Action Programme on the Environment created the conditions whereby the 
Commission could act in an innovative manner where prior national regulation had 
previously been absent. The crucial role of the Commission in policy initiation that 
was highlighted in Chapter 3, derived from the work of Majone and of Sandholz and 
Zysman, therefore appears to have been borne out by the case study analysis 
undertaken in this thesis. 
 
However, although Chapter 3 went on to note that Bulmer and Armstrong have 
criticised Sandholtz and Zysman, who argue instead that the Commission’s approach 
to the single market has much to do with “policy learning”, this thesis sees no 
contradiction between the two interpretations. While Bulmer and Armstrong may well 
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be correct in their assertion that the Commission’s approach to the single market had 
much to do with its ability to learn from the failure of the old harmonisation approach 
of EC regulation, this thesis argues that policy learning and policy entrepreneurship 
should not be considered mutually exclusive. Instead, this thesis would suggest that 
once the window of opportunity for renewed regulatory activity had been opened, the 
Commission was well placed to seize the opportunity to put into practice the new 
regulatory approach that it had learnt on the basis of lessons derived from the failure 
of an earlier regulatory approach. The Second and Third Generation Insurance 
Directives, described in Chapter 4, were in fact one manifestation of a dual strategy 
on the part of the Commission, utilising the window of opportunity opened by the 
European Court of Justice to apply lessons learnt from earlier approaches in the form 
of renewed EC regulatory activity designed to liberalise insurance markets. 
 
Chapter 3 also noted that, according to Majone, the Commission has interests of its 
own, such as growth and survival, while individual Commission officials also display 
the qualities of successful policy entrepreneurs by virtue of the structure of their 
career incentives. The result, according to Majone, is that the Commission has a 
tendency to favour innovative regulatory solutions. In the case of drinking water 
quality, this may be a factor that accounted for the innovative toxicological standards 
that were contained in EC regulation. It should also be noted that, in terms of acting as 
the central node of a vast issue network of non-governmental actors as Chapter 3 
predicted, the EC regulatory approach to drinking water quality took account of the 
prevailing consensus at the time that the EC toxicological standards were being 
formulated, namely a belief that there should be no pesticides in drinking water and 
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that this goal should be underpinned by EC regulation as far as was reasonably 
practicable according to the accuracy of scientific testing available at that time.  
 
The account of EC regulation of drinking water quality given in Chapter 5 also 
accords with the explanation given by Majone, and reported in Chapter 3, for the 
tendency of EC policy entrepreneurship to be particularly prevalent in the field of 
social regulation, such as environmental policy, on grounds that while the benefits to 
society as a whole if drinking water quality could be improved would be great, it 
initially appeared that the costs of cleaner drinking water would be borne by particular 
segments of industry (namely the water supply and agrochemical industries). 
However, as noted in Chapter 5, privatisation of the water industry in the UK 
subsequently ensured that the costs of capital investment in filtration equipment were 
passed on to consumers in their water bills, this itself resulting in pressure for re-
regulation and the adoption of more appropriate pesticide MACs in the 1998 revision. 
 
Chapter 3 also noted Majone’s claim that the ability of policy-makers to initiate 
regulation may depend more on their skill in utilising existing models of regulation 
than on their ability to invent novel solutions, in this sense emulation being more 
common than innovation in the EC regulatory process. In this context, the case study 
of EC regulation of insurance services outlined in Chapter 4 of the thesis appears to 
confirm that, where appropriate existing models of regulation already exist, EC 
regulators may well seek to emulate those approaches at EC level. In this respect, the 
thesis has noted already how the Commission directorate general responsible for 
financial services adopted the UK approach to liberalisation of insurances services 
and sought to replicate the perceived success of this approach in other member states. 
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The thesis also noted, in Chapter 5, that with no equivalent model that could be 
emulated by EC regulation available for setting standards for drinking water quality, 
the Commission instead engaged in innovative policy-making in the sense that new 
toxicological standards were adopted that had not previously been used as the basis 
for regulation at member state level. 
 
Chapter 3 further noted that Majone’s characterisation of the policy innovation in the 
EC regulatory process can be thought of in terms of the “deepening” of EC regulation, 
with new regulatory initiatives of this type coming to the fore as the result of a 
demand and supply model. That is to say, genuine innovation in the EC regulatory 
process emerging when there is a consensus amongst member states and non-
governmental actors that EC regulation is desirable and necessary to achieve a 
particular policy goal and because the Commission is able to devise a regulatory 
approach that is considered appropriate to achieve that goal. In this context, the thesis 
noted the emergence of a scenario in which, rather than Héritier’s model of member 
states competing with each other in order to influence the content and form of EC 
regulations with a view to minimizing their own adjustment costs, there was 
consensus and a desire to co-operate in order to ensure that the most appropriate 
regulatory approach was adopted as the EC norm. 
 
Chapter 3 then looked in greater detail at the mutual interdependence between the 
Commission and the European Court of Justice. It noted that judicial activism, 
whereby the Court has adopted an expansive role in delivering rulings which have 
been instrumental in shaping EC regulatory policy making, was a key driver for the 
Single Market Programme and created the window of opportunity the policy 
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entrepreneurship on the part of the Commission was able to exploit through its White 
Paper on Completion of the Internal Market. In addition, Chapter 3 emphasised that 
the Court’s Cassis ruling played a key role in helping to construct a shared belief 
system in favour of the single market initiative and was an important consensus-
building event that encouraged co-operation on the part of member states in relation 
to EC market liberalising regulation. This role of the Court is, it must be 
acknowledged, akin to Héritier’s expectation of decision shifts leading to EC 
regulation, as discussed earlier in this chapter. 
 
Chapter 4 described how the Court’s ruling in the German Insurance Case provided 
the same sort of stimulus for EC regulation of insurance services, opening a window 
of opportunity for the Commission to fulfil what respondents interviewed for this 
thesis described as a long-held desire for further regulation to complete the internal 
market for insurance. The Court’s ruling also played an important role in building 
consensus on favour of further EC regulation of insurance markets by overcoming 
opposition from member states (such as Germany) that had previously operated 
protectionist policies designed to favour their domestic insurance industries. 
Conversely, Chapter 5 described how the outcome of cases that come before the 
European Court of Justice can be to encourage member states to seek regulatory roll-
back and de-regulation. In this instance, the case at hand followed a complaint by 
Friends of the Earth to the Commission that the UK was failing to meet its obligations 
under Directive 80/778/EEC on drinking water quality.  When the Court found 
against the UK, the Government of that member state responded by demanding a 
revision of the Directive concerned, specifically referring to the fact that pesticide 
MACs set by the Directive were by that time out of date and did not reflect the 
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improved accuracy of toxicological testing, as embodied in the revised WHO 
Guidelines on Drinking Water Quality that had, by that time, become available. 
 
Chapter 3 went on to note that EC regulation in the single market context largely 
amounted to a necessary curb on excessive or counter-productive regulation by 
national authorities. In this context, the case study of EC regulation to liberalise 
insurance services that was presented in Chapter 4 then illustrated how this 
conception of EC regulation has operated in practice. 
 
Crucially, Chapter 3 also discussed the prospects for what Majone has described as 
the transformation of a single play into a sequential game, by which he meant that 
when the EC regulatory process is repeated, patterns of co-operation emerge that 
would be highly unlikely in a single play. The effect, therefore, is that co-operation 
among policy actors is repeated across a range of EC regulatory policy issues as 
actors learn to co-operate and act together to achieve mutually beneficial results in 
preference to seeking unilateral solutions where common problems exist. In the 
context of both case studies, the sequential game explanation does appear to offer 
insight into why member states opt to co-operate in favour of EC regulation, whether 
this be in terms of measures to liberalise insurance markets, or in terms of standards 
introduced to improve the quality of drinking water. 
 
Chapter 3 also noted that these sequential games may emerge as the result of 
persistent, small-scale attempts to develop EC regulatory policies that are the 
cornerstone of the regulatory development in the European Communities. In this 
sense, opportunities for EC regulatory activity can develop over relatively long 
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periods of time, with agreement on regulatory initiatives often achieved several years 
after policy proposals were originally made. In relation to EC regulation on insurance 
services and on drinking water quality, the relatively long time scales that elapsed 
between identification of the problem and the need for regulation on the part of the 
Commission and emergence of the opportunity for that EC regulation to be negotiated 
and adopted illustrate the significance of this timeframe for outcomes from the EC 
regulatory process. 
 
The strategy of linking-up or packaging together that was identified in Chapter 3 as a 
common theme of the EC regulatory process also appears to have particular resonance 
in relation to the case studies of insurance services and drinking water quality. For EC 
regulation of insurance services, the 1985 Commission White Paper on Completion of 
the Single Market was the key packaging together document, garnering a consensus in 
favour of a single market that should include a single market in insurance services and 
setting out the measures that would be required to liberalise such markets. For EC 
regulation of drinking water quality, the 1973 First Action Programme on the 
Environment was the key packaging together text that identified EC regulation as 
necessary in order to ensure the quality of drinking water intended for human 
consumption. In both cases, linking up specific proposals for EC regulatory activity 
within a document professing to present an integrated framework approach, serves the 
purpose of committing member states not only to a set of general policy aims but also 
to subsequent targeted regulatory initiatives designed to achieve desired outcomes 
within that framework approach. 
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Chapter 3 went on to suggest that, once the window of opportunity for EC regulatory 
activity has been opened, the initial drafting stages are crucial in determining the form 
and content of measures ultimately adopted. It also noted that commentators in EC 
policy-making, including Cini and Milward, have identified the crucial role played by 
comitology during this negotiation phase of the EC regulatory process, with the 
Commission’s network of advisory committees performing a useful function by 
assisting with the interest aggregation process. However, to reiterate a point made 
earlier in this chapter, the evidence presented from the case studies of insurance 
services and drinking water quality in this thesis do not bear out the expectation that 
experts working within a network of committees will always play an important role in 
the EC regulatory process. In neither of the case studies undertaken for this thesis was 
the role of expert committees identified as being a significant factor. In the case of 
insurance services, where emulation of the regulatory approach already adopted in the 
UK was so crucial, respondents interviewed for this thesis commented that the 
European Commission had essentially decided on its preferred regulatory approach 
early on in the process and that, in the absence of alternative regulatory approaches 
which might otherwise have enabled member states to present different solutions and 
to compete with each other in order to influence the content and form of EC 
regulations with a view to minimizing their own adjustment costs, there was general 
consensus that the UK regulatory approach was the correct one for the EC to adopt, 
with co-operation and an absence of dissent characterising the regulatory process. 
 
Similarly, while Chapter 3 acknowledged that there is a considerable body of 
literature that highlights the significance of epistemic communities of professionals 
with recognised expertise in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-
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relevant knowledge within that issue area, the role of such technical experts appeared 
to be minimal in relation to the case studies of insurance services and drinking water 
quality. Although the literature on epistemic communities that was reviewed in 
Chapter 3 had pointed to the fact that EC regulatory policy-making in areas with 
significant technical content was a function largely left to technical experts, Chapter 4 
noted that there had been relatively little role for experts from outside the 
Commission services when formulating the preferred EC regulatory approach to 
achieve liberalisation of insurance services. This was because the Commission itself 
had decided at the outset that emulation of the UK Financial Services Act would 
achieve the objectives desired. For drinking water quality, Chapter 5 noted that the 
absence of prior toxicological standards indicating the level of individual pesticides 
that were safe to drink led the Commission to adopt a standard that was the smallest 
quantity that pesticides could be detected in water at the time that EC regulation was 
adopted. The standard adopted for drinking water quality was not, therefore, the result 
of a complex set of negotiations and consultations on the part of the Commission but 
was the result of its desire to see a standard that would act as a surrogate for zero 
pesticides given its overall objective of eradicating pesticides altogether in response to 
the public desire to see this achieved. The significance of comitology and the role of 
epistemic communities in the EC regulatory process should not, therefore, be 
overplayed in the light of the evidence presented in the two case studies undertaken 
for this thesis. 
 
Chapter 3 also noted that, in EC environmental policy-making, different national 
interpretations of scientific evidence are often difficult to separate from genuine 
disagreements about appropriate standards. In this regard, attempts to revise and 
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update Directive 80/778/EEC on drinking water quality were stymied, even though 
updated WHO Guidelines on Drinking Water Quality were available to demonstrate 
that the pesticide MACs set out in the Directive were out of date and that a relaxation 
of standards could be achieved without harm to human health and at the same time 
would lead to a reduction in the compliance costs that were being experienced in 
terms of consumers’ water bills in the UK, where the water industry had been 
privatised. 
 
Furthermore, when technical experts were drawn into the EC regulatory process in 
relation to drinking water quality in a substantive sense in the context of consultations 
on how Directive 80/778/EEC should be revised, the decision to retain pesticide limits 
at the level deemed appropriate almost two decades earlier appeared to fly in the face 
of scientific logic as interpreted in the WHO Guidelines on Drinking Water Quality. 
Regulatory entrenchment, based on public perceptions that drinking water should 
contain no pesticides at all, regardless of whether there were toxicological risks 
associated with this, won the day to such an extent that the case study undertaken in 
this thesis indicates that the role of technical experts can and will be subordinated to 
the political imperatives and dominant public opinion of the day. 
 
Chapter 3 pointed out, however, that the technical bias of EC regulation may have 
consequences for the way that member state preferences are expressed when a 
Commission proposal reaches the Council, with all details having been worked out 
without sufficient attention having been paid to the cost effectiveness or practical 
implementation problems involved. The case studies confirm that neither the broad 
regulatory approach nor the detailed standards embodied in a Commission proposal 
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will necessarily be the subject of close scrutiny and debate when Council scrutiny of 
proposed regulation is undertaken. Proposed EC regulation of insurance services and 
of drinking water quality both passed through the Council without undergoing 
substantive change or revision. Member state consensus in favour of EC regulation 
that has been identified as a theme of this thesis appeared to characterise both 
emulation and innovation in terms of EC regulation of insurance services and drinking 
water quality respectively. 
 
However, Chapter 3 was correct to note that a reluctance of the Council to engage in 
difficult and time-consuming control over highly technical aspects of EC regulation, 
coupled with the lack of central oversight at Commission level, could have the 
consequence of resulting in EC regulatory policy outcomes that were other than those 
intended. In relation to insurance services, those consequences were in terms of 
concerns that national supervisory authorities’ use of the “general good” exception 
would effectively keep the market for insurance services segmented, uncertainty on 
this matter resulting in subsequent re-regulation to clarify the status of the “general 
good” provision, as discussed in Chapter 4. In relation to drinking water quality, the 
unanticipated high compliance costs, reflected in consumer water bills, was discussed 
in Chapter 5. 
 
Chapter 3 also acknowledged the possibility that experts in various aspects of 
regulation such as lawyers may also compound regulatory complexity by “gold 
plating” EC regulatory proposals. It was noted that there is a risk that these experts 
care more about the process than the product of regulation, since the complexity 
increases the value of their expertise. In relation to the case study of insurance 
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services outlined in Chapter 4, no specific evidence emerged that indicated a 
deliberate gold plating of EC regulation. This may be accounted for by the extent to 
which the Second and Third Generation Insurance Directives amounted to pure 
regulation of the prior regulatory approach undertaken by the UK. It was, however, 
noted that the “general good” provision proved difficult to apply in practice, although 
complexity associated with this specific provision appears to have been more to do 
with post-decisional arguments about the application of EC regulation in the national 
context than due to deliberate attempts to create regulatory complexity on the part of 
experts involved during the EC regulatory process. 
 
Similarly, although the case study of drinking water quality in Chapter 5 
demonstrated that pesticide MACs proved difficult and costly in terms of member 
state compliance, analysis of the regulatory process found no evidence that experts 
had deliberately put in place red tape. Rather it was the absence of prior national 
regulatory approaches that resulted in EC regulatory innovation to set out new 
toxicological limits. Since the case studies indicated that consensus on the approach to 
be taken was followed by co-operation on the formulation of EC regulation deemed 
appropriate, there is no indication that unnecessary regulatory complexity was a key 
factor in the need for re-regulation in each instance. Instead, clarification and updating 
of regulatory standards were the main drivers of the re-regulation process. 
 
Chapter 3 went on to suggest that, given the relatively small number of actors 
involved in the EC regulatory process, policy-makers may seek to draw lessons from 
each other instead of expanding the number of ideas and actors involved in the 
process. It also suggested that policy actors may choose the present regulatory 
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proposals by giving them an external source of scientific authority designed to meet 
demands for information about the likely impact and to indicate that new EC 
regulation will be a success. This legitimisation function helps to explain why EC 
regulation may emulate prior national approaches. 
 
As Chapter 3 pointed out, epistemic communities will have their own standards of 
proof for their knowledge. The perceived success of the UK approach to regulation of 
insurance services described in Chapter 4, for instance, was undoubtedly a key factor 
in the emergence of a consensus in favour of emulating the UK approach at EC level 
via the Second and Third Generation Insurance Directives. However, the case study of 
drinking water quality outlined in Chapter 5 demonstrated the limits of external 
sources of scientific authority. In that case study, it will be recalled that efforts to 
achieve re-regulation were underpinned by the toxicological evidence contained in the 
revised WHO Guidelines on Drinking Water Quality, which superseded the earlier 
accepted scientific knowledge that was used as the basis for the original Directive on 
drinking water quality. Despite this linkage between revised WHO toxicological 
guidelines and calls for the revision of EC regulation of drinking water standards, the 
earlier regulatory standards had, as noted above, by that time become embedded in 
public consciousness as a surrogate for zero. 
 
Chapter 3 went on to describe how notions of advocacy coalitions help to explain the 
way that actors in the EC regulatory process learn from one another and from past 
experience. It is through learning that awareness of regulatory policy options comes 
about. However, the literature on advocacy coalitions outlined in Chapter 3 also notes 
that the options considered will be bounded by belief systems and norms, with the 
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effect that policy oriented learning will consider a range of options limited by the core 
values of the group. 
 
Using this theory of advocacy coalitions, in relation to the case study of insurances 
services undertaken in Chapter 4 it is then possible to construct a scenario in which 
consensus on the decision to emulate the UK regulatory approach to liberalising 
financial services was achieved because, considering the limited range of options 
available to them, actors in the EC regulatory process learnt from the UK experience, 
saw that it had been a success and sought to replicate this on a Community-wide 
basis. 
 
In relation to the case study of drinking water quality, the relevance of the advocacy 
coalition explanation of bounded policy oriented learning is less apparent. This is 
perhaps not surprising given the absence of prior national regulation containing the 
toxicological standards that were introduced in EC regulation. It appears from the 
drinking water quality case study, therefore, that regulatory innovation is, by its 
nature, not necessarily driven by policy learning since the likelihood is that no prior 
standards exist that can be learnt from. Nevertheless, in terms of problem definition, 
in the second case study the identification of the problem of pesticide residues in 
drinking water may well have resulted to some extent from learning from past 
experience. 
 
The significance of policy learning as an explanation of why consensus and co-
operation might be drivers for the EC regulatory process therefore appears to have 
been confirmed by the case studies presented in this thesis. The limits of policy 
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learning were, however, also identified in the case study of drinking water quality, 
where proposed re-regulation designed to update toxicological standards contained in 
EC regulation proved impossible to achieve despite the fact that more up to date 
toxicological standards had come to light in the time since the original EC regulatory 
standards had been adopted. 
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CHARACTERISING EC REGULATION: 
EMULATION, INNOVATION AND RE-REGULATION 
 
CONCLUSION: 
INFORMING FUTURE DEBATE 
 
This thesis began by characterising the EC regulation in terms of three levels of ideas, 
namely that: (a) the EC regulatory process is best understood in terms of styles or 
processes of regulation termed emulation, innovation, and re-regulation; (b) that there 
are particular determinants or causes of regulation that are understood as regulatory 
competition, consensus and co-operation; (c) a hypothesis can be derived from the 
review of associated literature that diffusion of ideas and policy learning leading to 
consensus and co-operation are of greater significance than regulatory competition in 
the EC regulatory process. 
 
After examining the body of existing literature that provides explanations for the 
emergence of regulation as the dominant EC policy instrument, the thesis looked at 
the regulatory competition model, exemplified by the work of Héritier. The thesis 
argued that the competition model is, on its own, insufficient to explain why EC 
regulation may, in some instances, emulate prior national regulation but, in other 
cases, take the form of innovative new regulation with no precursor in the national 
regulatory context. By reviewing explanations for the EC regulatory process based on 
competition, diffusion and learning, the thesis was able to suggest that consensus 
leading to co-operation are significant in enhancing our understanding of why 
particular forms of regulation have come to the fore. 
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The thesis then reviewed the various interests, actors and institutions involved in the 
EC regulatory process and suggested how established theories could contribute to this 
debate about the significance of competition, co-operation and consensus. Then, after 
undertaking case study analysis of EC regulation relating to insurance services and 
drinking water quality, the thesis was able to present clear examples of instances 
where emulation and innovation in the EC regulatory process had occurred. 
Furthermore, co-operation and consensus, rather than competition between different 
prior national regulatory approaches, best described what had occurred in these 
specific cases. 
 
Finally, in terms of re-regulation, it was noted that while second round regulatory 
change in the form of regulatory refinement and clarification may subsequently be 
achieved, as in the case of insurance services regulation, if the consensus achieved 
during first round regulation breaks down, achieving co-operation on second round 
regulation may be difficult to achieve, with the prospect that regulatory entrenchment 
rather than regulatory refinement may be the outcome, as happened in the case of 
drinking water regulation. 
 
In this sense, the principal finding of this thesis concurs with Fritz Scharpf’s 
(1999:191) assertion that it is where interests converge that EC regulation is most 
likely to occur. In the light of the arguments presented in this thesis, it is hoped that, 
in the future, co-operation and consensus will be accorded greater significance as 
factors driving the EC regulatory process than has been the case in the past. 
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